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B.S., MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Barbara H. Partee
The vagueness of a vague sentence intuitively consists
in there being both a deficiency in its meaning and a
multiplicity of things which a speaker might mean by it.
One who knows the meaning is attuned both to the deficiency
and to constraints on the possible speaker’s meanings. 1
attempt to provide a theory of speaker’s meaning and of
meaning which does justice to these phenomena.
I analyze a speaker’s meaning as an answer to a “What-
do-you-mean (WDYM) "-question, and analyze the latter using
van Fraassen’s theory of why-questions, according to which
why-questions are entities consisting of several context-
dependent parameters. I argue that speaker’s meaning in the
sense relevant to vagueness is an answer to a WDYM—quest i on
with a distinctive parameter and which meets certain con-
straints. I partially analyze the parameter - a “conceptual
0 —reason" — and identify the constraints. I then elaborate
on the original vagueness phenomena, accounting for the
multiplicity of possible speaker’s meanings in terms of the
v
multiplicity of constrained answers, and identifying a
positive and a comparative notion of content deficiency.
As a preliminary to developing the required theory of
1 ar gue that the truth of a vague sentence is
dependent on speaker’s meaning, and set up a Montagovian
framework which allows for this. I posit a speaker’s
meaning index coordinate and explore some consequences. 1
argue that the expression "in a sense" is an intensional
operator linked to this coordinate, and not to a coordinate
which eliminates indeterminacy, i.e. extension gaps, and
that speaker’s meanings do not in general narrow gaps. In
this way I distinguish vagueness from indeterminacy.
I he identification of the meaning of a vague sentence
with its Montagovian intension proves to be only partly
successful. It does not seem to account for positive or
comparative deficiency of content. But it does seem to
account for a competent speaker’s knowledge of constraints
on possible speaker’s meanings for a sentence.
f ABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
IV
ABSTRACT
v
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
j
CHAPTER 2: THE PRAGMATICS OF SPEAKER’S MEANING
I. Introduction y
II. Explanation in Commonsense Psychology 10
A. Van Fraassen’s Theory 10
B. Commonsense Psychology 17
1. Relevance Relations 17
2. Contrast-Classes 21
3. Evaluation of Answers 29
III- Speaker’s Meanings as Explanations 36
A. The Topic of a WDYM-Quest i on 37
B. WDYM- I nter r oga t i ves 44
C. Examples 40
1- Explaining Saying: Examples 2-3 h8
2. Explaining Saying-That: Example 9 98
3, Explaining Be 1 l e v i ng-Tha t : Examples 5-7 61
9 . Examp le 8 61
a. The Fallibility of Homophonic Interpretation. 68
b. Conceptual E-Reasons 75
c. Answers and Semantic Competence 80
D. Summary 89
V. Gricean Speaker’s Meaning 85
Notes to Chapter 2 91
CHAPTER 3: VAGUENESS AND SPEAKER’S MEANING
I. Introduction 95
II. Occasional Analyticity 96
III. Deficiency and WDYM-Quest i ons 103
IV. Multiplicity and WDYM-Quest l ons 109
A. The Set of Possible Speaker’s Meanings 109
B. Structuring the Possible Speaker’s Meanings 106
1. The Relation W Defined 106
2. Properties of W 107
3. The Structure <S ,W> 112
V. Semantic Competence and WDYM-Quest i ons 113
Notes to Chapter 3 11^
CHAPTER 9: TRUTH AND SPEAKER’S MEANING
I. Introduction l^ to
V 1 1
A. fhe Dependence of Truth on Speaker’s Meaning 116
1. Intuitions
^
2. Natural Kinds 117
3. Speaker’s Meaning and Public Context 119
A. Conclusions 122
Traditional Conceptions of "Vagueness" 12a
C. Vagueness
,
Ambivalence, and Variation 127
II. Speaker’s Meaning and Model-Theoretic Semantics .... 130
A. The Basic Framework 130
1. Syntax 130
2. Semantics 131
3. Informal Remarks 133
B. Treating Indeterminacy 13^
1- The Accommodation of Ambivalence and Variation . 13A
2. The Delineation Coordinate 135
C. Treating Vagueness 139
1. The Speaker’s Meaning Coordinate 139
2. Properties, Abstraction, and Predication 1A3
3. Speaker’s Meaning and Denotation 19A
A. Occasional Analyticity 1A6
5. Denotation at an Empty Index 1A8
a. Introduction 1A8
b. The Attributive Theory of Adjectives 1A9
c. Cluster Concepts 157
6 . “In a Sense" Revisited 162
7. The Comparative Revisited 166
8 . Logical Truth Revisited 17A
D. Vagueness and Indeterminacy 175
E. Conclusion 177
Notes to Chapter A 179
CHAPTER 5: MEANING AND SPEAKER’S MEANING
I. Introduction 185
II. Deficiency and Intension 185
III. Constraints and T i s-Cond i t i ons 197
IV. Conclusion 20A
Notes to Chapter 5 206
APPENDIX: FOCUS AND CONTRAST-CLASS 207
REFERENCES 212
|
v i i i
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1 once saw a segment of 60 Minutes in which Mike
Wallace interviewed a prominent member of the Church of
Scientology. As I recall, part of the interview went
something like this.
Scientologist: Scientology is the only road to total
freedom
.
Wallace: What does that mean?
Scientologist (combatively): Is there some word you
don’t understand?
Wallace: Well, I don’t have the concept.
The evident point of the scientologist’s barb is that "Sci-
entology is the only road to total freedom" is a perfectly
good sentence of English, and hence ought to be comprehensi-
ble to a competent speaker of English such as Wallace. So
Wallace’s professed lack of under st and i ng is dishonest.
Intuitively, the barb doesn’t work. But why not? The
answer, it seems to me, is something like the following.
The sentence "Scientology is the only road to total
freedom" is, true enough, a perfectly good sentence of
English. And, true enough, in virtue of this it must have
some sort of communal and occasion-invariant meaning. So
insofar as anyone who knows the meaning may be said to
"understand" the sentence, Wallace indeed must understand.
But the meaning of a sentence must be distinguished from
1
2what the speaker means by the sentence. The speaker’s
meaning has to do with how the speaker is conceptualizing,
or "using" an expression, on a particular occasion. Unlike
the meaning of a sentence, what the speaker means by a
sentence is neither communal nor occ as 1 on- i nvar 1 ant
. So
one who knows the meaning will not in general know the
speaker’s meaning. So there is nothing unreasonable about
Wallace’s query. For though he "understands" in the sense
of knowing the meaning of the scientologist’s sentence, he
doesn’t "understand" in the sense of knowing what the
scientologist means.
It might be objected that Wallace does not ask what the
scientologist means, but what "that", i.e. the sentence,
means. But note, first, that Wallace could just as easily
have asked "What do you mean by that?", and that this would
be an odd or impossible way of asking for the communal
meaning. More fundamentally, note that the scientologist is
surely right in supposing that the sentence has a communal
meaning, and that Wallace knows perfectly well what it is.
I mag i ne if the conversation had begun:
Scientologist: Scientology deliquesces.
Wallace: What does that mean?
Here Wallace presumably would be asking for the communal
meaning, for he presumably would not know the meaning of one
of the scientologist’s words. This clearly contrasts with
the actual situation. Hence we must say either that Wallace
3is speaking loosely, and incorrectly, or that "the meaning"
a sentence can mean either its communal meaning or what
the speaker means by it; the choice depends on one’s atti-
tude toward ordinary usage. I don’t want to take a stand on
this. Either alternative is consistent with the distinction
between communal meaning and speaker’s meaning, which is the
important thing. But to avoid confusion, I will stipulate
that "the meaning" of a sentence will henceforth mean its
communal meaning (though I will also continue to use "commu-
nal mean i ng " )
.
What makes the distinction between meaning and speak-
er’s meaning crucial is the fact that the sentence "Scien-
tology is the only road to total freedom" is vague. Speci-
fically, the constituents "freedom" and "total freedom" are
vague. We might say that the scientologist’s problem is
that he assumes that Wallace’s question can be reasonably
asked only if the meaning of the sentence isn’t known, where
in fact it can also be reasonably asked if the sentence is
found meaningful but vague.
But what is vagueness? I take it to be a kind of dual
phenomenon. Consider another example, the sentence "John is
conservative", which is vague with respect to "conserva-
tive". Intuitively, there is a kind of deficiency here,
something which makes it difficult to understand just what
is being said about John. But there seems to be a kind of
multiplicity as well, a multiplicity of possible things
u.
being said about John, e.g.:
John tends not to dress in bright colors
John doesnt like to see the traditions of the
fraternity changed
John’s opinions are cautious
John 5 opinions always accord with received views
and forth. We might say that these examples correspond
to possible "senses" of "conservative". Note that multi-
plicity stems from possible senses and possible senses of
senses. For instance, the last example corresponds, not
only to a possible sense of "John is conservative”, but to a
possible sense of the third example.
The tension can be resolved by saying that there is
somehow a deficiency in the communal meaning, and a multi-
plicity of possible speaker’s meanings. Notice how this
distinguishes vagueness from ambiguity. In the case of,
e.g., "John’s at the bank", we would posit several communal
meanings. If we wished to posit different possible speak-
er’s meanings as well, these would evidently have to coin-
cide with the several meanings. In contrast, a vague
sentence has one meaning, and not several but apparently
unlimited possible speaker’s meanings.
Whatever meaning is, the meaning of a vague sentence is
as well. But the meaning of a vague sentence is also in two
ways distinctive, corr espond i ng to the two facets of vague-
ness; I will put the point in terms of the abilities of a
5semantically competent speaker . First, one who knows the
meaning of a vague sentence is attuned to some sort of
deficiency. Second, he is attuned to constraints on poss i
~
ble speaker’s meanings. Mu 1 1 i p 1 i c i tous though these are,
they are clearly subject to constraints; for example, one
not mean by John is conser vat i ve " that John has a big
nose. A competent speaker is able to tell whether or not a
given speaker’s meaning is okay. Note that this does not
entail that a competent speaker explicitly knows all the
possible speaker’s meanings. Nor should it, since enumer-
ating possible speaker’s meanings, unlike enumerating the
several meanings of an ambiguous sentence, involves imagina-
tion as much as it does semantic competence.
These observations are intuitive but programmatic; they
need a theory for support. My goal in this essay is to
develop such a theory.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will try to
develop an account of speaker’s meaning. My strategy here
will be to draw on Bas van Fraassen’s theory of scientific
explanation to analyze questions like Wallace’s; speaker’s
meanings will emerge as answers to such questions. Then I
will proceed to reanalyze the phenomena concerning vague-
ness, specifically deficiency, multiplicity, and semantic
competence. These will be the subjects of Chapters II and
III. I will then take up the task of seriously analyzing
the meaning of a vague sentence by adopting a precise theory
6of meaning, namely that inherent in Montague semantics. In
Chapter IV, I will propose a formal semantic theory which
attempts to capture the intuitive dependence of truth on
5 meaning. In the final chapter I will consider the
extent to which this theory supplies the desired account of
mean i ng
.
Vagueness is not confined to a single syntactic cate-
gory. For example, if "freedom" is vague, evidently so is
"freely" and "free", considered both as a verb and as an
adjective. Nonetheless, in what follows I will confine
attention to certain adjectives. More specifically, I will
confine attention to certain personal dispositional adjec-
tives, e.g. "conservative", "clever", "reckless". This is
mostly for convenience. But it is also because I have an
explanation of sorts of why these adjectives are, or tend to
be, vague. It is simply because they purport to categorize
people psychologically, and people are psychologically
complex. Thoughtful application of one of these words
therefore requires tailoring to the case at hand; to allow
for the possible tailorings, constraints determined by the
communal meaning are loose.
Vagueness, in the sense I have tried to display here,
is surely a very pervasive phenomenon, however , and I don t
mean to suggest otherwise by concentrating on certain
expressions. But illuminating its full extent and vai iety
is not a task for which I am presently prepared.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRAGMATICS OF SPEAKER’S MEANING
I . I ntroduc
t
1 on
Any attempt to explicate the notion of speaker’s
meaning runs into an immediate difficulty, for there is
v ar i ety in the sorts of things that can count as a speaker s
meaning. We can see this by following the lead of William
Alston and considering examples of the different sorts of
things that can be requested with "What—do -you—mean" ques —
4-
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t i ons
.
Example 1. A1 says that it’s going to rain. Bo, who has
been thinking that it’s going to snow, says: "What do you
mean, it’s going to rain?"
Example 2. A1 and Bo are rehearsing a scene that they’ve
rehearsed many times before; after a certain line of Bo’s,
A1 is supposed to say: "Women are all alike." This time Bo
gives his line but A1 says: "Females are very similar". Bo
stops acting and demands: "What do you mean, 'Females are
ver y similar’?"
Example 3. A1 and Bo have been engaged in a serious conver-
sation. Suddenly A1 says: "Bleegh blugh." Bo responds:
"What do you mean, 'Bleegh blugh’?"
Example A. A1 and Bo have been involved in a discussion
about politics. A1 then says that seventy-four' is a large
7
8number. After a stunned silence, Bo asks: "What do you
mean, Seventy-four is a large number’?"
Example 5. Al, a hospital aide, reports that the patient is
patient’s heartbeat and his brainwaves, asks: "What do you
mean, he’s 'fading’?"
Example 6. In response to a question about John’s age, Al
says: "He’s old." Bo, an insurance agent working out a
policy for John, says: "What do you mean, he’s 'old’?"
Example 7. Al says that John is good. Bo presses him:
"What do you mean, he’s 'good’?"
Example 8. Al says that John is reckless. Bo presses him:
"What do you mean, he’s 'reckless’?"
Clearly, what Bo is requesting varies from case to case. In
the first example, he is asking for epistemic reasons, i.e.
reasons, i.e. reasons for deciding on a course of action (in
this case, deviating from the script); in the third, for an
explanation of Al’s apparent nonsense; in the fourth, for an
explanation of Al’s apparent irrelevance; in the fifth, for
a paraphrase in terms of the patient’s heartbeat or brain-
waves; in the sixth, for a specification in terms of years;
in the seventh and eighth, for a specific "sense". These
distinctions are not hard and fast. But if we regard the
speaker’s meaning as what is given in response to a "What-
do-you-mean" question, it is nonetheless clear that differ-
fading. Bo, a doctor who has been monitoring both the
ion for a belief; in the second, for
9ent sorts of things can be speaker’s meanings.
One way to proceed, given my interests, would be to
simply take note of the variety and then immediately focus
attention on cases such as the last. But that isn’t what I
will do. Instead, I will try to shed light on such cases in
part by considering basic similarities they bear to other
sorts of cases. In particular, I will try to account for
the cases I’m most concerned with in terms of a framework
which is suitable for the description of all types of
speaker’s meanings. The motivation for this framework’s
application to the case I’m most concerned with will derive
in large measure from its suitability for other types of
cases. Of course I will want to say something about differ-
ences; but I will do this from within the general framework.
The unifying idea is this. When we specify a speaker’s
meaning, it is in contexts where there is something puzzling
about, or some problem with, a speaker’s utterance. Of
course, this is so in the examples, where actual questions
expressing puzzlement or dissatisfaction are being asked.
But I would want to say that even in contexts where no
question is actually being asked, there is an implicit
question to which the specification of speaker’s meaning may
be regarded as a response. For example, one might say:
"John is good. By that I mean . . . "
.
Here the speaker gives
his meaning in response to an implicit question, which he is
ant i c i pat i ng . He is specifying his meaning in order to
10
dispel any problem he thinks his listener might have with
(presumably) good". My point of view can be summarized
succinctly: a specification of speaker’s meaning is an
answer to a guestion. If this is right* then we can reason-
ably expect to learn a lot about speaker’s meaning by
exploring the nature of the questions which specifications
of speaker’s meanings are supposed to answer. I propose,
then, to undertake a study of What— do ( does ) —you ( he , she )
—
mean questions (henceforth, WDYM-quest i ons )
.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will present a
theory of why-questions recently developed by Bas van
Fraassen. Second, I will discuss in a general way the
theory ’ s application to the domain of commonsense psycholo-
gy. Third, I will try to show that the theory is ideally
suited for an analysis of WDYM-quest i ons by considering my
examples in some detail, especially the last. Finally, I
will discuss the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning, in
order to distinguish it from mine.
I I . Explanation and Commonsense Psychology
A. Van Fraassen’s Theory
The underlying idea of van Fraassen’s theory of expla-
nation is that an explanation is an answer - in particular
,
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an answer to a why-question. So, his theory of explanation
is a theory of why-quest 1 ons
.
A why question is, to begin with, a question, which can
be regarded as an abstract entity "expressed by" an inter-
rogative (a string of symbols). Answer
s
to questions are of
different types, the most basic of which is the direct
answer, i.e. an answer which gives neither more nor less
information than is required. For example, consider the
following answers to the question expressed by "Can you get
to Victoria both by ferry and by plane?"
( a ) Yes
.
(b) You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane.
< c ) You can get to Victoria by ferry.
(d) You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane,
but the ferry ride is not to be missed.
(a) and (b) are direct answers, whereas (c) gives less
information than is required, and (d) gives more.
Why-quest ions are distinguishable from other kinds of
questions by the parameters which constitute the question
expressed by a why- i nter rogat i ve in a given context. There
are three such parameters.
First, there is the topic P of the question. For
example, the topic of the question expressed by "Why is this
conductor warped?" is the proposition that a certain conduc-
tor is warped .
Second, there is the contrast-class . This is a set of
3propositions distinct from P. Consider , for example, "Why
did Adam eat the apple?" This can be construed in various
IE
way s :
( 1 ) Why was it Adam who ate the apple?
(P) Why was it the apple that Adam ate?
(3) Why did Adam eat the apple?
These construa 1 s are distinguishable by their contrast -
classes
. Thus* ( 1 ) asks why it was Adam, rather than
somebody else, who ate the apple. (P) might ask why Adam
ate the apple rather than some other fruit in the garden.
(3) might ask why Adam ate the apple rather than toss it to
Eve. The contr ast - c 1 asses are, respectively, {Somebody else
ate the apple), {Adam ate some other fruit in the garden),
and {Adam tossed the apple to Eve).
The third constituent of a why-question is the
r espec t - i n-wh i ch a reason is requested, which deter-
mines what shall count as a possible explanatory
factor, the relation of explanatory relevance . In the
[conductor] example, the request might be for events
'leading up to’ the warping. That allows as relevant
an account of human error, of switches being closed or
moisture condensing on those sw i tches . . . On the other
hand, the events leading up to the warping might be
well known, in which case the request is likely to be
for the standing conditions that made it possible for
those events to lead to this warping: the presence of a
magnetic field of a certain strength, say. Finally, it
might already be known, or considered immaterial
exactly how the warping is produced, and the question
(possibly based on a misunderstanding) may be about
exactly what function this warping fulfills in the
operation of the power station.
The interests of a questioner in a particular context may
place further constraints on a relevance relation. A
questioner might be interested in a particular sort of, say,
event "leading up to" something, or particular sort of
13
standing condition. Van Fraassen quotes N. R. Hanson:
There are as many causes of x as there are explanations
of x. Consider how the cause of death might have been
set out by a physician as a 'multiple hemorrhage’, by
the barrister as 'negligence on the part of the dri-
ver ’
,
by a carriage builder as ’a defect in the brake-block construction’
, by a civic planner as 'the pre-
sence of tall shrubbery at that turning.
He
as
remarks: "
' the cause
’
In other words, the salient feature picked
in that complex process, is salient to a
out
given person because of his orientation, his interests, and
various other pecul i ar i t i es in the way he approaches or
comes to know the problem - contextual factors." 6 Thus, the
relevance relation of the question to which the specifica-
tion of a cause is an answer may be highly constrained by
interests peculiar to the context.
So a why-question can be regarded as a three-tuple
<P,X,R>, with P the topic, X the contrast-class, and R the
relevance relation. The asking of a why-question is a
pragmatic matter in that these factors, most notably R and
X, are context-dependent.
A direct answer to a why-question is expressed by an
expression of the form:
P in contrast to (the members of) X because A
Such an answer claims that P is true, that the members of X
are false, that A is true, and finally that A is a reason
for P in the contextually-determined relevant sense - that
7
is, the "because" signifies that A bears R to <P,X>. For
examp 1 e
,
14
suppose you ask why I got up at seven o-clock this
morning, and I say 'because I was woken up by the
clatter the milkman made.’ In that case I have inter-preted your question as asking for a sort of reason
that at least includes events- 1 ead i ng-up-to my getting
out of bed, and my word 'because’ indicates that the
milkman’s clatter was that sort of reason.
. .Contrast
this with the case in which I construe your request asbeing specifically for a motive. In that case I would
have answered 'No reason, really. I could easily have
stayed in bed, for I don’t particularly want to do
anything today. But the milkman’s clatter had woken me
up, and I just got up from force of habit I suppose.’
In this case, I do not say 'because’ for the milkman’s
clatter does not belong to the relevant range of
events, as I understand your question.
A "direct answer" can be defined:
B is a direct answer to question Q = <P,X,R> iff there
is some proposition A such that A bears R to <P,X> and
B is the proposition which is true iff <P; and the
members of X are false; and A) is true.
Thus, answering a why—question is also a pragmatic matter,
at least insofar as whether or not something is a direct
answer depends on the same contextual features that deter-
mine the question.
Call A the "core" of answer B. Henceforth I will use
the term "answer" to mean either an answer or an answer-
core; which one will be clear from context.
Some further definitions will prove useful. A why-
question presupposes just that
(a) its topic is true,
(b) the members of the contrast class are false, and
(c) at least one of the propositions that bear its
relevance relation to its topic is true.
These presuppositions are true if and only if there is some
15
true direct answer. A non-direct answer which denies a
presupposition is a correct ive answer.
Van Fraassen describes a further contextual feature as
foil o ws
:
In the context in which the question is posed, there is
a certain body K of accepted background theory and
factual information. This is a factor in the context,
since it depends on who the questioner and audience
are. It is this background which determines whether or
not the question arises: hence a question gay
arise... in one context and not in another.
He then offers the following definition:
question Q arises in context with background K iff K
implies presuppositions (a) and and does not imply
the denial of any presupposition.
Further
, something can now be said about what constitutes a
good answer
. Van Fraassen offers three criteria by which an
answer "Because A" might be judged, of which we need consi-
der only two. "The first concerns the evaluation of A
itself, as acceptable or as likely to be true. The second
concerns the extent to which A favors the topic as against
1 lthe ... members of the contrast class." The first may be
symbolized: Pr(A/K), i.e. the probability of A given K; for
the evaluation of A takes place in a context where K is what
is taken for granted (henceforth I will refer to this as the
"likelihood criterion"). The second, however, cannot be
regarded as a comparison of Pr(P/K8*A) with Pr ( P /K?*A ) ,
Pr(P^/K&cA), etc., where the P^’s are the elements of X, and
P is the topic. One reason is that, if the relevant ques-
tion arises in K at all, then K entails P and the negation
16
of each P. ; so any A would be maximally good by the proposed
criterion. We need to consider a body of theory and infor-
mation K ( Q ) differing from K just in lacking those elements
which entail presuppositions (a) and (b) of Q, i.e. the
presuppositions that P and that not P
, for each P 12 We
1 i
might then try to measure the extent to which A favors P
over the elements of X by comparing Pr < P/K < Q ) &A ) with
Pr ( P^ /K ( Q ) 2*A ) , for each P . However, this won’t quite do
either. The problem is that, even if P is favored over the
elements of X on this comparison, this may not be owing to
A; A may be irrelevant. Consider:
Why didn’t Fred get pregnant?
Because he’s on the pill.
Here
Pr (Fred doesn’t get pregnant/K(Q)8*(Fred is on the
pill)),
where K(Q) is a corpus including facts about human repro-
duction, is considerably higher than
Pr (Fred gets pr egnant /« ( Q ) & ( Fr ed is on the pill)).
Yet we wouldn’t want to say that this is a good answer in
virtue of favoring the topic over the elements of the
contrast-class; for the topic would be equally favored even
if we weren’t assuming the truth of the answer. That is,
Pr (Fred doesn’t get pr egnant /K ( Q )
)
compares just as favorably with Pr (Fred gets pr egnant /K < Q ))
.
This suggests that we can measure favoring by seeing how
17
much A shifts the probability function toward P" - i.e. how
much better P compares with its rivals when A is assumed
than when A is not assumed. This will be a function of how
much the least favorable comparison of P with some P
1
becomes more favorable, and of how much the number of P ’s
i
with which P compares least favorably decreases. When there
is only one P^, as will often be the case in examples
henceforth, we may think of A’s goodness on the favoring
criterion simply as how much better Pr ( P/K ( Q ) 8<A ) compares
with Pr < P /K < Q ) 8*A ) than Pr<P/K<Q>> compares with Pr < P /(Q))
1 i
This completes my summary of van Fraassen’s theory of
why-questions and their answers. It should be noted that
the theory is supported by an extensive critical discussion;
for this the reader is referred to van Fraassen’s book.
B. Commonsense Psychology
Though van Fraassen is primarily concerned to account
for explanations in science, he intends his theory as a
general one. In this section I want to discuss the theory’s
application to everyday explanations of actions and beliefs.
1 . Relevance Relations
In his discussion of the milkman example, van Fraassen
notes two ways one might explain an action: by citing an
event which "leads up to" it, and by citing a "motive".
This list shouldn’t be taken to be (and I’m sure van Fraas-
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sen doesn’t take it to be) exhaustive, or even very clear as
far as it goes; for it's a commonplace that an action can be
explain in a great variety of apparently distinct ways. If
van Fraassen’s general approach is sound, we should expect a
corresponding variety in "senses" of the question "Why did
he do that 7
. As it happens, this way of viewing matters is
not new. J. Q. Urmson once remarked as follows:
Let us consider some questions which may be asked about
an action... we may start with this list, which makes no
claim whatever to completeness:
1. What was the point of his doing that?
2. What was his reason for doing that?
3. What led him to do that?
A. What prompted him to do that?
5. What made him do that?
6. What possessed him to do that?
7. How did he come to do that?
8. How did it come about that he did that?
This list is certainly very i ncomp 1 ete ... These ques-
tions are not perfectly precise, and admit, according
to context, of being answered in more than one way; but
there are fairly typical types of answer for some of
them, and the answers appropriate to some of them would
be quite i nappr opr i ate as answers to others. . . [for
example] let us suppose that Jones, in playing chess,
moves his Queen into a position where it can be taken
by his opponent without return. Someone might ask:
"What made him do that?" If the answer is that he
panicked under pressure of time, then the question was
appropriate, and no one will think of going on to ask
what the point of the move was, or what led Jones to
make it. But if the answer is given "Don’t you see, it
was the only way of escaping mate in two moves", it
would be i nappropr i ate to say, "Oh, so that is what
made him do it"; rather one must say "Oh, so that was
his reason!", or "So that was the point of it". In
saying this one recognizes that the original question
was, in fact, i nappr opr i ate to the situation and might
have been met with the retort " No t h i ng gade him do it,
for he had a very good reason for it".
These remarks echo van Fraassen’s. Concerning a given
action, there are different relevance relations one might be
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interested in, and whether or not a given answer is a direct
answer ("appropriate") depends on what it is. (The retort
is a corrective answer, denying the presupposition that
there s something that made him do it.
)
It s not clear that each of Urmson’s sample questions
corresponds to a distinct relevance relation. And to
account for the possibility of a given question being
"answered in more than one way" (e.g. question 3 by "Vani-
ty
, or by Blind fury", or by "His father’s urging"), one
might want to allow that even some of these "disambiguated"
why—quest i ons are yet ambiguous with respect to relevance
relation (e.g. that question 5 might be asking for a dispo-
sitional trait, or an occurrent mental state, or an outside
influence). Making out a full typology of relevance rela-
tions in this domain - identifying them, and saying how they
are related - would be a considerable theoretical task, one
which I can’t undertake here. Most fundamentally, I think,
it would involve addressing the very complex issue of
whether "reasons" (as in question 2) are "causes" (as,
intuitively, in questions 3-6) - whether "reasoned" actions
(e.g. making a fire to get warm) and "caused" actions (e.g.
knocking over a cup upon hearing a sudden noise) are of a
kind. But however this may be, the relation of "being an
agent’s reason for" is a very important relevance relation,
or kind of relevance relation, especially for my purposes,
and I need to review some basic facts.
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Commonly we give explanations which can be put in the
following form:
x did Y because
<B) x believed that if he did Y, Z would result, and
( D ) x des i red Z
.
That this schema can accommodate a great many everyday
explanations is shown by a number of considerations. First,
the believed and "desired" can be construed generally
enough to subsume a number of different kinds of attitude,
differing in degree. Second, actual explanations consist-
ing simply of an explanans of the form (B) or of the form
(D) (e.g. Because he wants to get warm") can be regarded as
leaving implicit an explanans of the other form ; in prac-
tice it s unnecessary to mention both. Third, Z need not be
a state of affairs distinct from and subsequent to Y, but
may be something attained ijn the performance of Y (e.g. "He
killed her because he wanted revenge", "He raised his arm
because he wanted to signal a left turn"); sometimes an
action can be explained by redescribing it. Fourth, expla-
nations which do not explicitly mention either a belief or a
desire (e.g. "To get warm") - explanations supplying the
"intention" with which something is done (not to be confused
with the intention to do something), or the "purpose",
"goal", or "motive" in doing something - can be subsumed by
the schema via the generalization: typically, if x’s reason
for doing Y was Z (or, to Z) , then x believed that if he did
15
Y, Z would result, and x desired Z.
21
I will say that an explanation which can be schematized
in the above way supplies a "p-reason" - short for "practi-
cal reason", i.e. a reason for doing something. "Being a
p-reason for" is an important and pervasive kind of rele-
vance relation. It is to be distinguished from another
important kind of relevance relation, that of "being an
e rea50n for
,
where "e—reason" is short for "epistemic
reason", i.e. reason for believing something. When one asks
why somebody believes something, what one generally wants is
that somebody’s epistemic reasons ("justification", "evi-
dence", "warrant"); there isn’t the variety in relevance
relations that we find in the case of actions. I take an
e-reason to be, not a belief together with a desire, but
simply a belief, or set of beliefs. So I take it that
x believes that p because
x believes that q^, and
x believes that q^, and ...
x believes that q^
n
is a schema which can accommodate explanations which give an
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e-reason
.
So p-reasons and e-reasons are important kinds of
relevance relations in commonsense psychology. I say
"kinds" because both can be further constrained by the
interests of a questioner in a context, as we will see.
2. Contrast-Classes
Suppose Q = <P,X,R> arises in a context with background
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K. Then there are people in the context who share certain
beliefs from which it follows that P, that the elements of X
are false, and from which it doesn’t follow that there’s no
true proposition bearing R to <P,X>. 17 Still, it may be
that there’s nobody who asks, or is disposed to ask, Q; for
"arising" is not a psychological notion. In this section I
want to consider what constitutes a question’s arising "for"
somebody (as I will say). We already know one requirement:
that the somebody be "interested" in R. Just what that
involves may need further c 1 ar i f i cat 1 on . But here I want to
consider the contrast-class: in what sense need somebody be
"interested" in X? That is, of what psychological signifi-
cance is X when <P,X,R> arises for somebody?
The answer to this question is not simply: if <P,X,R>
arises for q, then q is disposed to utter an interrogative
with a certain "focus", or stress placement. The reason is
that, like R, X can’t in general be read off from an inter-
rogative, even one with a certain focus. Consider, for
example, "Why did Adam eat the app 1
e
?
" . The focus tells us
that the contr ast-c 1 ass consists of elements which vary
according to what Adam eats, but no more; it doesn’t decide
bet weeen
,
e
. g .
{Adam eats a pear},
{Adam eats a pear, Adam eats the snake),
{Adam eats some other fruit in the garden),
and so forth. For this further determination we must appeal
to aspects of the questioner’s psychological state other
than the interrogative he’s disposed to utter.
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For further illustration of th4s point, consider the
case where it is asked why somebody believes something.
Epistemic justification is highly sensitive to variations in
contrast-c lass, as Dretske has pointed out < though not in
these terms )
.
...let us assume that Clyde... robs the grocery store.
Tracy, suspecting that Clyde robbed the store, under-
takes an investigation. Damaging evidence comes to
light and Clyde is arrested. Suppose Tracy is asked to
recite his evidence for thinking that Clyde robbed the
9 °
®
r Y store. It is natural to think of Tracy being
asked this within a setting in which the identity of
the thief is in question. That is, Tracy is being
asked what evidence he has for thinking that
Clyde robbed the grocery store.
In response to such a query Tracy, naturally enough,
cites such facts as that Clyde was seen loitering
around the store at 3:00 A.M., Clyde’s fingerprints
were found on the cash register, and so on. What is
important to notice is that none of these facts consti-
tute evidence for supposing that
Clyde robbed the grocery store.
If we want evidence for [the latter] the best I can
think to offer is the fact that all the money was gone
from the cash register when the owner returned in the
morning. That, surely, is evidence that Clyde robbed
the place; he did not just sleep overni^gt in the store
with his arms around the cash register.
Dretske is pointing out that "Why does Tracy believe that
Clyde robbed the grocery store?" can express different
questions, demanding different answers, depending on stress
placement in the " that " -c 1 ause . This is so, but doesn’t
quite get to the heart of the matter, for even a focussed
l nterr ogat i ve doesn’t determine a contr ast -c 1 ass . Just as
<Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the grocery store,
Tracy believes that Clyde slept in the grocery store
with his arms around the cash register, e-reason>
demands a different answer than
<-Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the grocery store,Tracy believes that somebody else robbed the grocery
store, e-reason>,
so too does the latter demand a different answer than
<.Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the grocery store,
Tracy believes that Alex robbed the grocery store,
e-reason)
,
though the same focussed i nterrogat i ve may express these
last two questions. (When the contrast-class has a single
element, as will often be the case henceforth, I will omit
the set-brackets.) For example, that Alex was in Hawaii at
the time might be a (good) answer to the latter question,
but not to the former. The under determ i nat i on of contrast-
class by focus should, anyway, have been clear from Dret-
ske’s suspiciously arbitrary choice of {Clyde slept in the
store with his arms around the cash register} for the
contrast class of the question expressed by "Why does Tracy
believe that Clyde robbed the grocery store?". He certainly
didn’t get this just from the focus.
The under determ i nat i on of X by an interrogative is
dramatic in cases where there is no focus, and not even a
hint as to what X is. For example, suppose q sees Sue walk
along the street, stop suddenly, and then walk back the
other way. Presumably q’s i nter rogat i ve would not be, say,
"Why did Sue wa 1
k
back the other way?", as if the contrast-
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class were something like (Sue skips back the other way}.
Rather, it would presumably be “Why did Sue walk back the
other way?", without focus, expressing a question with the
contrast-class {Sue continues to walk in the same direc-
tion}. What q presumably wants is an explanation of why Sue
turned around rather than continued.
This example suggests one sort of way that a questioner
q might be interested in X. X contains a single event which
q expects to happen; when P happens instead, q is sur-
prised
,
and <P,X,R> arises for him. A general case can be
conveniently described if we assume that we may speak of the
set of beliefs K
^
of an agent (at a time), and of a "person-
al probability" function Pr of an agent (at a time), Pr (p)
q q
being the agent’s degree of belief in proposition p (at a
time); the function is relativized to K in the sense that
Pr (p) - Pr (p/K ), for any p. Given these assumptions, we
q q q
can describe the case as follows. At time t^, q has person-
al probabilities as follows:
Pr
q
( P/X ) = Pr
q
( X/P ) = 0
Pr
q
( X ) = 1 , or i s c 1 ose to 1
Pr ( P ) = 0 , or i s c 1 ose to 0
(I adopt the expedient of using "X" to refer to the element
of X, when X has just one member.) Thus, at t q deems X
and P incompatible, has a very high degree of belief in X,
and a very low degree of belief in P. (Note it is not
assumed that Pr (P) = 1 - Pr (X), since it isn’t assumed
q q
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that P and X are collectively exhaustive.) At some later
time t
x
, q comes to fully believe P <i.e. the proposition
that P is added to q’s "corpus" ) . Then his degree of
belief in X is "conditional ized"
,
i.e. changes to the value
of Pr
^
( X / P ) at t Q , i.e. 0.
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At this point <P,X,R> arises
for q. Note that this general account doesn’t require that
P and X occur at a time later than t^ (by "occur", I of
course don’t mean "actually occur"); q needn’t "expect X in
the sense of anticipating its future occurrence. For
example, at t Q q might be sure that Eve ate the apple, and
then at t^ ask why it was Adam rather than Eve, having just
been told by someone he trusts that it was Adam. I will
call a question which arises for someone in the way de-
scribed here an "urgent" question.
Now consider another example. Bob is at the pet store
shopping for a kitten, and chooses one from among the three
on display. His companion Joe asks him why he chose the one
he did, not because he is surprised at the choice - to Joe
all the kittens seemed the same - but simply because he is
curious how Bob chose from among the three. We can describe
a general case a follows. At time t^, q has personal
probabilities as follows:
Pr (P/P.) = Pr (P./P) = 0, for each P in X
q 1 q 1 l
Pr (P./P ) = 0, for i = j
q i J
Pr (P) = Pr (P.), for each P.
q q l l
Thus, at t q deems P and the PVs pairwise incompatible,
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and has an equal degree of belief in P and each P
. (Note
1
again it is not assumed that P and the elements of the
contrast-class are collectively exhaustive.) At a later
time t r Pr (P) becomes 1, and for each P., Pr <P.) assumes
^ l q i
the value of Pr
q
(P.) at t Q , i.e. 0. <P,X,R>, for some
R> then arises for q. Again note it is not required that P
and the P^s occur at a time later than t Q . Note also that
since at t Q the pr obab i 1 i t i es of the (incompatible) members
of the contr ast-c 1 ass aren’t required to be high, X needn’t
have just one member
, as in the previous case (though it
may). I will call a question which arises for somebody in
the way just described a "non-urgent" question. It should
be kept in mind that whether a question is urgent or non-ur-
gent has to do with its psychological etiology, and not just
with its intrinsic features (i.e. its topic, contrast— c 1 ass
,
and relevance relation).
It should be noted that for a topic to be deemed
incompatible with a member of the contrast-class, it is
sufficient but not necessary that they be deemed logically
incompatible. If, for example, the topic is
A1 believes that the water is cold
and the contr ast-c 1 ass member is
A1 believes that the water is not cold,
then my apprehension of incompatibility stems from my
assumption that you don’t have inconsistent beliefs.
I emphasize that I haven’t tried to provide logically
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necessary or sufficient conditions for a why-quest i on ’
s
arising for somebody. It’s clear, for example, that one
could have personal probabilities as in the second sort of
case without ending up being disposed to ask anything; e.g.
Joe may simply not be very curious about Bob’s decision. I
have a much harder time imagining someone having personal
probabilities as described in the first sort of case without
ending up being disposed to ask a question (which is why the
term "urgent" seems apt). Still there is no logical connec-
tion between having the pr obab i
1
1 t i es described and coming
to feel puzzled, but at most a psychological one. Note also
that my terms "urgent" and "non-urgent" may be misleading,
inasmuch as they suggest exhaustion of the possibilities.
But I take myself to have described the two basic cases:
antecedent expectation of the contr ast—c 1 ass over the topic,
and antecedent indifference.
A final note on contrast-classes. I assume that in
some cases the contr ast-c 1 ass consists simply of the nega-
tion of the topic. For example, if I ask "UJhy is Joe
standing on his head in the road?" because, naturally
enough, I find Joe’s action inherently bizarre, then the
contr ast-c 1 ass appears to be simply (Joe doesn’t stand on
his head in the middle of the road); in fact I take that to
capture the force of "inherently". In this case P and X are
collectively exhaustive. Also, van Fraassen’s favoring
criterion for the goodness of an answer A reduces to a
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simple comparison of Pr(P/K(Q)) with Pr ( P/K < Q ) &.A ) . Note,
finally, that inherently bizarre actions give rise to urgent
questions; the occurrence of the topic is cause for sur-
prise. It may seem problematic in this case to regard the
questioner as having "expected" the contrast-class, but the
problem is resolved is we suppose that one’s beliefs needn’t
be accompanied by conscious feeling.
^
3 • Evaluation of Answers
In this section I want to show that van Fraassen’s
likelihood and favoring criteria are ones which we in fact
commonly use to assess the goodness of explanations in
commonsense psychology. At least, this is so if the corpus
K and the probability function Pr are appr opr i a te 1 y under-
stood; I discuss these in turn.
K must be understood to include general "real-world" or
"commonsense" knowledge, knowledge about the world had by
any normal adult. Such knowledge includes, for example, the
knowledge that most birds fly, that nobody likes to have a
headache, that clean water is good to drink, that people
need friends, and that most people are rational and have
commonsense knowledge. Of course, K may also include
contextual information which, though no part of commonsense,
is nonetheless well-established, e.g. that John has just
sneezed, or that Nary doesn’t like strawberries (but for
simplicity I will leave such information out of account in
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the examples to follow). Note that there is nothing special
about the questioner’s corpus K
q
; depending on how acute q
is K
q
may or may not coincide with the corpus K relevant to
the "objective" evaluation of answers to q’s question.
The probability function Pr should reflect the reason-
ing of normal adults, as far as this is possible. For
example, Pr ( The sun will rise tomorrow) (=Pr(The sun will
rise tomorrow/K)) should be close to 1. Of course this is
quite vague, as was the specification of K, but no more
characterization is necessary for the purposes 1
have in mind. Note again that the questioner’s perspective
is not privileged; Pr(p) is not necessarily equal to Pr (p)
Q
(even if it so happens that K equals K ) . We need not even
q
construe Pr ( p ) "subjectively", i.e. as a degree of belief.
I haven’t the need or the time to argue for a particular
interpretation of probability statements.
Now let’s consider some explanations of why somebody
did something in which what is wanted is a p—reason.
Consider the questions
01: <Joe stands on his head in the middle of the road,
Joe doesn’t do this, p-reason>, and
Q2 : <Sue goes to the store, Sue stays home, p-reason>.
Now consider the possible (abbreviated) answers:
A 1 : To win a bet.
A2 : So he can see oncoming traffic upside down.
A3: To get some exercise.
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A4: To get a million dollars.
Intuitively, A1 and A3 are pretty good answers to Q1 and Q2
,
respectively, while A3 and AA are pretty bad answers to Q1
and 03, respectively. These intuitions assume only common-
sense knowledge and that Joe and Sue are normal, i.e. reason
normally and have commonsense knowledge, and no special
information such as that Joe is a lunatic or the Sue has a
very rich uncle at the store. In accounting for them it is
thus appropriate for this to be reflected in K.
Consider first the likelihood criterion. Recalling
that a p-reason has a belief component and a desire compo-
nent, we have that the probability of an answer A supplying
a p-reason is
Pr < B&D/K
)
= Pr(B/K) x Pr ( D/ B&K
)
= Pr ( D&B /K
)
= Pr ( D/K ) x Pr < B/D&.K ) ,
where B and D are the belief and desire components, respect-
ively. Thus the likelihood of A is directly proportional
bothto Pr(B/K) and to Pr(D/K), a fact to which I will be
3 1appealing in assessing likelihood.
Turning to the examples, A1 may be cast in the explicit
form of a direct answer to Ql, as follows:
Joe stands on his head in the middle of the road rather
than not doing so because (Dl) he wants to win a bet,
and (Bl) he believes he can do this if he stands on his
head in the middle of the road.
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(The ‘Tather than" clause is not really necessary when the
contrast-class is trivial, i.e. consists simply of the
negation of the topic.) B1 is likely enough given common-
sense knowledge; it’s a crazy thing, to do, it wouldn’t be
unusual to bet on somebody doing something crazy, etc. Dl
is also likely given commonsense knowledge; winning a bet
usually means material gain, people generally want material
gain, etc. Hence A1 fares pretty well on the likelihood
criterion. Similar remarks apply to A3. However, A2 and AA
presumably don t do so well. The be 1 i ef — c omponent of A2 is
likely enough — it is likely that Joe believes he will see
oncoming traffic upside down if he stands on his head in the
middle of the street - but the desire component is not. AA
,
on the other hand, has a likely desire-component but an
unlikely be 1 1 ef -component
.
So the intuitive quality of Al-AA is accounted for by
how good they are on the likelihood criteiron. What about
the favoring criterion? It turns out that explanations
supplying p-reasons are almost always good on the favoring
criterion. The basic idea is that, given that somebody
wants Z and thinks he can get Z by doing Y, the probability
that he will do Y will almost always go up. More precisely:
Pr (
x
does Y/K < Q ) )
will usually compare less favorably with
Pr ( P. /K ( Q )
)
than
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Pr(x does Y/K(Q)8*(x desires Z
,
does Y
, Z will result))
does with
and believes that if he
Pr <P. /K<Q)g»< x desires Z, and believes that if he does
Y
, Z w i 1 r esu It)),
for any P^ (keeping in mind that any P
^
is incompatible with
P, i.e. with x’s doing Y). 22 This is so regardless of how
the p-reason does on the likelihood criterion. Consider AA
,
for example, which isn’t good on the likelihood criterion.
Since K(Q) doesn t contain any special relevant information
about Sue
,
Pr (Sue goes to the store/K(Q))
will be comparable to
Pr ( Sue stays home/K(Q) )
.
However
,
Pr ( Sue goes to the store/K ( Q ) &< ( Sue wants to get a
million dollars, and believes she can by going to the
store
)
compares very favorably with
Pr ( Sue stays home/K ( Q ) & ( Sue wants to get a million
dollars, and believes she can by going to the store)).
So AA is good on the favoring criterion.
Note that the evaluation of an answer by either cri-
terion depends crucially on the assumption that Joe and Sue
are normal. Given that K contains these assumptions, the
likelihood of answers amounts to the likelihood of a normal
person having the beliefs and desires in question. And
given that K(Q) contains these assumptions, the extent to
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which an answer favors an action over another action (or
actions) depends on how much more likely it is that a normal
person would perform the action once the information that
the person believes the action will get him something he
wants is added to K(Q).
Let s now turn our attention to e-reasons. Consider
Q3: <Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the store,
Tracy believes that Alex robbed the store,
e-reason>
and
Q4 : <Bob believes that the plumber did it,
^ Bob believes that the gar dner did it, Bob believes
that the maid did it}, e—reason}
.
Consider the possible (abbreviated) answers
A5 : Because he thinks the fingerprints on the cash
register are Clyde’s.
A6 : Because he thinks he was told so by a unicorn.
AT : Becuase he thinks only the plumber could have known
where the gun was hidden.
A8 : Because he thinks the sky is blue.
Intuitively, A5 and A7 are pretty good answers to Q3 and Q4
respectively, while A6 and A8 are pretty bad answers to Q3
and A4 respectively. Note again that these intuitions
assume only commonsense knowledge and that Tracy and Bob are
normal, so that it will be appropriate to include only such
information in K and K(Q).
The likelihood of an answer amounts to the likelihood
of a normal person having the belief in question. So, A8 is
likely, A5 and A7 not unlikely, and A6 unlikely.
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Now consider the favoring criterion, beginning with A5
.
(I will dispense with the formality of putting it in the
explicit form for a direct answer). Consider
Pr
(
Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the store/K(Q)
)
and
Pr (Tracy believes that Alex robbed the store/K(Q) )
.
These are comparable. Now consider
Pr ( Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the
store/K(Q)&,Tracy believes that the fingerprints.
. .etc, )
and
Pr ( Tracy believes that Alex robbed the
store/K(Q)8«(Tracy believes that the
fingerprints.
. .etc. ) ) .
Presumably now the first is higher; hence A5 is a good
answer on the favoring criterion. It can be seen that
unlike answers which give p—reasons, answers which give
e-reasons do not automat i ca 1 1 y satisfy the favoring criteri-
on. Favoring has to do with how the addition of a certain
belief would effect the believer’s reasoning; again, an
assumption in K(Q) that the believer is normal has great
ef fec t .
It can be easily be shown that A6 and A7 are also good
on the favoring criterion; A8
,
however, is not. So we have
that both A5 and A7 are reasonably likely, and favor the
topic over the contrast-class; A6 favors, but isn’t likely;
A8 is likely, but doesn’t favor. This account for intui-
t i ons
.
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To summarize. We’ve seen that with the right assump-
tions about the background corpus and the probability
function, van Fraassen’s likelihood criterion can account
for intuitively good answers to questions requesting a
p-reason (in which the topic is an action), while both the
likelihood and favoring criterion can account for intuitive-
ly good answers to questions requesting an e-reason (in
which the topic is a belief). In the case of a p-reason,
the favoring criterion is almost always satisfied. In the
case of an e-reason, it corresponds to the extent to which
the ( content—c 1 ause of) the answer
-be 1 i ef confirms the
(content-clause of) the topic-belief. In both cases the
result depends on K(Q)’s containing the assumption that the
agent in question is normal.
Other criteria to be used in the evaluation of an
answer might well be introduced: let me mention one which
will useful. Presently nothing rules out a reiteration of
the topic as a bad answer ; in fact such an answer will be
maximally good on the favoring criterion. And so we might
introduce a non-circularity requirement, which as a first
app r o x i ma t i o n might be rendered as a simple requirement of
non-identity between topic and answer.
III. Speaker’s Meanings as Explanations
In the previous chapter I introduced van Fraassen’s
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analysis of why-questions, and then showed how it applies to
why-questions asked in the context of commonsense psycholo-
gy. In the present section I will show how the analysis
applies to WDYM-questionS) i.e. questions expressed by
WDYM-interrogatives. The picture that will emerge is that
of a WDYM-quest ion as a species of why-question asked in the
context of commonsense psychology. A specification of
speaker ’ s meaning will accordingly be understood as an
answer to a WDYM-quest i on . This will be my way of account-
ing for what I take to be a pr e theor e t i c a 1 fact, namely,
that specifications of speaker’s meaning are explanations.
A. The Topic of a WDYM—Quest i on
Why do I say that WDYM-questions are asked in the
context of commonsense psychology? Because the topic of a
WDYM-quest i on is always an action or belief, described in
everyday fashion, and the relevance relation is always a
p-reason or e-reason of some sort. To state this more
fully, I need to make some assumptions about the perception
of speech
.
I assume that when one apprehends the utterance of a
declarative sentence, one normally enters in a process of
be 1 i ef-format i on that has at least the following stages.
First, there is the belief that a string with certain
formal properties has been uttered. I will represent this
belief with a "direct-discourse" locution, e.g.
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A1 says "It is going to rain".
The quotes here indicate that the enclosed expression is
being mentioned, not used; no semantic properties are
attributed to Al’s utterance. This is going to vary from
case to case. In the case where the listener recognizes the
utterance as well-formed, I will suppose that the belief
that A1 says "It is going to rain" is the belief that the
utterance belongs to a sentence- type determined by a certain
structural description. In the case where the listner does
not recognize the utterance as well-formed, the belief may
simply be that the utterance instantiates an unstructured
string of lexical items, as e.g. in
A1 says "It going is rain",
or an unstructured string of phones, e.g.
A 1 says "Itzo ranh"
.
I am not here making any claims about the semantics of
direct discourse reports, only announcing how I will be
construing them. Not much is at stake, since I could always
devise alternative means for specifying the beliefs I’m
interested in.
Second, there is the belief that the uttered string has
a certain meaning. I will represent this belief with an
indirect discourse locution, e.g.
A1 says that it is going to rain.
This stage must be preceded (or accompanied) by a recogni-
tion of the string as well-formed. In typical cases -
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" homophon l c interpretation' 1 - one supposes that the expres-
sion has a certain communal meaning, and that the utterer is
using it with that meaning. In such cases the indirect
discourse report can be gotten from the direct simply by
removing the quotation marks (provided the quoted expression
contains no indexical expressions such as "I" or "you").
More will be said about homophonic interpretation in due
course. Note that both sayings and sayings-that are acts,
i.e. things that people do.
I will suppose that if the uttered string is a well-
formed sentence of a natural language, then there are
community-wide and t i me- i nvar i ant "semantic rules" in virtue
of which the sentence has the meaning it does. And I will
5Pea ^ i n t e r c h ang eab 1 y of a person’s "semantic competence",
knowledge of semantic rules", and "knowledge of meaning".
Third, there is the belief, stemming from the assump-
tion that the utterer is sincere and has not misspoken, that
the utterer believes what he is saying, e.g. that
A1 believes that it is going to rain.
This stage must be preceded by a recognition of an utter-
ance’s well-formedness, and by an i nterpretat i on (not
necessarily homophonic). Of course this is not an attribu-
tion of an act to the utterer, but of a belief.
Note that the two principles which I take listeners to
use
, i.e.
if x utters "p", and x shares our language, "p"
40
contains no indexicals,
. .., then x says that p,
and
If x says that p, and x is sincere, hasn’t misspoken,
• • •
’
then x believes that p,
jointly entail what has been called the "disquotational
principle", which has the form:
DP: If x utters "p"
, and (1) x shares our language, "p"
contains no indexicals,..., and (2) x is sincere,hasn’t misspoken,
..., then x believes that p.
Thus DP may be thought of as having an "interpretation"
component and a "belief" component; its caveats divide
accordingly, as I’ve indicated. (I leave the caveats
open-ended to allow for the possibility that I’ve left out a
few . )
I don t claim that the stages of speech perception 1 ’ ve
24d&scribed are exhaustive. But I’ve said enough to enable
me to clarify the remarks made at the outset. The reason I
say that WDYM-quest l ons are questions asked in the context
of commonsense psychology is that the topic of a WDYM-ques-
tion is always an act or belief attribution. Now, this
might create the impression that a WDYM-quest i on is simply a
why-question with an appropriate topic. In an important
sense this must be so, because I am claiming that the same
analysis applies to both; the question expressed by a
WDYM- i nter rogat i ve must in every case be expressible also by
a why- i nter rogat i ve of some sort. However, there is a
difference having to do with psychological etiology: a
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question expressed by a WDYM-interrogative arises for
someone during the process of speech perception, whereas an
identical question expressed by a why-mterrogative need
no t .
lo illustrate, consider the first of the examples
presented at the outset of this chpater
. Bo's question is:
Ql: <A1 believes that it is going to rain,
A1 believes that it is going to snow, e-reason>.
This is an urgent question; Bo is surprised because he
himself believes it s going to snow, and supposed that A1
believes this too, and not that it’s going to rain. At the
time of the utterance Bo comes to believe three things in
the process of perceiving the utterance, namely:
A1 says "It is going to rain",
A1 says that it is going to rain,
and
A 1 believes that it is going to rain.
In virtue of the latter
, Bo’s previous expectations are
upset, and the question arises for him; he wants Al’s
evidence for thinking it’s going to rain, as opposed to
snow
.
n the present analysis of the question expressed by
Bo’s i nterrogat i ve
,
the same question might have been
expressed by a why- i nterrogat i ve
,
i.e. "Why do you think
it’s going to rain?", if Bo’s interests are kept constant.
And I would maintain that this is always the case: whenever
We h3VG a que5tlon expressed by a WDYM- i nter r ogat i ve
, the
same question can be expressed by a why- i nter r ogat i ve . Yet
there is still something distinctive about WDYM- i nter r o-
gatives, as can be seem be reflecting upon the possible
answer from Al: "I didn’t say that it was going to rain."
This is not a corrective answer, as that notion has been
defined; it doesn’t deny any presupposition of the question
expressed, e.g. that Al believes that it is going to rain.
Yet it still seems to be corrective in some way. It ap-
P ear5 ’ e.g., that Bo could not reasonably respond: "Yes,
perhaps not, but answer my question: What do you mean, it’s
going to rain 7 ". That is, Bo couldn’t acknowledge the
answer without giving up his question. Suppose, on the
other hand, that Bo had uttered a why— i nter r ogat i ve express-
ing the very same question. Then not only would the answer
not be corrective in the strict sense, but it would not
corrective in any sense. Bo could reasonably respond:
"Yes, perhaps not, but answer my question: Why do you think
it’s going to rain?" (perhaps with an answer on "think").
Bo can reasonably acknowledge the answer without giving up
his question - especially if Bo came to believe that Al
expects ram not from having being told by Al, but from some
other source.
I choose to account for this difference by distin-
guishing, following Stalnaker, between pragmatic and seman-
tic presuppositions. The semantic presuppositions of an
<3
interrogative on an occasion may be taken to be what we have
been calling simply the '•presuppositions" of the guestion
expressed by the interrogative on that occasion. Hence the
semantic presuppositions of Bo’s WDYM-interrogative are
identical to those of a why- i nter r oga t i ve uttered in similar
circumstances, since the questions expressed are the same.
Whereas semantic presupposition is a relation between
linguistic entities, a pragmatic presupposition is a propo-
sitional attitude on the part of an utterer; very roughly,
it is a belief without which one can’t "felicitously" utter
the interrogative. The pragmatic presuppositions on the
part of the utterer of a WDYM-interrogative on a given
occasion include the semantic presuppositions of the ques-
tion, in that the utterer believes these semantic presup-
positions. So, for example, Bo believes that the topic of
his question is true, i.e. that A1 believes that it is going
to rain. But in addition, the pragmatic presuppositions of
an utterer of a WDYM- i nter r ogat i ve on an occasion include
those of his beliefs formed prior, in the process of speech
perception, to that belief which is represented by the
topic. So, for example, Bo presupposes not only that A1
believes that it’s going to rain, but also that A1 says
(said) "It’s going to rain" and that A1 says (said) that
it’s going to rain. But Bo does not presuppose these things
in the case where he utters a corresponding why-interro-
gative (though he may, of course, believe them); in the case
/
cf why-interrogatives the pragmatic presuppos i t i one are Just
the semantic pr suppos , t i ons
, construed as beliefs. Hence
the apparently corrective nature of "1 didn't say it was
going to rain" as an answer to the question expresed by the
WDYM- interrogative hut not as an answer to the question
expressed by the why- i nter r ogat i ve
. In the case of the
UIDYM
- interrogative but not the why- a nterr ogat i ve
, the answer
denies a pragmatic presupposition. 25
f ° Sum up • 1 claim that WDYM-quest ions
, i.e. questions
expressed by a WDYM- i nter r oga t i ve
,
are why-questions with a
topic which represents a belief formed at some stage of the
questioner’s perception of an utterance. The user of a
WDYM-interrogat ive has pragmatic presuppositions correspond-
ing to beliefs formed at prior stages (in addition to those
cor respond i ng to presuppositions of the question expressed).
B. WDYM-interrogat ives
We’ve seen that the relevance relation and contrast-
of a why—question can’t be read off from an interro-
gative. The topic, however, more or less can be. But if
what I have been saying about WDYM-quest i ons is right, then
WDYM-interrogat ives are opaque not only with respect to
relevance relation and contrast-class, but also with respect
to topic. In this section I will say something about the
relations between topics and forms of interrogative.
The following is a list of the various surface forms
that a WDYM-interrogat i ve might take:
( 1 ) What do you mean?
(2) What do you mean by that?
(3) What do you mean, p?
<e.g. What do you mean, it’s going to ram?)
(
)
What do you mean, "p"?
(5)
(e.g. What do you mean, "Bleegh blugh"?,
or: What do you mean, "Seventy-four is a larqe
number " ?
)
p 7 What do you mean?
(6) What do you mean by "p"?
(e.g. What do you mean by "Bleegh blugh"?,
or: What do you mean by "Seventy-four is a larqe
number " ?
)
(7) "P"? What do you mean by that?
( 8 ) What do you mean,
. . ."w"...?
(e.g. What do you mean, John is "old"?)
(9) ... "w" . . . ? What do you mean?
( 10 ) . .."w"...? What do you mean by that?
(11) What do you mean, "w"?
(e.g. What do you mean, "old"?)
(12) "w" 7 What do you mean?
(13) What do you mean by "w"?
(e.g. What do you mean by "old"?)
( 19 ) "w"? What do you mean by that?
I take (3), (<4), and (8) as primitive forms, (1) and (2) as
elliptical for any of these, (5), (6), and (7) as elliptical
for ( 9 ) , and (9) through (19) as elliptical for (8). Thus,
I take a basic form of a WDYM-interrogat i ve to consist of
"what do you mean" followed by a sentential clause, where
this clause may be unquoted, quoted, or partially quoted-
h6
Consider now the following forms for answers:
(
9
> I mean that
. . .
<10) By that I mean that ...
(11) By "p" I mean that
. .
.
( IB) By "w" I mean
. .
.
Evidently (10)-(1B) correspond to the non-basic forms (B),
(5), and (8). (9) is all-purpose; in particular it is
appropriate for answers to i nter r ogat i ves in any of the
basic f or ms
.
My tentative conclusions concerning the topics of
questions expressible by the three basic interrogative-forms
are these: an interrogative of the form (3) expresses a
question with a be 1 i ev i ng- that as topic, one of the form (9)
may express a question with either a saying or a saying-that
as topic, and one of the form (6) may express a question
with either a saying-that or be 1 i e
v
i ng- tha t as topic. The
WDYM- interrogative thus serves as a partial indicator of the
stage of speech perception at which the question arises for
the questioner. (This need not be identical with the stage
to which the questioner has progressed; more on this later.)
An apparent difficulty immediately arises. Forms (9)
and (6) contain quotation marks; yet I say that they may
express questions with topics in which no quotation marks
appear ( say l ngs- that or bel ievings-that ) . How can this be 7
That is, how can it be that the WDYM- i nter rogat i ve is quoted
or partially quoted when the question expressed by the
A7
interrogative may arise for the questioner at the interpre-
tation stage or later? If the question arises for the
questioner after the utterance has been interpreted,
wouldn’t that be reflected in his WDYM-interrogative by an
absence of quotation marks? This would be a genuine diffi-
culty if quotation marks always functioned so as to enable
mere mention of an expression, i.e. always merely trans-
formed an expression into a name of that expression. But
they don’t always function this way. Consider:
According to the T i mes
, Andropov "had a headache".
Here the quoted expression is mentioned, since the intent is
to attribute (a tokening of) the expression itself to the
1. 1. mes • But it is also being used; otherwise the sentence
would not be grammatical and hence would not make sense
either, as intuitively it does. The quotes in a WDYM-in-
terrogative are sometimes like this. Sometimes the quoted
expression is partly mentioned, attributed to the utterer
because it is found problematic in some way, and partly used
with a certain i nter pretat i on . Hence from the fact that
quotes appear in a WDYM-interrogative it doesn’t follow that
the question expressed arises for the questioner at a
pre- i nterpretat i on stage, i.e. that the topic of the ques-
tion is given by a say i ng— 1 ocut i on (in which the quotes are
purely mention-quotes). The converse, however, is true: if
the topic of the question is a saying, then quotes must
appear . In that case the quotes are purely mention-quotes.
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C. Examples
ro support and illustrate the general remarks made so
far, I turn now to a const derat i on of the examples presented
at the beg i nni ng of this chapter. My aim is not a complete
account of UDYM-quest i ons ; the various issues will not be
equally explored, some not at all, and until the last
example no issue will be explored at very great length. For
example, I will throughout be considering only questions
which arise in response to the utterance of a sentence m
the indicative mood. My excuse, to repeat, is that I’m
aiming for an analysis of vagueness. I need say just enough
about WDYM-questlons generally to make the general framework
clear and plausible, in preparation for its application to a
particular sort of case. (More about the general framework
may be found in the appendix.
)
* • Expla ining Saying: Examples 2 and 3
In example 2, Bo’s guestion is:
Q2 : <A1 says "Females are very similar",
A1 says "Women are all alike", p-reason>
This is an urgent guestion, in the sense earlier defined.
Bo had expected A1 to say "Women are all alike", and not
"Females are very similar"; Al’s utterance thus comes as a
surprise, and the guestion arises for him.
I recently noted that if guotes appear in a WDYM-in-
terrogative, it doesn’t follow that the topic of the ex-
pressed question is a saying, for the quotes may not be
<f9
purely ment i on-quo tes
. I did not say it didn't folio, that
the stage of speech perception to which the questioner has
progressed is represented by a saying-locution. That would
be a distinct claim, for the stage at which a question
arises for the questioner, represented by the topic of the
question, is not always identical to the stage to which the
questioner has progressed. This is demonstrated by the
present example, for whereas the topic is a saying, Bo has
no doubt interpreted Al’s utterance. Owing to the atypical
play-acting context, Bo expected the utterance of a specific
string, so that the utterance of even an 1 nter pr et i ve 1
y
similar string is cause for surprise; Bo’s 1 nter pr et a
1
1 on is
no part of the psycho 1 og i ca 1 etiology of Bo’s question. (We
can thus see that the above-mentioned distinct claim is
true. That is, if quotes appear in a WDYM-i nterrogat l ve it
doesn’t follow that the questioner is at a pre-interpreta-
1 1 °n stage of speech perception; even if the quotes are
Purely ment i on—quo tes
,
the questioner may have interpreted
the utterance.)
I turn now to the consideration of possible answers to
Q2 . A direct answer has the usual form of a direct answer
to a why-question:
P in contrast to (the members of) X because ...
,
where
is a proposition bearing R to <P,X>
In this case we have:
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(savino)
are VerY slmilar " m contrast toy g Women are aU aUke .. because
...
, where
... is a proposition giving a p-reason for A’s savinoFemales are very similar” rather than ”Women are all
So, for example, the answer:
A1 wanted to try something new
(expressed, e.g., by a response of "I wanted to try some-
thing new" from Al) can be understood as a direct answer m
abbreviated form, filling in the above blank with:
Al wanted to try something new, and believed that hecould do this by saying "Females are very similar".
Since what is wanted is a p-reason, direct answers will
almost always be good on van Fraassen’s second criterion
(but see note 22). But the likelihood criterion accounts
for the intuitive worth of many possible answers. The above
answer is intuitively good, and this is traceable to a
likely-enough desire component and likely be 1 i ef
-component
,
given commonsense knowledge and the fact that Al has always
given the line correctly in the past. On the other hand,
the ( ab b r e v i a t ed ) answer
Al wanted to say a line with four "e"’s in it.
has an unlikely desire component, while
Al wanted to eat spaghetti
has an unlikely belief component.
Let’s turn now to example 3. Bo’s question is:
Q3: <A1 says "Bleegh blugh",
Al doesn’t say "Bleegh blugh",
communicative p-reason>.
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ThjB is an urgent question; Bo had been expecting the
negation of the topic, so that Al's utterance comes as a
surprise, and prompts the question. Note that here the
topic represents only a phonological stage of speech per-
ception; this is also the stage to which the questioner has
progressed. The prior expectation of the contrast-class may
seem problematic, as in the case of an inherently bizarre
action (indeed, the topic might be classed as an inherently
bizarre action), but recall that one's personal probabili-
ties needn’t be accompanied by conscious feeling.
As in example 2, what Bo wants is a p-reason. But
unlike example 2, Bo wants a p-reason of a particular sort,
one having the form:
A1 wanted to communicate that p
A1 believed that if he said "Bleegh blugh", he would
communicate that p
That is, even though A1 has uttered gibberish, Bo supposes
that A 1 wanted to communicate something by it, and wants to
know what it is; thus the spec i f i cat i on of "communicative"
P~reason i n Bo’s question. It is an open question just how
this relevance relation is to be further analyzed, in light
of the various analyses of communicative "intentions".
Suffice it to say here that Bo wants a p-reason of a certain
sort.
Let s now consider answers. Note first that answers
providing non-communicative p-reasons are not direct. For
examp 1 e
,
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A1 wanted to clear his throat
(henceforth I will not be putting answers in fully explicit
form) would not be a direct answer. (It may, however, be
"satisfactory" in that Bo would no longer seek an answer to
his question. This is because it would be reasonable to
infer from it the corrective answer that no communicative
p-reason exists.) Since a p-reason is wanted, the second
criterion is again useless. However, the likelihood cri-
terion assumes new significance. K must be supposed to
contain, in addition to commonsense knowledge and the assump-
tion that A 1 is normal, information concerning what has been
said in previous discourse, and elements determining what
would be relevant or appropriate to now say. For example,
A1 wanted to communicate that his dog has fleas
would not be too likely an answer if the previous conversa-
tion had been about basketball. Given its irrelevance it
isn’t too likely (though of course quite possible) that A1
would want to communicate this. The likelihood of the
belief component will depend on elements of K determining
what gibberish might reasonably be expected to communicate.
For example, the above answer has an unlikely belief compo-
nent, for it’s unlikely given commonsense knowledge that an
utterance of "Bleegh blugh" would communicate anything about
the dog. On the other hand, the answer
A1 wanted to communicate that what Bo just said was
nonsense
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has a somewhat more likely be 1 i ef
-component
. Note that in
all these evaluates the assumption that A1 is normal is
crucial, licensing the inference from what could reasonably
be expected to communicate what to what A1 would likely
believe about this.
In this example Bo doesn’t interpret because the
utterance is gibberish. Another reason a listener may be
unable to interpret is if the utterance is in a language
the listener doesn t understand; he supposes that the
uttered string has meaning (he doesn’t consider it gibber-
ish), but he doesn’t know what it is. In such a case,
however, the listener’s question would not be a WDYM-ques-
tion with a saying as topic. He would not ask what the
speaker meant, but what the sentence meant - e.g. not "What
do you mean, ' Je ne sais quoi ’?"
,
but rather "What does ' Je
ne sais quoi’ mean?".
2
. Explaining Say inq-That : Example A
I said earlier that what Bo wanted in example ^ was an
explanation of Al’s apparent irrelevance. That might have
brought Gricean implicatures to mind. In the case where
there is apparent violation of the conversational maxim
requiring relevant contributions, an imp 1 icature serves
precisely as an explanation of the apparent violation. This
makes it natural to suppose that such implicatures may be
subsumed by the current framework, i.e. rendered as answers
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to a (tacit)
substant i ate
process
.
WDYM-quest ion
. In this section I will try to
this point of view, treating example a in the
Here are two of Grice’s original examples of relevance
1 mp 1 icatures
, i.e. implicatures generated by an apparent
violation of the maxim of relevance:
Bo: I am out of petrol.
Al: There is a garage around the corner.(Implicature: The garage sells petrol, and may ben n pn i 7
a'?!
Sm
;
th doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.Al He s been spending a lot of time in New Yorklately.
( Impl icature: Smith may have a girlfriend in New York.)
The general point of view I am espousing here is expressed
by Marcelo Dascal:
...an implicature is a hypothesis about the speaker’sintentions that explains away the apparent irrelevance
of his utterance, by explaining how the utterance is infact relevant. So, the task of the hearer is similar
to the task of a scientist who looks for a theory that
explains given data, under certain broad theoretical
assumptions (comparable to the [maxim of
relevance]
. . .
;
So relevance implicatures are explanations. Now, by defini-
tion, an implicature of any sort must be "calculable" by the
hearer; the hearer must in some way be able to determine the
implicature for himself, without help from the utterer.
Thus, on the present view relevance implicatures are expla-
nations which the hearer can work out for himself. So there
is no need for the hearer to request an explanation with a
WDYM—quest i on . But that does not entail that the explana—
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tiDn may nDt be re9srded answer to an implicit WDYn-
quest ion, representing his initial puzzlement; it is just
that he answers the question himself. I „m npw support
this point of View by showing how all the facts of relevance
implicatures can be accounted for by the present theory.
1 begin by saying what I take the facts to be.
Fact 1: That for which an explanation is wanted is Al’s
say i ng that p, not Al’s saying "p", the apprehension of
apparent irrelevance would not be possible without inter-
pretation. The quotes in Al’s interrogative are of the
hybrid sort.
Fact 2; Bo finds Al’s saying that p puzzling because he
believes, first, that A1 is not "opting out' 1 of the maxim of
relevance, i.e. that A1 is somehow making a relevant contri-
bution, and second, that p is not relevant with respect to
previous discourse. As Dascal remarks, the latter is a
judgment about p’s actua
1
irrelevance, not merely p’s
apparent irrelevance. What is perhaps only apparently
irrelevant is A1 s say i nq that p. So we have here a distinc-
tion between "semantic" relevance and "pragmatic" relevance,
i.e. between p being relevant with respect to previous
<^i 5Course > and A1 ’s saying that p being relevant with
respect to previous discourse. The first entails the
second, but the second doesn’t entail the first. If p is
irrelevant, then Al’s saying that p is apparently irrele-
vant; but Al’s saying that p might actually be relevant if
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an exp 1 anat ion of a certain sort is avaUable. 28
Fact 3: What is
-anted is an explanation that meets
certain constraints. These are as follows.
iiying
e
thst
1
o
nat
Th
n mUSt
^
PBCif V A1 ' s intention in
content q.
involves specifying a certain
This is meant to be neutral between diferent ways of speci-
fying the desired intention, e.g. between »A1 intended for
Bo to believe that q“ and "A1 intended for Bo to believe
that A1 believes that q".
C2: q must be relevant with respect to previousdiscourse.
C3: There must be some
-'connection' 1 between p and q.
"Connection" simply labels a problem here. Consider Grice’s
first example. The implicature could hardly be that Bo
should travel by bicycle instead of car, even though this
would be relevant, because there is no connection between
this and there being a garage around the corner. If we
reflect on the actual implicature, we might conclude that a
"connection" consists in identity of certain propositional
constituents (in this case, the garage). But consider the
second example. Here there is more to it: Al’s spending a
lot of time in New York is evidence for his having a girl-
friend there. Obviously there is a problem here, that of
specifying the nature of the different connections. So C3
is quite vague; but it is nonetheless clear that some such
constraint exists.
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If there is an explanation meeting all these con-
straints, then Al-s saying that p is, though apparently
irrelevant i actually relevant.
The facts can be accounted for as follows.
Fact 1 15 accommodated by having the topic of a WDYM-
question be a saying-that. Note that we have here further
illustration of how the stage of speech perception at which
a question arises for the questioner may be distinct from
the stage to which the questioner has progressed
. For
example, in the first example Bo presumably assumes that A1
believes that there is a garage around the corner. But he
doesn’t seek an explanation for the belief - he doesn’t want
Al’s evidence for thinking there is a garage around the
corner - but for Al’s saying that there is a garage around
the cor ner
.
Fact 2 may be recast as a description of how the
quest ion
<A1 says that p, A1 doesn t say that p, communicative
p-reason>
arises for Bo. At a time just prior to the utterance, Bo
expects A 1 not to say that p; this is a reflection of Bo’s
a55um ing that A1 is observing the maxim of relevance, and of
his attunement to p’s irrelevance. At the time of the
utterance Bo come to believe that A1 says "p", and that A1
says that p (assuming the i nterpretat i on to be homophonic).
In virtue of the latter, the original pr obab i 1 i t i es are
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reversed, and the question arises urgently for Bo. Like the
prev 1 ous example, it may help to cons.der here that one
needn’t be conscious of one's personal probabilities - in
particular, that Bo needn’t be aware of his expectation that
A1 will not say that p.
The constraints mentioned under fact 3 are entailed by
various conditions on good answers to the above question.
Any direct answer will supply a communicative p-reason.
Recall that when I introduced p-reasons, I meant to subsume
"intentions". (But see note 15.) Note that it really is a
c ommunicative p-reason that is wanted. There would be no
implicature if A1 said that p only because he wanted to,
say, hear himself talk; such an answer would not be direct.
So much for Cl. C2 is captured by the criterion of de-
sire-component likelihood, and C3 by belief-component
likelihood, where K is again taken to include information
about previous discourse and what is (semantically) relevant
with respect to this discourse, and, in addition, the
assump t i on that A1 is observing the maxim of relevance. For
example, the answer
A 1 intended to communicate that Smith likes New York
is unlikely. Given K, that Smith likes New York is irrele-
vant and hence it is unlikely that this is what A1 wanted to
communicate. Now consider the answer
A 1 intended to communicate that Smith’s previous
girlfriend was short and cur 1 y-ha i r ed
.
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Thxs has an unlikely be 1 i ef
-component
,
given commonsense
knowledge; though the communicative content is relevant, it
is unlikely that A1 thought he could communicate this by
saying that Smith has been spending a lot of time in New
York. Likelihood of the belief component is a criterion of
adequacy on any proposed theory of "connections" between p
and q, in that any proposed connection must be such that a
normal person conversing with another normal person could
reasonably expect to communicate q by saying that p. Note
finally that the answer
A1 intended to communicate that Smith might have agirlfriend in New York
is good on all counts; it is direct, and has both a likely
c* es ire component and likely belief component.
I conclude that relevance implicatures may be construed
as answers to a WDYM—quest i on
, one which arises for the
questioner in a certain way, and whose parameters are set in
a certain way. They are not just any answers; they are
direct answers which are very good on the likelihood cri-
terion. This, in part at least, is what enables normal
people to come up with them, making it unnecessary to
actually ask the question which has arisen for them. For
all that relevance implicatures are still answers.
Now, what about example 9? Here Bo regards Al’s
utterance as an implicature gone wrong (though strictly
speaking this is a contradiction in terms). Bo ’ s quest ion,
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and the way it arises for him, follows the pattern of
questions to which relevance implicatures are answers; it is
just that in this case there is no answer which is very good
on the likelihood criterion. So in this case Bo needs help,
and the question is asked. As he has to ask, there is no
very good answer available, but he can still hope for a rela-
tively good one. So, for example, the answer
A1 wanted to communicate that Reagan is too old to bePres i dent
has a likely desire component, given that the conversation
has been about politics and that A1 is observing the maxim
of relevance, but a no t-so- 1 i ke 1 y though not-total ly-un-
likely belief component. Such an answer is about as good as
could reasonably be hoped 'for.
With respect to how the various issues in this area
might be resolved, I have done nothing. I’ve said very
little about the nature of semantic relevance (in terms of
which pragmatic relevance may be accounted for), about the
nature of connections, about how people manage to "abduce"
explanations which meet the constraints. My point has been
only that it is appropriate to approach these problems from
within the theory of WDYM-ques t i ons and answers. (This is
not to say that the problems might be more easily resolved
when so approached. As to that, I’m not sure.)
I have been confining discussion to relevance implica-
tures. It might be wondered whether my conclusions transfer
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to other kinds of i mp 1 i cature
. I think that they transfer
at least to those kinds which resemble relevance implica-
tes with respect to the nature of the "violation" of a
conversational maxim. Relevance implicates are character-
ized by the semantic irrelevance of what is said and of the
apparent pragmatic irrelevance of the speaker’s saying what
he did. More broadly, they involve actual violation "at the
level of what is said" (in Grice’s terminology) and apparent
violation "at the level of what is meant". But it would
seem that whenever there is such violation, whether or not
relevance is involved, an utterance is cause for surprise
and puzzlement, however tacit. But where there is puzzle-
ment stemming from an utterance, there is a WDVMquestion
representing the puzzlement, whether or not the listener is
capable of resolving it for himself. Hence I expect that
many kinds of implicature, at least, are amenable to the
present approach
, differing only in the maxims which must be
accounted for in the psychological etiology of the question
and in the constraints on answers. (Again though, this
would amount in the short run at least to a transfer and not
a resolution of the various problems). But these remarks
29are speculative, and I won’t pursue them further.
3 . Explaining Be 1 i ev i nq-That : Examples 5-7
In examples 5-7, Bo’s questions are, respective ly:
Q5:<A1 believes that the patient is fading,
A1 be 1 i eves that the patient is not fading,
( e-r eason ) > , y
’
Q6 : < A 1 believes that John is old,
A1 believes that John is not old, <e-reason)>,
07 : < A 1 believes that John is good,
A1 believes that John is not good, e-reason)>.
These examples are alike in certain respects, and different
in others. I will first discuss the ways in which they are
a 1 ike.
lo begin with, the topic in each case is a believ-
i ng- that ; accordingly, the relevance relation is in each
case an e-reason. Thus in each case Bo presupposes a saying
and saying-that (in addition to a be 1 i ev i ng- tha t ) ; he has
progressed to, and the question arises for him at, what 1
have identified as the final stage of normal speech percep-
tion (of a declarative sentence), as in example 1. More-
over, in each case the puzzlement represented by the WDYM-
question is in two ways distinguishable from earlier exam-
ples * First, the questions are non-urgent. For example, in
the case of Q5 Bo had no inclination prior to Al’s utterance
to think either that A1 believed that the patient was fading
or that the patient was not fading; so the utterance does
not come as a surprise. Nonetheless when he comes to
believe that A1 believes that the patient is fading, via the
normal stages of speech perception, he is puzzled. This
brings us to the second distinctive aspect of the puzzle-
ment, which is that it is occasioned by, not an entire
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sentence, but only by some particular word; this is mani-
fested by a partially quoted WDYM- i nter rogat i ve
, where the
quotes are of the hybrid sort mentioned earlier.
The fact that Bo is puzzled by a particular word is
captured by the contrast-class, together with its utiliza-
tion in the favoring criterion. Let’s see how this works.
Note first that, as we are now dealing with e-reasons and
not p-reasons, the favoring criterion will no longer automa-
tically be met by any direct answer. Recall that, when
applied to an answer supplying an e-reason, favoring has to
do with how the addition of a belief would effect a believ-
er’s reasoning. So, for example,
consider as an answer to Q5
A1 believes that the patient’s heartbeat has weakened
(which has the fully explicit form
A1 believes that the patient is fading rather than that
the patient is not fading because A1 believes that the
patient’s heartbeat has weakened).
(Let’s suppose that this supplies an "(e-reason)" - this
will be explained shortly - so that the answer is direct.)
This answer does well on the favoring criterion; when the
information that A1 believes that the patient’s heartbeat
has weakened is added to the relevant background K ( Q ) , Al’s
believing that the patient is fading becomes more likely,
and his believing that the patient is not fading becomes
less likely. For it is part of K(Q) that A1 forms his
beliefs in a reasonable way, and it is reasonable to believe
£>H
that the patient i. facing on the basis of the e-reason that
the patient s heartbeat has weakened, and not reasonable to
believe that the patient is not fading on this basis. Note
that the pragmatic presuppositions concerning what A1 has
"said" must be excluded from K<Q) here, in accordance with
the general policy of excluding items which imply the topic.
Note also how the choice of contrast-class here makes it so
that an answer good on the favoring criterion must provide
evidence pertinent to Bo’s puzzlement with "fading" in
particular. Similarly for Q6 and Q7 ; the interest in a
particular word is reflected in the contrast-class, and the
way it interacts with the topic in the application of the
favoring criterion.
I want to emphasize that in these examples Bo is not
seeking an "interpretation" in the sense in which I am using
that term. He has full knowledge of the communal and
t i me- i nvar i ant semantic rules, whatever that may consist in,
allowing him to form the relevant saying-that belief. That
15
,
the examples are most naturally accounted for in this
way. I think this point is clear enough intuitively, but it
may perhaps be made more obvious by considering a case in
which A 1 utters a word that Bo has never heard before.
Suppose, e.g., that Bo forms the belief that A1 says "John
is perspicacious"; assuming Bo’s problem is only with
"perspicacious", we might alternatively suppose that Bo
forms the belief that A1 says that John is "perspicacious"
.
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In this case Bo does seek an interpretation in the relevant
sense ; in this respect the case is just like one considered
earlier (p. 53) in which Al’s entire sentence is in a
language that Bo doesn’t know. But here again, Bo’s ques-
tion would not be a WDYM-quest i on
. The more natural interro-
gative would be
-What does 'perspicacious’ mean?" (mention
quotes), not "What do you mean, 'perspicacious’?" (hybrid
quotes). In general, when what is wanted is an interpre-
tation in the relevant sense, we do not have a WDYM-ques-
tion; we do not have a request for the p-reasons or e-rea-
sons of the utterer. In contrast, Q5-Q7 are all questions
in which an 1 nterpretat 1 on is presupposed, and hence not
sought after. Of course this is not to say that what is
sought is not an "interpretation" in any sense. In all
three examples, it might properly be said that what Bo is
after is an "interpretation"; I would insist only that it
isn’t an 1 n t er pr et a t i on in my sense.
I turn now to differences among the examples. The
parentheses surrounding the relevance relation in Q5 indi-
cate that Bo is interested not just in any e—reason, but in
one constrained by his further interests on this occasion -
in particular
,
he wants evidence having to do with the
weakening of either the patient’s heartbeat or his brain-
waves. So, for example, the answer
A1 believes that the patient has been coughing a lot
1 s no t dir ec t
.
There is a certain respect in which this example
resembles a case of lexical ambiguity. Suppose, e.g., that
A1 says that he is going to look at the "table", and Bo,
having no clue as to whether A1 means a chart or a kitchen
table, asks a question. Again, Bo must be supposed to be
semantically competent, i.e. to know whatever semantic rules
for "table" are at work here 30 ! otherwise no puzzlement
would arise. And the question would (or could - see below,
be a WDYM-quest ion (as I have already intimated by putting
the puzzle in terms of what "A means"), expressed, e.g., by
"What do you mean, 'table'?", or perhaps simply "'Table'?".
(Certainly this latter would not be short for: "What does
'table' meant".) Thus my claim that questions in which an
interpretation is sought are not WDYM-quest ions needs
further c 1 ar 1 f i ca t ion ; for in a way B does in this case want
an interpretation in the relevant sense. I should put the
claim as follows: questions in which what is sought is
sought for lack of semantic competence are not WDYM-
questions. So put, the present case is not a counterex-
ample. But, given that we have a WDYM-question here, what
kind is it? I am not sure exactly how to analyze this case
(though I do think that the topic is that A1 says that he is
going to look at the "table" — mention-quotes - and the
relevance relation is that of a communicative p-reason).
But one thing is clear: this case differs from previous
cases in that Bo’s problem here is not that he has no
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exp 1 ana t ion, but that h e has .ore than one. Note that Bo
mi9ht make thiS by ask i ng you mean , chart or
’table- as in 'kUchen table'?"; this would not express a
WDYM-quest ion, any .ore than "Does the sun rise because the
earth reyolyes or because the sun revolves?" expresses a
why-question. Example 5 is similar in this respect. Bo
supposes (perhaps incorrectly) that fll means either that the
heartbeat has weakened or that the brainwaves have weakened,
and just wants to know which one. Hence, he might have
asked instead "Do you mean his heartbeat is weaker or that
his brainwaves are?", which would have expressed a different
question. The difference, however, is that in the case of
lexical ambiguity it is merely in virtue of his semantic
competence that Bo has the competing explanations; not so in
example 5.
In example 6, Bo’s interest is again in an e-reason of
a particular sort, in this case in Al’s belief concerning
John s age in years. That is, Bo supposes that A1 bases his
belief that John is old on a belief concerning what John’s
age is in years, and this is what Bo wants. So, for exam-
ple, the answer
A1 believes that John has a lot of gray hair
would provide an e-reason, but not be direct. But unlike
the previous case, Bo does not here have competing explana-
t i ons
.
In example 7, Bo isn’t interested in any particular
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kl nd of e-reason. However, a certain problem concerntng the
favor i ng craterion should be noted. We have been ass„»„9 ,
in app lying the favoring criterion to answers supplying
e-reasons, that K<Q) contains the supposition that A1
reasons normally, so that favoring has to do with how a
normal reasoner would modify his beliefs in response to a
certain new belief. In light of the present example, normal
reasoning must be construed so as to include normal evalu-
ative judgments. But note that the answer
A1 believes that John is a fervent patriot
will not make the topic either much more or much less likely
relative to the contrast-class members when added to K(Q),
for not enough is known about John’s values. It doesn’t
help much to assume that he is normal, for it is hard to say
whether a normal person would consider patriotism good.
When the topic is a normative belief, goodness on the
favoring criterion will generally require that K ( Q ) contain
1 nformat ion about the believer’s idiosyncrasies.
A . Examp 1 e B
‘
Bo’s question here is:
Q8:<A1 believes that John is reckless,
A 1 believes that John is not reckless, conceptual
e-reason>
In several respects this example is just like examples 5-7.
The topic is a be 1 i ev i ng — tha t ; accordingly, the relevance
relation is an e-reason, though one of a special sort that
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Will require explication. The question is non-urgent.
Finally, Bo-s puzzlement is again occasioned by some parti-
cular word; just as before, this is captured by the con-
trast-class and its role in the favoring criterion. What is
distinctive about this example is the nature of the rele-
vance relation, and some consequent features of the evalu-
ation of answers. But before getting to that, I want to
discuss a matter which, while relevant to previous examples,
I have chosen to put off until now.
a. The Fallibility of Homophonic I nterpretat 1 on
In discussing examples 5-7, I dismissed the possibility
that Bo’s puzzlement was owing to some failing in his
knowledge of communal and t i me- i nvar i ant semantic rules. I
dismiss this possibility in example 8 also (obviously, since
the topic of Q8 is a be 1 i ev i ng- that ) . But I would like to
consider another possibility, one which might be raised on
the heels of an objection to the notion of community-wide
semantic rules.
Simply put, the problem of radical i nterpr etat i on is
the problem of developing a theory for interpreting the
utterances of people whose language is completely unknown.
It has been studied by Quine and by Davidson; I will not
attempt here even an exposition of either ’s views. What I
am concerned with is the view, held by both, that in an
important sense al^j[ i nt er pr e t a t i on is radical interprets —
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tion. Davidson remarks:
The problem of interpretation is domestic as well asforeign: it surfaces for speakers nf fh= ,
1 S
i n j. h .*• P o t e same lanquaqe
that the „
the question, how can it be detainedb language is the same? Speakers of the same
sam2
U
e
9e Can 90 on tbe assumption that for them thee xpressions are to be interpreted in uisfway, but this does not indicate what justifies theassumption. All under stand i ng oinvolves radical interpretation.
the speech of another
The view can, I think, be put in the following way. In
everyday life, we assume that others speak the same language
we do (English, say); that is, we ordinarily interpret
homophomcally. But this assumption is a hypothesis
, one
whose merits are to be judged by the same criteria by which
radical-interpretation hypotheses are judged. Just what
these critera are is a deep guestion. Suffice it to say
that one consequence of the present view is that homophonic
interpretation is fallible, as (arguably) all hypotheses
are; when we interpret homophomcally, we might be wrong.
Davidson again:
Let someone say , . . "There ’ s a hippopotamus in the
refrigerator" : am I necessarily right in reporting him
as having said that there is a hippopotamus in the
refrigerator : Perhaps; but under questioning he goes
on, It s roundish, has a wrinkled skin, does not mind
being touched. It has a pleasant taste, at least thejuice, and it costs a dime. I squeeze two or three for
breakfast." After some finite amount of such talk we
slip over the line where it is plausible or even
poss i b 1 e to say correctly that he said there was a
hippopotamus in the ref r i ger ator , for it becomes clear
he means something else by at least some of my words
than I do. The simplest hypothesis so far is that my
word "hippopotamus" no longer translates his word
"hippopotamus"; my word "orange" might do better
The possibility of error is not merely academic, for differ-
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ences in meaning mere subtle than this one are not unusual.
For example, it you say ,. Mary>s in love „ u i>n , t
dousl y uni ikel y that 1 pan correctly report you as haying
said that Mary is infatuated.
Let us suppose that homophonic interpretation is
fallible. Then ,e must conclude that the notion of communi-
ty-wide semantic rules, knowledge of which constitutes
semantic competence, is an idealization. The semantic rules
utilized by one speaker are not in general exactly the same
as those utilized by another. And so we must modify the
notion of semantic competence, e.g. by saying that semantic
competence consists in knowledge of the rules used by most
speakers. (I don’t mean to suggest that there may not be
better ways to proceed.) Now let’s return to question of
the correct topic for QB (and also Q5-Q7 > . It is still
clear on the present picture that Bo’s puzzlement does not
stem from some lack of “semantic competence"; even on the
present picture, it is clear that this case differs from one
in which A1 utters a word for which Bo knows no semantic
rules. It is just that, in pointing out the difference by
saying that in this case Bo is semantically competent, and
so presupposes a homophonic interpretation, we must assume
the new notion of semantic competence. But another possible
objection now comes to mind. Granted that Bo is not lacking
* n semantic competence, in the new sense, perhaps what Bo
wants to know is how A1 interprets "reckless", according to
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Al-s semant rules. Bo can still be assumed semantically
competent
, in the new sense; but he refrains from homophone
interpretation (so that the quotes in his WDYM-c 1 ause are
purely mention-quotes), for fear that his semantic rules are
not Al-s. If homophomo interpretation is fallible, then
this might be a reasonable thing to do. We can summarize
this possibility by saying that perhaps what Bo wants is the
meaning of "reckless" in Al’s "idiolect".
I have no wish to deny that there are questions of this
sort, or that it can be reasonable to ask such questions
precisely because homophonic interpretation is in general
fallible. 1 would even add that such questions appear to be
WDYM-questions. In fact I think that B could request what
"reckless" means in A’s idiolect using the very same inter-
rogative, i.e. "What do you mean, he’s 'reckless’?". In
such a case, the quotes would be purely mention-quotes, and
che question expressed would have as topic, not a believ-
ing— that, but a (partial) saying-that, i.e.
A1 says that John is "reckless",
where the mention-quotes in the specification of topic would
reflect Bo’s refraining from (complete) homophonic inter-
pretation. And the relevance relation would be a p-reason
(communicative, presumably), not an e—reason. (As in the
case of ambiguity, I’m not sure about the contrast-class.
)
But this is not the most natural construal of what is going
on in example 8. (Even if it is, the point would remain
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that there is a distinct sort of case analyzable, in part,
by 08). In example 8, Bo finds "reckless" vague. This is
not to say that he suspects that Al’s semantic rules are
different from his. It is only to say something about the
nature of the semantic rules, or the "output" of such rules,
WhiCh Bo perfectly
.ell suppose he shares with Al. To
P it another .ay, it is only to say something about the
nature of the "concept" which Bo might perfectly
.ell
suppose he shares with Al. It would appear that Bo’s
attunement to the vagueness depends upon his having homo-
phonically interpreted, i.e. that he presupposes, rightly or
wrongly, a homophonic i nterpretat i on
.
Consider a further point. Suppose that homophonic
interpretation is fallible, and that semantic rules are not
community-wide. Still, nothing follows concerning the
rules’ relative time-invar lance. That is, we may still
suppose that the rules known by a given speaker are rela-
tively time-invariant, and in particular that those known by
a speaker who is semantically competent, in the new sense,
are so. What "reckless" means in Al’s idiolect is not the
sort of thing that changes from occasion to occasion; if the
alternative proposal is correct, then what Bo wants is a
relatively stable thing, a concept that Al carries around
with him, as it were. But on the construal I am urging,
what Bo wants is simply what A means by "reckless" on this
occasion. For example, a direct answer might be
7^t
A1 believes that John runs red lights.
If this provided whet "reckless- means in Al’s idiolect, we
should expect that pretty much whenever A1 uses "reckless"
he means "runs red lights". That’s possible, but it would
be pretty strange. At any rate, it’s clear that there is a
distinct construal. The answer provides just what A1 means
on this occasion; next time is a different story. It would
be fruitless to try to deny the distinction by supposing
that one’s semantic rules change easily from occasion to
occasion. That would that be a very suspect notion of
semantic rules.
There is actually a very straightforward demonstration
of the distinction I want. In Q8
, the topic is a believ-
ing- that
. So a response by A1 of "I don’t really think that
John is reckless 1 ' expresses a corrective answer; Bo couldn’t
reasonably acknowledge this answer, and then repeat his
request for a "way" or "sense" in which John is reckless.
n the other hand, this same answer would not be corrective
if Bo had asked a question requesting what "reckless" means
in Al’s idiolect. This is actually a reflection of the
difference in time-variability, for the time-variability of
what Bo is requesting with QB is explicated by the fact that
he wants an e-reason for a particular belief of Al’s, and
this will in general differ from e-reasons for different
beliefs of Al’s concerning who or what is or are reckless
when, beliefs he may express on other occasions.
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To summar i ze . In example 8
, and also in examples 5-7,
the topic is a believing-that, so that Bo presupposes an
interpretation. More precisely Rn nroeP i , Bo presupposes a sayingthat
attribution whose content-clause is homophoni ca 1
1
y inter-
preted; and the content
-c 1 ause of the believing-that attri-
bute which is the topic is interpreted likewise. Example
8 1S thUS distinguishable from a case in which Bo seeks the
meaning of a word in Al’s idiolect. It is also distinguish-
able from a case in which A1 utters a word whose meaning Bo
doesn’t know, and from a case of lexical ambiguity.
b. Conceptual E —Reasons
I mentioned recently that intuitively what Bo is
seeking in example B is something which varies from occasion
to occasion. This is a reflection of the nature of the
relevance relation of QB
, which I have labelled "conceptual
e-reason
. That is, this relation is such that typically
beliefs stand in the relation only for a short period of
time. My goal in this section is to further characterize
conceptual e-reasons, by determining how they differ from
other kinds of e—reason.
Intuitively what Bo wants is a "specific" or "precise"
5ense ° ^ reckless 1 which A1 has in mind. Thus we might say
that if a belief is a conceptual e-reason for a topic
belief, then it is more specific or precise than the topic
be 1 i ef
.
But note that the same condition intuitively holds
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of examples 5-7, ip »h,ch the relevance relations are
e-reasons, but not conceptual e-reasons. The condition
thus not sufficient to characterize the relevance relat
i s
ion
of QB .
To say that a belief is more
-precise-' than another is
evidently to say something about the relation between the
respective contents of the beliefs. Just what this relation
is is a difficult question, one which I will not be in a
position to address until chapter 5. Suffice it to say
presently that since being a conceptual e-reason for a topic
belief entails being more precise than the topic belief, the
relation "is a conceptual e-reason for" is asymmetric.
I turn now to another essential char ac ter i st i c of
conceptual e-reasons. Imagine the following dialogue taking
place after Q8 is put to Al.
A1 : Well, I mean that John spends money without ever
checking his account.
Bo: 1 agree that John spends money without ever
checking his account, but I don’t agree that he’s
r ec k 1 ess
.
Al: But look, when I say that he’s reckless, all I mean
is that he spends money without ever checking his
account
.
If Al s initial response expresses a direct answer, and
hence provides a conceptual e-reason, then Al’s reply to
5 objection is a natural one. I take the reply to be an
attempt on Al’s part to clarify the "I mean" of his initial
response, to indicate that he was providing a conceptual
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e-reason. And as a consequence of this, he is using "reck-
less" in a certain way on this occasion. And given this
usage, he takes John’s recklessness as necessarily equiva-
lent to his spending behavior, so that there can be no
accepting one while denying the other, as Bo does. (Given
that Bo asked DB
, which requests a conceptual e-reason, it
would be unusual for Bo not to construe Al’s response as
providing a conceptual e-reason, but put this aside. The
objection to Al’s response might just as well be made by
someone other than Bo.)
Thus, consider the following:
SI: John spends money without ever checking his ac-
count
.
SS : John is reckless.
S3: John spends money without ever checking his accountif and only if John is reckless.
If SI (presumed uttered by Al) expresses a true direct
answer to QB
, then Al believes that Si, Al believes that SB,
and the first belief is a conceptual e—reason for the
second. The present moral is that, as a consequence of this
relation holding on this occasion, Al considers S3 to be
necessarily true on this occasion. The relation’s holding
may be thought of as constituting A’s "usage" of "reckless".
The present feature of conceptual e-reasons serves to
distinguish example 8 from examples 5—7. Consider example
5. Suppose Al believes that the patient’s brainwaves are
weakening. While this fact provides a direct answer to Q5
,
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it most likely wouldn't do so if the relevance relation of5 were a conceptual e-reason. We can imagine, for example,
Bo (the doctor) convincing A1 that weakened brainwaves was
actually a hopeful sign, owing, say, to some intricate
correlation between brainwaves and metabolism. Presumably
A1 would not respond to any such attempt to convince him
with the complaint: "You don't understand; when I say he’s
'fading', all I mean is that his brainwaves are weakening."
A1 would not be using "fading" in such a way that he would
consider the patient's fading to be necessarily equivalent
to his brainwaves weakening. Of course, we may still say
that when A1 says that the patient is "fading", he means
that his brainwaves have weakened; it is just that here the
means doesn’t indicate that a conceptual e-reason is being
supplied, as it did in the imaginary dialogue considered in
connection with example 8.
Similarly for example 6. The proposition that, e.g.,
A1 believes that John is sixty-two is a direct answer to Q6
,
but most likely wouldn’t be if the relevance relation of Q6
were a conceptual e-reason. For presumably A1 isn’t using
old' in such a way that he would consider oldness to be
necessarily equivalent to being sixty-two.
Finally consider example 7. Suppose that A1 believes
that John is a fervent patriot. This is presumably not a
conceptual e—reason for A1 ’s believing that John is good,
for it is easy to imagine Al’s being convinced that patri-
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. s no
o t i sm
, or anything for that matter (except goodness), j
good. This is not to say that we may not loosely
ice Bo in example 7 as wanting a "way" or "sense" in which
John is good, just as I have characterized the situation in
example 8. But it must now be pointed out that wanting a
'way" or "sense" does not always amount to wanting a con-
ceptual e-reason. 33
Since dispositional adjectives are very frequently
normative in part, the above considerations entail that,
strictly speaking, a sense of a dispositional adjective
cannot be analyzed as a conceptual e-reason. For example,
A1 presumably could possibly be convinced that John spends
money without ever checking his account but isn’t reckless,
simply by being somehow convinced that there’s nothing bad
about John’s spending money without ever checking his
account. So my analysis of example 8 really applies only to
dispositional adjectives with no normative component.
Rather than change my example, however, I will simply ignore
the normative component of "reckless".
Summing up, the relevance relation "being a conceptual
e-reascm for" has three char ac ter i st i c features. First, in
general it holds only for the duration of a context of
utterance. Second, it is asymmetric because one relatum is
more specific or precise than the other. Finally, when it
holds, a believer may be said to be "using" an expression,
where this implies that he takes a sentence containing the
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express ion to be necessarily equivalent to a certain other
sentence
. This last feature is what tost clearly distin-
guishes conceptual e-reasons from other kinds of e-reason,
and 1 will elaborate on it in the next chapter.
c. Answers and Semantic Competence
I have two goals in this section. First I want to draw
out some consequences of intuitive properties of certain
answers for the nature of communal meaning. And second I
want to identify the constraints on answers which correspond
to constraints on intuitively proper senses of "reckless".
I ve argued that the attribution to A1 of the belief
that 8E is partly made on the pragmatic presupposition that
when A 1 utters SE
, his words can be interpreted homophoni-
cally. Now consider the possible answer to Q8
A 1 has no conceptual e-reason for believing that Johnis reckless.
his is a corrective answer, since it is a semantic presup-
position of Q8 that A1 has such a conceptual e-reason.
However, it does not correct the topic, and hence does not
correct the presupposition of a homophonic interpretation of
Al’s sentence. In sum, a homophonic interpretation is
consistent with the non-existence of a conceptual e-reason.
Now consider the answer
A1 believes that John spends money without ever check-
ing his account.
This intuitively provides, or at least could provide, a
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non-corrective answer to Q8
, in the broad sense of not
denying any pragmatic presupposition land hence not denying
any semantic presupposition either). Hence it does not deny
the presupposed homophonic interpretation. Thus, a "usage"
of "John is reckless", in the sense of a conceptual e-reason
is consistent with this sentence’s haying its normal mean-
ing. This Vindicates a claim implicit from the very begin-
ning, Hhen I distinguished meaning from speaker’s meaning in
Chapter 1
.
I noted in Chapter 1 that semantic competence with
respect to a sentence which is vague with respect to some
constituent entails being attuned to constraints on possible
speaker 7 s meanings. Now that I have identified speaker’s
meanings with answers to WDYM-quest i ons
, I take these con-
straints to be certain constraints on answers to the rele-
vant question. I take the relevant constraints on possible
speaker’s meanings for "John is reckless", for example, to
be certain constraints on answers to Q8 - three in parti-
cular
.
A trivial constraint is non-circularity. Recklessness
is not intuitively among the specific senses of "reckless".
A second constraint is possible directness. Most
significantly, this requires an answer to possibly be a
conceptual e-reason. This means an answer must be more
precise than the topic belief, and also be such that it
possibly gives rise to the sort of perceived necessity
as
mentioned in the previous section hh^h c u . What is required for the
latter is that the answer be of the form
A1 believes that John P,
where P expresses a (perhaps conjunctive) dispositional
property. This rules out, for example, the answer that A1
believes that everybody says that John is reckless, though
this is an e-reason, and allows the answer that A1 believes
that John spends money without ever checking his account. I
am not, however, prepared to say what is required in
general, i.e. when a dispositional adjective need not be
i n vo 1 ved .
I he sense in which an answer must be "possibly" direct
is not alethic but psychological. I suppose that it is
logically possible for a speaker on an occasion to hold any
two sentences to be necessarily equivalent. But it isn’t
psychologically possible for a speaker on an occasion to
hold, e.g., "John is reckless" and "Everybody says that John
is reckless" to be necessarily equivalent, intuitively
because the latter is not of the form John P
, where P
expresses a dispositional property.
A third constraint is goodness on the favoring critei
—
ion. Consider how the answer expressed by SI does on the
favoring criterion. In accordance with the way we have
previously applied this criterion, we allow as an element of
K(Q) the assumption that A1 is a normal reasoner . Then
does
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Pr(Al believes
that John
that John
„ .
15 r eckless/K<Q)&,< A1 believesspends money without checking his account )
)
compare more favorably with
Pr(Al believes that
believes that John
account )
)
John is not reckless/K(Q)&(Al
spends money without checking his
than
Pr(Al believes that John is rec k 1 ess/K ( Q )
)
does with
Pr(Al believes that John is not r ec k 1 ess/K ( Q ))
?
Evidently so. In contrast, the answer expressed by
-John
has a big nose" doesn’t do as well on the favoring criter-
ion, as the reader may verify.
Note that "reckless" has its normal communal meaning
throughout; this follows from "John is reckless" having been
interpreted homophon i c a 1 1 y . The goodness of an answer on
the favoring criterion thus depends upon the communal
mean i ng
.
How good a possibly direct answer is on the favoring
criterion is a measure of how likely it is that A1 would
infer that John is reckless given that A1 believes that John
has a certain dispositional property. But note that the
assessmen t proceeds without assumptions about whether the
answer is direct (or possibly direct), and hence about
whether the inference is non-demonstrative or "analytic".
(I will have more to say about each possibility in Chapters
8-f
3 and A
, respectively.)
Note that the contrast-class and relevance relation of
QB are such that every possibly direct, favoring answer is
belief attribution whose content-clause is some predication
of John, one which is more precise than the original "is
reckless". All possibly direct, favoring answers may thus
be individuated by their more precise predications.
Summing up, the constrained speaker’s meanings corre-
sponding to the "proper usages" of "John is reckless" are
non-circular, possibly direct, favoring answers to Q8
.
Semantically competent speakers are attuned to these con-
straints, i.e. they are able to judge possible answers
according to these criteria. Judging non-circularity and
possible directness corresponds to judging the presence of
"usage"; judging favoring corresponds to judging the "pro-
priety" of a usage. Note that in virtue of the favoring
constraint, semantic competence thus entails commonsense
knowledge and commonsense reasoning ability.
a
a
D. Summary
This completes my treatment of the examples presented
at the beginning of this chapter, and of WDYM-quest i ons
genera 1 1 y
.
To sum up: a UIDYM—quest i on has been regarded as a
triple of parameters fixed by the interests of a questioner
(or potential questioner) in a particular context. Aside
85
from the question itself, other aspects of a quest.oner’s
psychologies! state include the urgency or non-urgency of
the question and the questioner’s presuppositions (which
outstr ip the presuppositions of the question). Together
these factors represent a state of puzzlement prompted in
some way by the apprehension of an utterance. A specifica-
ion of speaker s meaning is simply an answer to a WDYM-
question, and which may be evaluated in various context-
dependent ways, i.e. in ways which depend upon various of
the context-dependent features of the question.
This notion of speaker’s meaning is not a familiar one
I turn now to distinguishing it from a notion which is.
1 V Gricean Speaker’s Meanino
Theorists are, I think, well aware that there is a
distinction between the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning
and the more everyday notion that has been my concern but I
want to try to say in my own way just what this distinction
i s .
Consider the following basic Gricean analysis:
U meant that p in uttering S if and only if U uttered S
i ntend i ng
(Gl) to produce in an audience A the belief that p
( G2 ) that A recognize U’s intention Gl, and
( G3 ) that A ’ s believing that p be achieved partly in
virtue of A’s recognition of U’s intention Gl . ^
In and of itself this analysis makes no claims about the
nature of meaning, i n the sense in which expressions have
meaning. In early papers Grice did, however, make it clear
that he thought meaning could in some way be understood in
terms of his notion of speaker’s meaning. Grice never
himself provided a very extensive account of just how this
worked, but others have. I will not review these efforts
here. Suffice it to say that for any account of meaning of
the sort envisioned by Grice to be non-circular, no notion
of "the meaning of S" can enter into the analysis of speak-
er ’ s mean i ng
.
For me, "speaker’s meaning" is simply a broad label for
answers that may be given to a WDYM-quest i on . Thus, a a
specification of a speaker’s meaning cannot be understood in
isolation; its significance can be seen only in relation to
some WDYM-quest ion. We have seen that the ways in which the
parameters of a WDYM-quest i on may vary; the significance of
answers varies accordingly. We can see this by reviewing
the fully explicit basic form for a direct answer to a
WDYM-quest 1 on (or to a why-question) <P,X,R>:
P in contrast to (the members of) X because A,
where A is a proposition bearing R to <P,X>.
Thus, a speaker’s meaning may specify p—reasons and e—rea-
sons of various sorts, and may presuppose topics and con-
trast-classes of three basic sorts: sayings, say i ngs- tha t
,
and bel ievings-that . From this perspective we might try
viewing the Gricean notion as a special case. We might,
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that is, view Gr icean speaker’s meaning as an explanation of
a say l ng , i... an act of uttering a string, where the string
is v i ewed
, by the seeker of the explanation, as ^interpret-
ed, and ln which what is provided is a communicative p-rea-
son
.
There is something right and something wrong about this
wou 1 d-be subsumption. What’s right is that Gricean speak-
er’s meanings may be regarded as explanations, providing
communicative p-reasons for people uttering strings regarded
as uninterpreted. It is, moreover
, merely because the
strings are regarded as un i nter preted that there is a demand
for explanatlon in the first place. That is, if we take the
theoretical stance that we don’t know what it is for expres-
sions to have meaning, then it becomes a striking fact, one
which calls for explanation, that people go around making
utterances. The Gricean explanation, provided by the
Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning, is, roughly and broad-
ly, that people do such things because they have certain
communicative intentions: utterances are made because people
have certain c ommun 1 ca t i ve ends, and believe that these can
be achieved by making utterances. That an expression has
meaning is then in some way analyzed in terms of its role in
facilitating the achievement of these communicative ends. 35
So let s suppose that Gricean speaker’s meanings do
provide explanations of some sort, and also that a communi-
cative p reason may be analyzed along the lines of the
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Gricean intentions G1-G3 . ,Mhat s no problem, for I’ve left
the analysis of communicative p-reasons open). Still,
Gncean speaker’s meanings may not be regarded as answers to
WDVM questions, i.e. as (direct) answers to WDYM-quest ions
whose topic is a saying and whose relevance relation is a
communicative p-reason; the subsumption fails. When the
topic of a WDYM-quest ion is a saying, then it is no part of
the etiology of the puzzlement that the questioner has
interpreted the utterance. This might be because, though
the questioner has interpreted, the context is such that it
is the verbatim report that matters (example E - though in
this case it isn’t a communicative p-reason that’s request-
ed), or that the questioner can’t interpret (example 3).
But in any case, these properties of the etiology of WDYM-
quest i ons with saying-topics are to be distinguished from
the distinctive property of the etiology of the puzzlement
which Gricean speaker’s meaning is supposed to resolve. In,
say, example 3, the WDYM-question arises for Bo not because
he is for theoretical purposes supposing that he doesn’t
know what meaning is, but simply because he doesn’t think
that the utterance has any meaning. Whereas the Gricean
notion of speaker’s meaning is highly theoretical, my notion
of speaker’s meaning is that of an answer to a question
which might arise in everyday life (whether or not the topic
is a say i ng ) .
Grice may once have thought of himself as attempting a
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conceptual analyse of an everyday, antecedently g 1Ven
no t i on of speaker’s meaning. 36 if so
, then , have a crit ._
cism: there is no antecedently gwen notion of speaker’s
meaning
.hich can serve the theoretical purposes he had in
mind. For I take the antecedently given notion to be that
f an answer to a WDVM-quest i on . (Whether or not he may
have successfully analyzed, in part, an antecedently given
notion is another question; I am leaving it open whether
communicative p-reasons might be analyzed along Gricean
lines, and hence whether answers to WDVM-quest i ons with a
communicative p-reason as relevance relation might be partly
analyzed along Gricean lines.) But I don’t think that
Gricean theorists nowadays regard their notion of speaker’s
meaning as an everyday notion, or even the question as being
very important. The concern is to somehow analyze meaning
in terms of communicative intentions, and it is immaterial
whether or not their notion of speaker’s meaning is antece-
dently given; it might just as well be stipulated, or done
away with altogether in favor of the conjunction of inten-
tions G1-G3 (or some modification thereof). 37 In any case,
my main point here is simply that the Gricean notion of
speaker s meaning is not a special case of my notion.
How, then, do I account for the apparent fact that
Gr 1 cean speaker s meaning is explanatory? Simply by saying
that it provides an answer to a broad why—quest i on
,
i .e.
<People make utterances, People don’t make utterances,
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communicative p—reason>,
where this arises for the theorist whQ does not to
meaning for granted. As always, the parameters of the
why-quest ion are context-dependent; e.g. the interest might
alternatively be in an physiological account of speech
production. So, even though it is not a special case of my
notion of speaker’s meaning, the Gricean notion of speaker’s
meaning is nonetheless subsumable by the theory of why-ques-
tions. This will be the case with all explanations, if van
Fraassen’s theory of explanation is correct.
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CHAPTER 3
VAGUENESS AND SPEAKER’S MEANING
1 • Introduct ion
I noted in Chapter 1 that a sentence such as "John is
reckless" seems to have at once a deficiency and a multi-
plicity of meaning, a conflict I resolved by positing a
deficiency of communal meaning and a multiplicity of possi-
ble speaker’s meanings. And I noted that one who knows the
meaning is attuned not only to the deficiency but also to
constraints on the possible speaker’s meanings. The point
of studying WDYM-quest ions was to explicate the notion of
speaker s meaning, and thus elaborate on and support these
obser vat ions
. In this chapter I want to consider where we
are with respect to this goal.
In chapter 1, I used the term "vague" to describe a
certain phenomenon, but care should be taken, for one lesson
of the previous chapter is that everyday terms do not make
very fine distinctions. In all of the examples Bo may be
said not to "understand " . I would say that whenever there
is a WDYM-quest i on
, there is some sort of lack of "under-
standing" of an utterance. There being a WDYM-quest i on is
not a necessary condition for a lack of understanding,
however; for there is also a lack of under stand i ng if the
communal meaning isn’t known. As I’ve noted previously, in
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examples 3-8 Bo may be said to want an "interpretation"; m
addition to these there is the sense having to do with
communal meaning. In examples 5-8 Bo may be said to find a
word "vague", and to want a "sense", or something less
vague, or more "precise". My conclusion, which should come
as no surprise, is that the theory of WDYM-quest i ons
, which
allows the articulation of distinctions among the examples,
is capable of finer distinctions than are those provided by
these everyday terms. What I have called "vagueness", and
the problem I am interested in, is the phenomenon illu-
strated by example 8, in which what is wanted is a concep-
tual e-reason. I will continue with this usage, as well as
with the correspond i ng usage of "precise", but I must warn
that it is partly stipulative.
I will begin here by elaborating on last chapter’s
discussion of conceptual e-reasons, specifically on the kind
of necessary inference they involve. I will then be in a
better position to reassess the phenomena discussed in
Chapter 1; the deficiency of meaning, the multiplicity of
speaker’s meaning, and semantic competence will be discussed
in turn.
I I . Occasional Analyticity
In the previous chapter I noted that a conceptual
e-reason gives rise to kind of perceived necessity. My
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remarks were confined to an example, however, and I would
now like to assay a generalization of sorts.
It is convenient to state the generalization in terms
of the notion of "acceptance". Unlike belief, acceptance is
a relation between a sincere subject and a sentence with a
certain meaning. The difference between acceptance and
belief can be seen most clearly in the case of a sentence
containing an indexical term, e.g. "I am late". In such a
case what is accepted, i.e. "I am late" with its attendant
context-independent meaning (or, at least, contex t- i nde-
pendent so far as "I" is concerned), is clearly distinct
from what is believed, i.e. the proposition that a particu-
lar person is late, a proposition which is determined by
context (in particular, the speaker). * I will no t be
c e,_ ned with indexicals, but it will be convenient to
speak of sentences and meanings rather than propositions.
The general result can now be stated as follows.
Suppose a speaker accepts SI under a homophonic interpreta-
tion, and also accepts S2 under a homophonic i nter pr etat i on
.
And suppose that on an occasion the belief "corresponding"
to the first acceptance is a conceptual e—reason for the
belief cor respond 1 ng to the second. Then the speaker
considers r Sl if and only if S2 n
,
call it S3, to be neces-
sarily true on this occasion. We may think of S2 as having
two "interpretations", one being the homophonic interpre-
tation, the other being a particular "usage" on this occa-
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s i on
.
If a sentence contains no indexicals, the belief
-'corre-
sponding" to an accepted sentence under a homophonic inter-
pretation is straightforwardly specified via d i squo tat i on
.
For example, if a speaker accepts "John is reckless", then
he correspondingly believes that John is reckless. Matters
are more complicated if indexicals are present, but I will
not consider these complications here.^
Under the given circumstances, S3 appears to have the
status of an "analytic" truth of some sort, relative to Al.
This is not analyticity in the traditional sense. For one
thing, traditional analytic truth is not relativized to
speakers. However, in the next chapter I will argue that S3
necessar i 1 y true in fact, and not merely in the view of
the speaker . From my point of view the crucial difference
is that Al does not hold S3 to be necessarily true in virtue
of an identity between the meanings of certain of its
constituent expressions. After all, Al takes SI and S2 to
have their usual, distinct, meanings. Al holds S3 to be
necessarily true on this occasion in virtue, not only of the
meanings of SI and S2
,
but also of what h_e means by S2 on
this occasion, where the relevant sense of "meaning some-
thing by" a sentence is that of a conceptual e-reason. I
will call the type of analyticity involved here "occasional
ana 1 y t ic i ty "
.
Crucial to this account is my claim that "John is
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reckless has both its normal meaning and a particular
usage. n y Justification for this, to repeat, is basically
that a homophonic interpretation is presupposed in the
asking of a question requesting a concepual e-reason. Yet
this still may seem a peculiar claim. In particular, it may
seem that the perceived necessity of S2 depends only on the
particular usage given by SI; what role is there for the
communal meaning to play? I want now to address this
concern, by considering how occasional analyticity differs
from stipulation.
Suppose a lecturer gets tired of saying
-carnivorous
mammal" all the time and introduces the term "carmam" to
stand for this. Then for the duration of the lecture he
will regard "carmam" as having exactly the meaning of "carni-
vorous mammal". Consequently he will regard a sentence of
the form
T is a carmam if and only if T is a carnivorous mamma 1
as necessarily true. Thus stipulation gives rise to per-
ceived necessity. I take the crucial feature of this sort
case To be that the abbreviating expression is arbitrary,
in that its own meaning, if it has one, is disregarded for
the duration of the context. Since it assumes exactly the
meaning of the abbreviated expression, there can be no
question of propriety or impropriety in the abbreviatory
relation, outside of heuristic value.
Cal 1 the relation that holds between accepted sentences
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si and S2 in virtue of the belief corresponding to SI being
conceptual e reason for the belief corresponding to S8 the
relation
. The c-relation clearly differs from a stipu-
lated abbreviatory relation in not being arbitrary, as can
be seen from the fact that there can be propriety or impro-
priety in a c-relation. Intuitively it is proper for SI and
S2 to c-re late, but improper for, say, "John has a clean
face" and S2 to c-relate. So it cannot be that S2 simply
assumes the meaning of SI. For what could it be other than
this meaning, as well as that of SI and "John has a clean
face", which accounts for that the fact that the c-relation
is proper in the one case but not the other? On my account,
this intuitive dependence of propriety on meaning is ac-
counted for by the fact that how well an answer does on the
favoring criterion depends on the meaning of the original
utterance (as well as on other factors - see pp . 82-3).
Inasmuch as stipulation is a fully explicit act on the
part of the speaker, the speaker must be fully aware of the
abbreviatory relation. This points out another difference
between stipulation and the c-relation. Earlier I imagined
a dialogue which might follow Al’s uttering SI as a response
to Q8. But an answer is not fundamentally something which
which some respondent is able to give; it is logically
possible for there to be some direct, and true, answer to Q8
which no one is aware of, and in particular, which A1 is not
aware of. And this is more than a merely logical possibi-
101
lity. It is not uncommon for people to say something
without quite knowing what they mean, perhaps later to
discover it; at least, so it would appear from everyday
talk. Suppose for example that SI is supplied, not by Al,
but by somebody else. Then it would not be unusual for Al
to say. Yes, thank you; that’s just what I meant." This
would suggest that, prior to the response being actually
given, SI did supply Al’s meaning, but Al was not fully
aware of this, at least in the sense that he was not able to
articulate it. (Or, if this is not convincing enough,
imagine a case in which the speaker’s meaning is more
complex.) Obviously no such phenomenon is present in the
case of stipulation.
A speaker’s being unaware of a conceptual e-reason
should be distinguished from there being no conceptual
e>_reason all. In the latter case but not the former
there is no true and direct answer to a question requesting
a conceptual e—reason. Phis will be the case if the speaker
simply has nothing more precise in mind; this is a common
phenomenon, one which is generally to the relative detriment
of the speaker’s understanding of the world. It should be
noted that in such cases there might in fact be a more
precise belief, but one which is not a conceptual e-reason
for the topic belief. For example, a speaker might accept
both SI and S2
,
but still SI may not express a conceptual
e-reason for the belief expressed by S2 ; the belief corre-
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spending to SI may not constitute „hat the speaker meant by
S2
.
I thus stress that the point about awareness is not
simply that it may be difficult to articulate a more precise
belief, but that it may be difficult to articulate a more
precise belief which is a conceptual e-reason for the topic
belief. Both claims are true, and both follow from the
wider claim that any belief may be difficult to articulate.
But it is the claim concerning conceptual e-reasons which I
take to account for the phenomenon of groping tor one’s
mean i ng
.
I hough a speaker need not be fully aware of his mean-
ing, he may be. A good way to see this is by noting the
existence of locutions for making one’s meaning fully
explicit. I am speaking of "in the sense that" or "in the
sense of locutions, e.g. "John is reckless in the sense of
spending money without ever checking his account". Note
that if the speaker’s meaning is made explicit in this way,
then the perceived necessity to which I’ve referred becomes
eminently compr ehens 1 b 1 e . For example, it is clear why a
speaker would take the sentence
John is reckless in the sense of spending money without
ever checking his account if and only if John spends
money without ever checking his account
to be necessarily true. But to the speaker’s mind, this
sentence has the same status as
John is reckless if and only if John spends money
lOJ
without ever checking his account
on this occasion, if bv "John i = r-ar- l, t ^ ..y n s reckless" a speaker means
on this occasion that John spends money without ever check-
ing his account.
Ihis completes my discussion of occasional analyticity
I want now to take another look at the vagueness phenomena
noted in chapter 1.
1 1 1 • Deficiency and UJDYM-Quest i ons
I he meaning "deficiency" of a sentence (i.e. sentence-
type), with respect to a particular constituent, tends to
give rise to a certain sort of cognitive phenomenon. 1
propose to analyze this tendency as the sentence’s aptness,
on an occasion of utterance, to prompt in a listener a state
of puzzlement relevantly like that of Bo’s in example B.
The essential features of such a state are the parameters of
the WDYM-quest ion one is disposed to ask, including a
conceptual e—reason as relevance relation and a contrast—
class which serves to single out a particular sentence
constituent, the non—urgency of the question, and the presup-
posing of a saying, saying-that (a homophonic interpreta-
tion), and be 1 i ev i ng- tha t . Note that without the presuppo-
sition of an i nterpretat l on it would not be possible to
offer such a state as entering into an analysis of the
puzzlement; this puzzlement clearly must depend upon an
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apprehension of the meaning. Moreover, without the presup-
position of a honiopho n ic interpretation it would not be
possible for such a state to enter into an analysis of a
1 C 1 enc V which is presumably community-wide.
[wo notes. First, a vague sentence is only "apt” to
prompt a state of puzzlement because there are circumstances
m which it would not; for example, one’s audience might
simply not be listening, or not be very interested. Second,
1 am not offering here a conceptual analysis either of
•meaning deficiency" or of "vagueness", since ordinary terms
do not single out the phenomenon I am interested in, as I’ve
mentioned. Rather, I am simply offering a more elaborate
charac ter i zat l on of the phenomenon. Since it appeals to the
notion of a conceptual e-reason, it serves nicely to dis-
tinguish the kind of vagueness with which I am concerned
from other kinds.
fo characterize a phenomenon is not to account for it;
it still remains to explain why the meaning of a sentence
might be apt to prompt a certain kind of UIDYM-ques t i on . I
will not consider this task until Chapter 5.
I V . Multiplicity and WDYM-Quest i ons
A. The Set of Possible Speaker’s Meanings
In the discussion of example 8 in the previous chapter,
I identified proper speaker’s meanings of "John is reckless"
105
"“h ans"er5 08
-hich met three constraints: non-circu-
lanty, possible directness, and favoring. Accordingly, 1
no. Identify the multiplicity of proper speaker's meanings
of " John is reckless" with the multiplicity of answers which
meet these constraints.
,W° remarks
- First, it should be recalled that good-
ness on the favoring criterion is relative to a probability
function Pr and a background corpus K. Insofar as we may
speak of "the" multiplicity of possible constrained speak-
er’s meanings, it must be that multiplicity which is rela-
tivized, via the favoring requirement, to a Pr which models
exactly commonsense reasoning and to a K which consists
exactly of commonsense knowledge (including the knowledge
that others are commonsense reasoners). Second, note that
the continuity of Pr ’s range accounts for the fact that the
question of whether or not a given speaker’s meaning is
pi oper cannot always be definitely answered.
I am going to assume the existence of a unique set S
rO
of constrained speaker’s meanings for "John is reckless".
There are two idealizations in this assumption. The first
is that there is a unique commonsense Pr and a unique
commonsense K. The second is that a threshold favoring
3value can somehow be chosen. I make these idealizations
because it will be simple and convenient to be able to refer
to "the" set S
rO
S
r(j appears to be uncountably infinite. It suffices to
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note that it seems we couldn’t enumerate the "domains" with
respect to which one might be reckless, e.g. reckless when
it comes to money, reckless when it comes to women, etc.
lhUS S
rO S multiplicity is presumably greater than that of
the positive integers. Beyond this, 1 am not sure what to
say .
1 mentioned in chapter 1 that multiplicity stemmed not
only from senses but from senses of senses. Accordingly we
should view S
rQ as having structure, in the algebraic sense
'his requires the definition of a certain relation, a task
to which 1 now turn.
B. Structuring the Possible Speaker’s Meanings
1 • The Relation U) Defined
the members of S^
0 are constrained answers to Q8
,
propositions of the form rAl believes that p n . 1 now want
to define a binary relation W on S^_^, the "is answered by"
relation, as follows.
^ Pi ar*d Pg are elements of S^_^, then pi is answered
by p2 just in case p2 is (the core of) a non-c i r cu 1 ar
,
possibly direct, favoring answer to <p 1 , X , concep tua
1
e-reason) for some X such that the members of X and pi
differ exactly with respect to the predicates of their
content clauses.
(See p. 1A for the distinction between answers and answer
cores . )
I he definition is s t r a i gh t f or war d save for the stipu-
lation concerning X. To understand this stipulation, recall
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that the contrast-class of Q8 is such that every possibly
direct, favoring answer is a belief attribution whose
content is some predication of John more precise than the
topic predication; answers may thus be individuated by their
pred icat 1 ons
. (See p. 8A . ) The idea behind the stipulation
is to ensure that X is such that if p£ is a possibly direct,
favoring answer to
<p 1 , X , concep tua 1 e—reason>,
then the predication of p2 is more precise than that of pi;
were the contrast-class arbitrary, so that it could be
trivial, or differ from the topic in the subject term, then
p2 might not so relate to pi. Thus W relates elements whose
predications precisify, not only the topic predication of
tJ8
, but each other.
S . Properties of Ul
1 now turn to enumerating a number of properties of the
answering relation.
W does not define a function of pi. This is both
because a given question may have more than one constrained
answer (as indeed the existence of a mu 1 1 i p 1 i c i tous S
r 0
shows), and because pi is the topic of more than one ques-
tion.
W is not "connected", i.e. it isn’t the case that,
given any two elements of S either the first is answered
r 0
by the second or vice versa. For example, of "A1 believes
10b
that John spends money without ever checking his account"
and "A1 believes that John runs red lights", neither is
answered by the other.
W 1S irref iexive, i.e. no element of is answered by
itself. This follows from the non-circularity requirement.
W is asymmetric, i.e. if pi is answered by P 2, p2 isn't
answered by pi. This follows from the asymmetry of the
relevance relation, noted previously. If p £ is possibly a
conceptual e-reason for pi, then it is a more precise belief
than pi, so that pi could not possibly be a conceptual
e-reason for p2.
W appears to be transitive, i.e. it appears that if pi
is answered by p2, and p2 is answered by p3, then pi is
answered by p3. Transitivity would follow from the the
transitivity of possible directness, the transitivity of
possible directness and non-circularity, and the transiti-
vity of possible directness and favoring under the specified
conditions. I discuss these matters in turn.
lo show transitivity of possible directness, I appeal
to my earlier remark that a possibly direct answer to Q8 is
one of the form
A1 believes that John P,
where P expresses a dispositional property, and the content
of the belief that John P is more precise than that of the
belief that John is reckless. Now suppose p2 is a possibly
direct answer to
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1 » X , concep tua 1 e-rea5on>,
where X 15 as described on p. 106, and where pi 15 of the
form
A1 believes that John 0.
By an obvious generalization of my earlier remark, we then
have that pE is of the form
A1 believes that John ^ ,
where f expresses a dispositional property and the content
of the belief that John ^ is more precise than that of the
belief that John 0. And suppose p3 is a possibly direct
answer to
<p£, X (conceptual e-reason>.
1 hen p3 is of the form
A1 believes that John Q
,
where 9 expresses a dispositional property, and the content
of the belief that John 0 is more precise than that of the
bel i ef that John
. Suppose we draw the intuitive conclu-
sion that the content of the belief that John 0 is more
precise than that of the belief that John 0 . Then p3
satisfies the criteria for a possibly direct answer to
<p 1 , X , concep tua 1 e-reason>,
the desired result.
Non-c 1 r cu 1 ar i ty in itself is obviously not transitive.
But it follows from the asymmetry of possible directness and
the transitivity of possible directness that the conjunctive
property of being non-circular and possibly direct is transi-
1 10
1 1 ve
.
turning now to the transitivity of possible directness
and favoring, consider the two questions
O 1 : <pl ,X1 , R 1
>
and
Q2: <A1,X2,RB>,
where A1 is a favoring answer to Ql. A favoring answer AB
to QB need not be a favoring answer to Ql because it may be
that the contrast classes are "skewed' 1
. For example,
suppose that Ql is
< Adam eats the apple,
Adam gives the apple to the snake, p-reason>,
and A1 is
Because he was hungry.
Suppose Q2 is
< Adam was hungry, Eve was hungry, preceding eating
behav i or >
,
and AB is
Because Eve ate more recently than Adam.
Clearly, A1 favors pi over XI, and A2 favors A1 over XB.
But AB doesn’t favor (much or at all) pi over XI. For it
doesn’t favor (much or at all) A1 over Adam’s being not
hungry. We might say, loosely, that it favors Adam ’ s being
hungry but not Adam’s being hungry ; so it doesn’t favor
Adam’s ea
1
1 nq the apple.
What this example shows is that transitivity of favor-
ing requires some sort of "coordination" between XI and XB.
1 1
1
The condition on X in the definition of w seems to achieve
such a coordination, as I will now try to show.
Suppose p2 is a possibly direct, favoring answer to
<p 1 , X 1 , conceptual e-reason>,
for suitable XI, where pi is of the form
A1 believes that John 0.
Then p2 is of the form
A1 believes that John 'f ,
where the content of this belief is more precise than that
of the belief that John $ . And suppose p3 is a possibly
direct favoring answer to
<p2 , X2 , concep tua 1 e—reason>,
for suitable X2. Then p3 is of the form
A1 believes that John 0 ,
where the content of this belief is more precise than that
of the belief that John ^ . But intuitively, if p£ favors
pi over X, then so does any belief attribution whose content
is more precise than that of p2. Since p3 is such a belief-
attribution, it is a favoring answer to
<p 1 , X 1 , concep tua 1 e-reason>.
Since, by transitivity of possible directness, p3 is also a
possibly direct answer to this question, we have shown
transitivity of possible directness and favoring.
Since both this last demonstration and the demonstra-
tion of the transitivity of possible directness rely on
intuitions concerning comparative precision, I don’t take
1 12
myself to have rigorously established W’ s tr ans i t i vi ty
.
rO u
1
Elements which precisify not
only the topic belief, but alec each other, in various „ays
on S j we may now
t
<S
rQ ,W> does not appear to be a discrete structure.
That is, there doesn’t seem to be a relation "is immediately
answered by" (of which W would be the transitive closure),
pi is answered by p2 and there is no p3 such that pi is
answered by p3 and p3 is answered by p2. In any case, I
have no account of the conditions under which an answer
would be immediate.
I would speculate that precisif ication may be continued
indefinitely, i.e. that given any pi, there is some p2 which
answers it. Certainly a conceptual e—reason may be very
complex - consider, for example, what a philosopher of
ethics might mean by John is moral" — and I don’t see how
there could be principled limits. Note that this would not
entail that vagueness is omnipresent, but only that degrees
of vagueness are. On my analysis vagueness requires not
merely that there exist constrained answers, but also that
the question to which they are answers be one that a listen-
er would be apt to ask.
Two structures isomorphic to <S^,UI> are worthy of
call it W., such that pi stands in UC to p2 if and only if
1 13
note. The elements of S
r0 are propositions of the form
A1 believes that John 0 .
They correspond one-to-one with the elements of a set S of
propositions of the form r John ^ and ^ mth ^ e^_
ments of a set of properties $. S
rl and are,
intuitively, the set of possible senses of "John is reck-
less", and the set of possible senses of "is reckless",
respectively.^ Relations on S
rl and can be defined
which hold between elements just in case Ul holds between the
counterpart elements in S^, yielding structures isomorphic
to <S . , W>
.
r 0
v * Semantic Competence and UDVM-Quest i ons
Let s now consider where we are with respect to the two
facets of semantic competence, attunement to deficiency and
attunement to constraints.
fhe meaning of a vague sentence is deficient in some
way. This entails that it is apt to prompt a WDYM-quest i on
of a certain sort. This question, together with its psycho-
logical etiology, represents the cognitive state of one who
apprehends the deficiency. In particular, such a person
presupposes a homophonic interpretation.
In addition to this positive, or absolute, notion of
deficiency, there is the comparative notion which accompa-
nies the notion of a conceptual e-reason. The content of a
1 1 <*
conceptual e-reason is intuitively less deficient, or more
"precise", than that of the belief to which it relates as an
e-reason. Note that it is contents of beliefs, and not
meanings of sentences, which are being related here.
However, it is natural (though not i ncontr o ver t i b 1 e ) to
suppose that content and meaning are intimately connected,
and later I will develop the means to spell out such a
connec t i on
.
In the previous chapter constraints on possible speak-
er’s meanings were identified with constraints on answers to
a relevant WDVM-quest ion, the constraints being possible
directness, non-circularity, and favoring. Semantic compe-
tence entails knowledge of constraints, which entails being
able to judge answers according to these constraints. We
may also characterize knowledge of constraints as knowledge
of the characteristic function of S^_
1
(or of S
, depending
on whether we take the expression in question to be "John is
reckless or is reckless"). To know the characteristic
function of S^_
^
(S^_^)
,
is to know, given a putative sense,
whether it is in S^_
^
(S ). This knowledge is equivalent to
knowledge of constraints, but the latter is what makes the
former possible.
So far, so good. But my story cannot be complete
without a general theory of mean i ng /content with which to
explain these observations. Towards this end, I turn now to
examining the relation between speaker’s meaning and truth.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
identifies the
1
.
See Perry (1979) and Perry (1981). Perry
ohjeet of acceptance as a sentence, but he means a sentencewith a certain meaning, since otherwise what is acceptedwouidn t, together with context, determine an object ofbe lef. Perry’s view is inspired by Kaplan’s distinctione tween character (which is the relevant sense of sentencemeaning ) and content; see Kaplan (1977).
2.
Care must be taken here: by the belief “corresponding"to an accepted sentence, I do not mean the belief whoseobject is determined by the sentence meaning together withon ex
, a la Perry. Rather, I mean simply the belief,
whatever its object is, whose specification is in a certainway systematically related to the sentence - typically, bydisquotation. Whether the object of this belief isdetermined Perry’s way is a question I leave open. The
reason for this care will become apparent in Chapter 5.
3.
Here I also assume that there is a way of determining aunique favoring "value". For questions like Q8 in which thecontr ast-c 1 ass is a singleton set, the assumption is
reasonable because a way of quantifying how much "better"the topic compares to the contr ast-c 1 ass after an answer ispresumed true than before comes easily to mind: take theprior difference between probabilities, take the posteriordifference, and then take the difference of the differences.
It should be kept in mind, though, that a contr ast-c 1 ass mayhave more than one element, in which case my assumption hereinvolves an assumption that there is a way of integrating
into a unique "value" different qualitative aspects of
favoring; see Chapter E, p. 17. This is important because I
will eventually reanalyze the question of example 8 as
having a contrast-class with numerous elements; see the
append i x .
9. Actually, it may be that not all possible senses of
reckless" can be derived from possible senses of "John is
reckless". Perhaps other subject terms, e.g. "General
Dynamics", "the United States", "the soccer team", and "the
weather", make for new possibilities, including perhaps
metaphorical senses. Thus, on a complete treatment S
would have to be specified via some quantification over
kinds of subject term. This task would be far from trivial,
and I leave it for another occasion.
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L H A P | E R h
TRUTH AND SPEAKER’S MEAN i Nb
1 • Introduction
A. I he Dependence of Truth on Speaker’s Meaning
1 . I n t u 1 1 1 o ns
in this chapter I will consider the implications of
speaker’s meaning for a theory of truth, where by "speaker s
meaning" I mean the sort of speaker’s meaning involving a
conceptual e-reason.
Why think that there are any such implications? Well,
suppose that someone says "John is reckless", meaning that
John runs red lights. If my previous account of the pheno-
menon ot a conceptual e—reason is right, then his assessment
of the truth of "John is reckless" (on this occasion) will
depend on his meaning that John runs red lights. hor he
regards "John is reckless" as true if and only if John runs
red lights; if he believes that John runs red lights, then
he will consider his statement true. Un the other hand, if
he had meant something different, then his assessment ot
truth might be different as well. Lonsider, moreover
,
a
listener who doesn’t know what the speaker means. 1 hen he
may be uncertain as to the truth of the statement; for
example, he may think that John runs red lights, but is very
cautious with his money. Asked it he thinks if the state
1 16
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ment is true, such a listener might respond:
-'Well, it
depends on what you mean." (Indeed, this is a very common
remark.) That is: the truth ot what is said is taken to
depend on what is meant. 1 hese considerations seem to
indicate that we require a certain degree ot precision
betore being able to judge truth. The prime tacie conclu-
sion is that the truth on an occasion ot a vague sentence
depends on the speaker's meaning.
1 see two possible objections to this conclusion, and 1
discuss them in turn.
id . Natural Kinds
I he data considered above concerns normal speakers'
judgments ot truth, but the prima tacie conclusion concerns
actual truth. It might be held that this constitutes a
t a 1 lacy. In particular
, it might be held that dispositional
adjectives are "natural kind" terms. If so, then, while
normal speakers’ judgments ot whether or not something is in
the extension might depend on what they mean, actual exten-
sion membership would not. Actual extension membership
would depend on the presence ot an underlying property which
in general only "expert" speakers, it there are any, can
detec t .
*
Just how plausible it is to regard something as a
natural kind term depends on the availability ot a well-est-
ablished scientific theory in terms of which an underlying
l lb
property is specified. It is clear that in the case ot
dispositional adjectives - e.g. "reckless", "skillful",
"persistent" - there is at present no such theory! hence the
view that these are natural kind terms is not cogent. Ihis
is not to deny the possibility: nobody, not even experts,
need be able to characterize the underlying property. But
the tact remains that there is at present no good reason tor
truth-theorists to treat dispositional adjectives as natural
k 1 nd terms
.
H certain difficulty arises here because it appears
that sometimes people do tacitly think of at least some
dispositional adjectives as natural kind terms, e.g. when it
is suggested that intelligence is an inherited trait. In
the terminology of the previous chapter, this means that
people s reasons for believing that someone is, e.g.,
intelligent are not always conceptual, (heir reasoning is
sometimes non-demonstrative, e.g. if someone’s mathematical
acuity is taken as good but not conclusive evidence ot his
intelligence. However, so long as there is no good theory
ot an underlying property, this aspect of everyday usage
cannot be taken seriously in a theory of truth. this is not
to say that we must reject the apparently non-demonstrative
character of the reasoning, as we will see. Nor is it to
say that normal speakers' judgments might not still be taken
to somehow determine extension, for it is clear that often
when people use, e.g., "intelligent", they have a particular
sense in mind.
usages in our
And we can appeal to such
account ot how extension is determined.
d
' ^gaker 15 Meaning and Public Context
It is a commonplace that truth can depend on context.
BUt ° n ° ne P ° S5lble view, the relevant features ot context
are overt
, m particular, they do not include mental
states ot the speaker. Since speaker's meanings are p-rea-
sons or e-reasons, which are beliefs and/or desires, they
could not be truth-determining features ot context on this
view; in particular conceptual e-reasons could not be. d bo
this view ot context is presumably incompatible with the
claim that truth depends on speaker's meaning (in the sense
ot a conceptual e-reason). I say "presumably" because it is
possible to maintain that speaker's meaning is always
determined by overt features of context, in which case there
would be no incompatibility. However, this would be ludi-
crous. (Jbvious 1 y I can, e.g., mean "runs red lights" by
"reckless" even if there are no overt clues about this
available to my audience. Equally obviously, there may be
misleading overt clues, e.g. the previous conversation may
have been about spending money; this would not entail that
what 1 really mean is "spends money recklessly" rather than
runs red lights", but only that I am being i mper sp 1 cuous
.
(iiven that overt contextual features and speaker's
meaning may diverge, in the sense that such features are
1 dO
unre 1 i ati 1 e indicators of the speaker-* meaning
, ho„ are we
to dec i de what truth depends on? Well, let’s consider an
example in which there is divergence, and see whether
earlier considerations concerning the dependence of truth on
speaker's meaning hold up. Suppose our previous conver-
sation has been about spending money, and 1 now say "John is
reckless", meaning that he runs red lights. Ihere are two
relevant judgments of truth here, mine and yours. As 1
regard my statement as true if and only if Joh n runs red
lights, my judgment of truth depends on my meaning, our
previous conversation notwithstanding; if I think John runs
red lights, then I will regard my statement as true. biven
that 1 mean that John runs red lights, our previous conver-
sation has no bearing whatsoever on my judgment of truth.
Uf course, it might be wondered why I chose to say "John is
reckless m this context while meaning that John runs red
lights, but that is irrelevant to the question of my judg-
ment of truth. Now what about your judgment? Well, because
of the previous conversation you presumably "interpret" me
as meaning that John spends recklessly - i.e. you presumably
assume that 1 mean that John spends recklessly. That
influences your judgment of truth accordingly; for example,
if you think that John spends recklessly, then you will
consider my statement true. The crucial point here, though,
is that the previous conversation bears on your judgment
or* 1 Y i nsof ar as you infer my meaning from it; you infer my
on what you take me
meaning, and your judgment then depends
to mean. If f or some reason you believed, correctly, that 1
meant that John runs red lights, previous conversation
notwithstanding, then, like me, you would regard my state-
ment as true it you thought that John runs red lights. thus
m both your case and mine, truth is regarded as dependent
on my meaning, and not on the overt feature of context. to
the speaker who means something an overt feature of context
such as previous conversation is irrelevant to truth; to the
listener it is relevant only insofar as it constitutes
evidence - fallible evidence - for something on which truth
is taken to depend, i.e. the speaker’s meaning.
What this shows is that the view that truth may depend
only on overt (or, at least, necessarily inferrable) fea-
tures of context isn’t grounded in intuition. However, the
reason I am considering this view to begin with is not
because it is intuitive, nor even because there is anyone to
whom I am prepared to definitely attribute it, but because
it might be thought to have certain methodological grounds.
I he grounds I have in mind stem from the W 1 1 1 gensten 1 an idea
that language is "public": we cannot individually ("pri-
vately") determine what expressions mean. By extension, we
cannot individually determine what they refer to.
I hope it is clear from previous chapters that the
phenomenon of speaker’s meaning is not inconsistent with the
first part of this broad thesis. fhere is indeed a "public
Idd
aspect ot a vague sentence such as “John 15 reckless" - lt
is what 1 have been calling simply its "meaning". Because
ot this, speakers may not use the sentence and mean whatever
they want. But it is a starting point of this essay that
difterent things may nonetheless be meant, within the
public" constraints. Thus we often fail to fully under-
stand each other even though we share a language; often we
must ask what is meant, though we know (presuppose in the
asking, in tact) the meaning. The "public" aspect ot a
vague sentence does not then entail that whatever determines
its truth must be "overt". What must be "overt" is simply
the constraints on a speaker's meaning; the speaker's
meaning itself may be unknown.
I he problem is that the extended part ot the Wittgen-
stenian thesis doesn't follow from the first part; the
public nature of meaning doesn't entail that meaning may not
somehow determine truth in combination with a private
speaker's meaning. Nor does the extended part have a great
deal ot independent plausibility. Insofar as it is inde-
pendently plausible at all, I don't see how its plausibility
could outweigh the foregoing intuitive considerations
concerning the dependence of truth on speaker’s meaning.
**
.
Lone 1 us 1 ons
bmee the view that truth depends on speaker's meaning
is an intuitive one, the burden is on the other side to show
Ldd
it incorrect. Neither the objection that the vague predi-
cates we 've considered are natural kind terms, nor the
objection that their extensions could not in principle be
determined by non-overt means, is convincing. Yet 1 don’t
know ot any more serious objections that might be made. bo
1 conclude that the intuitive view must be respected in a
theory ot truth.
1 reiterate that when I say "speaker's meaning" I mean
the sort ot speaker’s meaning involving a conceptual e-rea-
son. I hose sorts involving other relevance relations, e.g.
in examples 1-7 in the previous chapter, do not bear upon
truth. For example, the truth of "Seventy-four is a large
number” in example 4 is independent of my meaning that
Heagan is too old to be President. Inasmuch as speaker's
meaning ot any sort has to do with the mental states ot a
language user, the study of speaker's meaning generally is a
branch ot "pragmatics". The present conclusion is that
speaker s meaning involving conceptual e-reasons must in
addition be included in that part of pragmatics relevant to
semantics, what has sometimes been called "semantic pragma-
tics" or "indexical semantics".
The way I will be studying the nature of the dependence
ot truth on speaker's meaning is by considering how speak-
er's meaning might be incorporated into a framework of
tr uth-cond i t i ona 1 semantics. But before doing this it is
important to distinguish my notion of vagueness from other
IBP
notions with which it might be confused.
B. traditional Conceptions of "Vagueness"
Consider the following definitions:
H is vague (with respect to x and s)
15 (or would be) ambivalent whether or
x
.
if and only if
not P applies
s
to
H is vague (with respect to x and s) if and only ifhere are times at which s would consider p to apply to
x and other times at which s would consider H not toapply to x .
H is vague
3
(with respect to x and G) if and only if Pis vague
^
with respect to x and speakers in G.
P is vague^ (with respect to x and G) if and only if Pis vague^ with respect to x and speakers in G.
P is vague
5
(with respect to x and G) if and only if
some speakers in G would consider P to apply to x and
other speakers in G would consider P not to apply to x.
In these definitions, P is a predicate, x is an object, s is
a speaker, and G is a population of speakers. Gpeakers are
assumed to be semantically competent and to have full
knowledge of the properties of x (assumed constant).
Vagueness in the first two senses above has to do with
an individual speaker
, and st r a i gh t f or war d 1 y gives rise to
notions of vagueness relative to a population, "vague^" and
"vague^"
. But the last notion of vagueness relative to a
population, "vague ", is not analyzable in terms of any sort
of vagueness relative to a speaker. 1 will call the three
notions of vagueness relative to a population "speakers'
ambivalence", "intraspeaker variation”, and "interspeaker
1 c!b
variation", respectively.'3
Ihe varlablas in the above definitions may be bound in
different ways, and different claims made as to the exist-
ence and prevalence of "vagueness". 1 take it that all
empirical predicates of natural language are such that there
are possible objects and (actual) populations with respect
to which they are vague
3 (this is what is sometimes called
universal "open texture"); and similarly for "vague " and
vague
5
"
. I also take it that many natural language
predicates are such that there are actual objects and
populations with respect to which they are vague^ ; and
similarly tor "vague^" and "vague^".
Ihese tacts concerning the existence ot ambivalence and
variation, i.e. the claims taken above as true, have some-
times been confused with substantive conclusions drawn trom
the tacts; 1 have in mind two such conclusions. The first
is that truth is in general "indeterminate", since sentences
containing vague predicates may be neither true nor false.
This is a substantive conclusion because the facts all
involve speakers 7 judgments, and do not in themselves entail
actual i ndetermi nacy ; it might be and has been held that all
sentences are in fact either true or false regardless of
speakers 7 ambivalence or disagreement. However, 1 see no
plausibility in this very strong claim. There are many
predicates - e.g. "squishy", "cute", "pleasant" - tor which
it is hard to see how anything other than normal speakers"
l d6
judgments could determine the extension; hence tor these
predicates it is hard to see why speakers' ambivalence or
interspeaker variation wouldn't entail indeterminacy in the
extension. The claim 15 so strong that one suspects a
motivation other than due consideration ot various predi-
cates, and indeed there is such motivation - namely a desire
to preserve classical logic . 7 Even if this motivation were
a good one, the view would be no more plausible; but it has
been shown, and we will see, that classical logic can be
preserved even it sentences are not held to be always either
true or false. Thus, I take it that it follows from the
existence ot ambivalence and variation (though not immediate-
iyJ that some sentences are neither true nor false, the
opposing view being both implausible and poorly motivated.
(he second substantive conclusion, related to the
first, is that truth is in general a "matter ot degree".
Ihis is a substantive conclusion because, again, the facts
directly concern only speakers' judgments; conclusions as to
the nature of truth require additional argument. In addi-
tion, it is not obviously true. In the case ot predicates
which are associated with a measurable property, e.g.
"tall", "old", "heavy" (associated with height, age, and
weight), and in the case of color terms, it does seem that
"vagueness" is the result of the predicate's application
being a matter of degree, but this is not obvious in gener-
al. This is partly because the nature of a "degree ot
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truth" is not obvious - whether it is, e.g., a statistical
construct, an equivalence class, or what. 8 l will not be
concerned with the issues here.
L. Vagueness, Ambivalence, and Variation
What does vagueness, which entails an aptness to prompt
a certain kind of WDYM-quest i on
, have to do with speakers'
ambivalence, intraspeaker variation, or interspeaker van-
at ion?
Ihe first thing to notice is that a predicate’s vague-
ness is not a relation involving both the predicate and an
object, i.e. a candidate for the extension; it is simply a
property of a predicate (with respect to a population).
Ihus the vagueness of a sentence may be apprehended without
any thought as to whether the sentence is true. For exam-
ple, in example 8 of the previous chapter, Bo need not be
supposed to be giving any thought at all to the truth of
"John is reckless".
Ambivalence and variation may easily be rendered as
properties of predicates (with respect to a population),
simply by binding the object variable in the definitions of
"vague^", "vague^", and "vague^" . For example, a predicate
may be said to admit of speakers’ ambivalence if there are
objects (and a population) with respect to which competent
and knowledgeable speakers (in the population) are ambiva-
lent as to whether the predicate applies. Flowever
,
it is
Ida
clear that the vagueness of a predicate is conceptually
distinct from these modified senses of ambivalence and
var 1 at ion as well.
In addition, vagueness is not coextensive with ambiva-
lence or variation. It does follow from the existence
claims and the fact that vague predicates are empirical
predicates of natural language that vague predicates admit
ot ambivalence and variation in the modified senses.
Clearly a competent and knowledgeable speaker may be ambiva-
lent as to whether a given person is, e.g., reckless; or a
speaker may have one judgment on one occasion and another on
a different occasion; or two speakers may disagree. How-
ever, a predicate admitting of ambivalence or variation need
not be vague. For example,
-'red" admits of ambivalence and
variation, but “That book is red" is not (very) vague; its
utterance is not apt to prompt a request for a sense in
which "red" is being used.
it is worth noting also that the ambivalence and
variation (in the modified senses) admitted by a vague
predicate have multiple sources, stemming from the fact that
when a vague predicate is used, the utterer may or may not
mean something by it (i.e. there may or may not be a true,
direct, favoring answer to the relevant WDYM-quest i on )
.
Thus we have two possible sources of speakers" ambivalence:
ambivalence when a competent speaker takes an utterer of
,
e.g., “reckless" to mean, e.g., “runs red lights", and when
1
lev
he doesn't. Similarly, there are dlfterent sources ot
intraspeaker variation: a speaker may make conflicting
judgments at two different times while meaning different
things at these times, or meaning the same thing, or meaning
something at one time but not the other, or not meaning
anything either time. Finally, there are different sources
ot interspeaker variation: two competent speakers might
disagree while meaning different things, or the same thing,
or while one means something and the other doesn't, or when
neither means something.
1 he distinction between vagueness on the one hand and
ambivalence and variation on the other will prove important
in what follows. Here is my plan. First I will provide a
partial account of the syntax and semantics ot a tormal
language containing predicates which admit of ambivalence
and variation, including vague predicates. Then I will
complete the account in two stages. In the first stage I
will introduce devices proposed by David Lewis, Hans Kamp,
and Kit Fine for the treatment of indeterminacy induced by
ambivalence and variation. In the second stage 1 will
introduce speaker's meanings into the framework. This will
enable me to substantiate my earlier conclusion that truth
can depend on speaker's meaning. It will also enable me to
show that the Lew i s—Kamp—
F
1 ne devices are either incorrect
or irrelevant for the treatment of vagueness (in my sense).
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^ • The Basic Framework
1 • Syntax
L is a language with four syntactic categories, or
types : terms, sentences, one-place predicates, and two-
place predicates. I will abbreviate these as e, t, <e,t>,
and <ehe,t^, respectively. Among the expressions of type
e and of type <e,t> are basic expressions. Basic expres-
sions of type e include variables, and these are the only
variables in L. Basic expressions of either type include
constants, which I will not specify. L also contains
no n-b as l c expressions, and the following is a rule for
deriving and categorizing these:
yl * ^ 15 of type <§,b> and ft is of type a, then
(X ( 3; ) is of type b.
thus, sentences can be derived from terms and one-place
predicates, and one-place predicates from terms and twoplace
predicates. Other rules for non-basic expressions are the
following syncategoremat i c rules:
YE. If 0 is of type t, and v is a variable, then ( 0v)0
is of t ype t
.
Y3. If (f> is of type t, then so is ~ 0.
Y A . If (0 and 0 are of type t, then so is < /v 0 ) .
Y5 . It 0 is of type t, then so is 1(0).
Y6. It P is of type <e,t>, then >(P ) 15 of type
<e , <e , t > >
.
181
Y7. It 0 is of type t, and v 1
is ot type e.
is a variable, then v L 0
J
a
y 8. If
't' is of type e, then Af i s type <e , t >
.
a sense
Y8 Y4 correspond to familiar logical operators, Y5 to
" operator, Y6 to a "comparative" operator, Y7
"abstraction" operator, and Y8 to a "predication" ope
'7 to an
io rator
.
an "in
Y2 and Y7 each allow a kind of binding; "open" and
closed" sentences and abstracts can be defined in an
obvious way
.
8 - Semant l cs
8 model M for L is a ‘-tuple <A,I,F,P>. A is a domain
of entities, which fall into two sorts: concrete individuals
and properties. I is a set of "indices", i.e. ordered
sequences ot values, where each value is the value ot some
teature, or coordinate", on which denotation may depend.
Une such teature is a possible world; thus spec i t l c a t i on ot
1 involves the specification of a set of possible worlds.
Uther features will be introduced later. I- i s a function
whose domain is I X N, where N is the set consisting of the
non-logical constants and closed abstracts ot L. P is a
predication operator, corresponding to the expression
It is a function from pairs consisting of a possible world
and an element of A to partial functions from elements of A
to truth-values.
I he semantic rules for L assign to each expression
I 3d
ative to model M, index i, and assignment g (function
from the variables to A), a denotation - t 0
’
1
’
9
- appro-
priate for the expression's type. I he set D
a
of denotations
appropriate tor an expression of type a is defined as
foil ows
:
D
*
= A! D
t
-
Dwhere a and h are types, and D£ a is the set of functions,
including partial functions, from D to D
. The rulesa b
include the following.
non “lfi,gical constant or a closed
10 j"’ 1 ^ = F (i, 0 ).
SC. If 0 is a
abstract, then
f 0* J^
1
= g(0
a
^
lable (i * P ‘ variable of type e), then
then
to u ;
for some such g '
.
^ T 9
1
type ^a.b^, and O is of type a,
c «.< t? = ccx^’
! t9 <[$ -
s2
‘,
1L M,iTo of type _fn$ v is a variable, thenCVu01 ’ 1 ’9 = 1 iff = 1 for an g- like gexcept perhaps for the value assigned
lVu 0] R,1 ’5 = o iff [0 j ’ 1 ’ 9 = 0
S
w f^l!i?L
15 of type then C ~ 0 = J ift
L0I =0; and t ~ 0 1 ’ ,g = q iff l 0 J M ’ 1 ’ 9 = i.
s *+- jlfcOi and ^ are of type t, then [ 0 A ^ J M ’ 1 ’ 9 _ x ifT
L 0 J ’
’m j q and [ ^ 3 ,
M
9
i
=
n
1; and A^3 M,1 ’ g = o
iff [ 0D M ’ 1 ’9 = o or C^l M,1 ’ g = 0.
Note that Sl-SA correspond to Vl-YA.
Ihe following definitions complete this preliminary pre-
sentation of the semantics of L.
expression of tyoe.t, then 0 is true *
M and i iff [0 1 ’ 1 ’ g = 1 tor each assi
with
lgn-
1 f 0 is an
respect to
ment g
.
if 0 is any expression, then the intension of 0 with
respect to M and g is that function h with domain 1
1 3d
such that for all 1 ln I, h(i) is l 0J
,V,,1
’ g
d • Informal Remarks
My labels for the syntactic categories may remind the
reader of Montague’s system of types, in which the types are
and <*’*>’ where a and b are types. I have not
adopted this system because it generates a hierarchy of
property-types, i.e. types of the form <a,t>, with a an
arbitrary type, whereas 1 wish to adopt a simpler view of
properties according to which properties are individual
entities which may apply freely to any other individual
entity; I will elaborate on this later. Also, I do not need
all the types of the full type theory; instead 1 have
specified just the types which, together with the syncate-
gorematic rules, meet my needs. Nonetheless the framework
is in the spirit of Montague’s in basic respects. in
particular, the correspondence of a semantic rule to each
syntactic rule, specifying how the denotation of a complex
expression is determined from the denotations of the struc-
tural parts, implements Montague’s version of composition-
,
-
.
V
a 1 i ty
.
in the following two sections, I will complete my
account of the semantics tor L. First 1 will introduce a
coordinate which will permit the formulation of semantic
rules tor the operators 1 and >. Then I will introduce a
speaker’s meaning coordinate, the governing of which will
irequ ire semantic rules tor the abstraction and predication
operators
.
B . treating Indeterminacy
1
• ^ Accommodati on ot Ambivalence and Variation
the denotation of an expression at an index may be a
partial function. This is true, in particular, of an
expression of type <e,t>, i.e. a one-place predicate. thus,
at any given index a predicate may be thought of as parti-
tioning the domain into three subsets. The set ot objects
definitely in the extension of a predicate at an index will
be referred as its "positive" extension; an object x belongs
to the positive extension just in case the denotation of the
predicate at 1 yields 1 when given x. Similarly, x belongs
to the "negative" extension just in case the denotation at 1
yields 0 when given x. If x is neither in the positive nor
negative extension, then it is in the extension "gap"
1 will use the term "indeterminate" for a denotation
which admits of an extension gap at an index, or tor a
predicate with such a denotation. As I suggested earlier,
predicates which admit of speakers' ambivalence or ot
intraspeaker or interspeaker variation, and for which
ordinary speakers’ judgments of extension membership must be
regarded as decisive, consequently admit of indeterminacy.
It is tor the sake of such predicates that partial functions
are allowed in the current framework.
Id5
Ut course, there are other possible motivations tor
positing indeterminacy, e.g. presupposition failure or
Mortal incorrectness". But I will be supposing that all
indeterminacy in the present fragment stems from ambivalence
and var 1 a
1
1 on
.
t
-
1 he Delineation Coordinate
1 have identified an "index" as a sequence of coordi-
nates, and have mentioned the possible world coordinate.
Now 1 want to introduce another coordinate, originally
proposed by David Lewis tor the treatment of indeterminacy
induced by ambivalence and variation (what he calls "vague-
hor Lewis a "delineation" is a specification of a
boundary. (-or example, in the case of "cool" it is a
certain temperature: relative to an index i at which the
temperature delineation is t, the positive extension of
"cool" consists of those objects with a temperature less
than or equal to t, and the negative extension consists of
those objects with a temperature greater than t. Thus, at i
" cool" is determinate; no objects are in the gap of "cool"
at l. Liearly, different predicates will require different
regarded as a sequence of delineations, each delineation
ness " )
.
1 1
; thus the delineation coordinate must be
certain predicate or predicates.
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In general a coordinate may be empty at an index, and
this is true of the delineation coordinate. Thus, the
introduction of the delineation coordinate is not incompat-
ible with the existence of indeterminate predicates, since
it isn’t required that a boundary specification always
exist. A predicate may be indeterminate at an index if at
that index the appropriate delineation is empty.
Delineations enable treatment of a number of construc-
tions and notions putatively related to i ndeter
m
1 nacy
induced by ambivalence and variation. These include “hedg-
es", the comparative construction, logical truth, and
degrees of truth. I will confine attention to the "in a
sense" hedge, the comparative construction, and logical
truth
.
Let the operator "in a sense" be represented in L by
"I", an expression which combines with an expression of type
t to form a new expression of type t. Lewis proposes
essentially the following semantic rule:
S5 . If 0 is of type t, then C I ( 0 ) 1 M ’ 1 ’ ^ = l iff there
is some index i ’ like i except perhaps at the deline-
ation coordinate such that C 0 j ’
1
’^
= l:
C I < 0 ) 3 ,1,(3 = o iff for all such i ’ [ 0 J ’ 1 ’ ^ = 0
.
"In a sense" is thus an " i ntens i ona 1 " operator in the sense
that the denotation at an index of a complex expression
formed by the operator is not determined solely by the
denotations of the constituent expressions at the same
l ndex
.
According to Lewis, it is related to the delineation
13
7
coordinate just as the modal operator "possibly" is related
to the world coordinate.
Let the operator "is more than 1 ' by represented in
L by an expression which combines with an expression ot
type <e,t> to form an expression of type <e,<e,t>X And say
that a sentence is true over a set s of delineations at an
index i just when at every index i ’ like i except perhaps at
the delineation coordinate, the sentence is true at i’ just
when the delineation of i’ belongs to s. Following Kaplan,
Lewis proposes essentially the following semantic rule:
S 6 • If ^ of t YP e <B»t> and and § are of type e,
?n LX P ) (< a. 9 >> i n ’ T ’9 = t ^ 4- kthe C >< 0(,§ 1 iff the set of deline-
ations over which £ <$ ) 15 true at i is a proper
subset of the set of delineations over which g ( (X )is true at i; 0(9 ) ( < , 3 > )] n ’ 1 ’ 9 = 0 iff the latter
set is a subset (proper or improper) of the former set.
fhe denotation of a comparative construction in thus defined
in terms of the deno tations of the cor r espo nd ing positive
construction, at various indices? in this sense the seman—
tics of the comparative is derived from the semantics ot the
positive. This is appealing, given the fact that the
1 pcomparative is morphologically derived from the positive.
Since the denotation at an index of a sentence (an
expression of type t) may be a partial function, the sen-
tence may be neither true nor false? for example, it can be
seen by inspection of SI that "Px" is neither true nor false
at an index if the denotation of "P" applied to the denota-
tion of "x" is undefined. That is why SE
,
S3, and SF
,
the
1 3ti
rules tor the logical operators, require two clauses, one
for truth-conditions, the other for falsity-conditions.
Thus even classically valid sentences may be neither true
nor false; for example, at the index just described •‘~< PxA ~
P>< } " iS neither tr^e nor false. Therefore a straightforward
definition of logical truth as truth at every index of every
model would not preserve classical logical truths. lo
remedy this, Hans Kamp and Kit Fine have proposed using van
F r aassen ’ s device of a super va 1 uat i on
.
1
3
in the present
context, the proposal amounts to defining logical truth as
truth at all of only certain indices of every model: those
indices whose delineation coordinate has no null elements.
At such indices there are no gaps (or so we may suppose),
so, given the classical definition of the logical connect-
ives, the sentences which are logically true on the new
definition are exactly the classical ones.
^
fhe basic idea of S5
,
S6
, and the account of logical
truth is to consider indices at which predicates’ extension
gaps have been closed. Whatever the intuitive appeal of
this basic idea, it is clear that the adequacy of all these
accounts depends on what can be made of the notion of a
delineation. It is not enough to simply say that is a
specification of a boundary; so far that is just to say
that, whatever a delineation is, it must serve its intended
purpose of closing up gaps. Lewis does in fact say what a
delineation is: a number, e.g. a temperature in the case of
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"cool". What he has in mind are "scalar" adjectives, whjch
are associated with a numerically measurable property (e.g.
tall", "cool", "heavy", "expensive", assoc i ated w i th
height, temperature, weight, and price); the delineations
correspond to points along a "scale". And it is clear how
delineations so conceived eliminate gaps.
The question arises, however, what sense can be made ot
delineations
- gap-closers - appropriate for predicates
other than scalar adjectives, e.g. dispositional adjectives.
(I am thu5 assuming a sense of "delineation" which may be
broader than what Lewis has in mind.) If it is held that
the method of delineations is quite generally applicable, as
Kamp and Fine (in effect) do, then this question becomes
pressing. I will be considering it further below.
C. Treating Vagueness
1 • I he Speaker's Meaning Coordinate
I he truth on an occasion of a sentence such as "John is
reckless" depends on what the speaker means. Flow can this
be accounted for?
Line approach that might come to mind is one that is
popular tor the treament of lexical ambiguity. Un this
approach we would posit, for each dispositional adjective,
distinct lexical homonyms for distinct speaker's meanings.
But this is not a viable option, because the resulting
account of competence is both impossible and m i sconce i ved
.
140
It is impossible because for each adjective there would have
to be an infinite number of basic items, making English
unknowable to everyone but God. It is misconceived because
vagueness and ambiguity are distinct phenomena. Unlike an
ambiguous term, a vague term has a unitary meaning, but on
the proposed account there is no provision for such a
mean i ng
.
1 propose instead to introduce a speaker’s meaning
coordinate to which the denotation at an index of certain
predicates is sensitive.
The most fundamental difficulty with this proposal is
that speaker’s meaning cannot be allowed to influence denota-
tion uncond 1 t 1 ona 1 1 y . Someone might mean by "John is
reckless that John eats slowly; we wouldn’t then want to
say that the statement is true if John eats slowly. Truth
depends on what is meant only when conventional constraints
are not violated. In previous terminology, this means that
we must concern ourselves, not merely with non-circular and
possibly direct answers to appropriate WDYM-questions, but
with non-circular
,
possibly direct, favoring answers.
fhe only way I see to do this is by specifying the
speaker’s meanings in the model, in particular the set I of
indices. The specification of this set includes specifica-
tion a set of possible worlds. To allow for a speaker’s
meaning coordinate, we specify, for each vague adjective (X,
a set of properties corresponding to possible speaker’s
meanin9S
' To take constraints into account, we aimply
require the properties to correspond to the suitably con-
strained speaker's meanings. Thus, if in a context someone
means by "John is reckless" that John eats at noon, the
speaker's meaning coordinate is not given by “eats at noon";
given the specification of the set I, this would be impossi-
ble.
Specification of the S ^ ’ 5 is easy given previous
results. S
reckless > for example, is none other than the set
S
rE ° f the P rev i °us chapter, i.e. the set of properties
corresponding to the set of non-circular, possibly direct,
favoring answers to the question:
<A 1 believes that John is reckless, A believes that
John is not reckless, conceptual e-reason)
.
The other S^’s can be similarly specified. We could if we
wished also define an answering relation (“more precise
than ) structuring each S ^ , but this will not turn out to
be necessary.
1 am assuming for simplicity that each is unique,
though as I mentioned in the previous chapter, this involves
certain idealizations. For convenience I will refer to
as the set of possible speaker’s meanings for cK.
,
even
though strictly speaking it is only a set of constituents of
speaker’s meanings.
Note that speaker’s meanings are no less interest-rela-
tive in semantic theory. We are interested in conceptual
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e-reasons because we are interested in truth, and conceptual
e-reasons bear on truth.
Let V be the set of predicates which are sensitive to a
speaker’s meaning coordinate. For each element c* of V
j
there is a set S*.
, the set of possible speaker’s meanings
° f
°V 1 Wl11 5UPP ° 5B that each S* also contains a "null
element" of some sort, for reasons to be explained. The
speaker’s meaning coordinate is a sequence of components,
each component corresponding to a predicate of V. More
precisely: the speaker’s meaning coordinate is an element
of Sc*
^
x S*
e
x ... x S*
n
.
What should be in V is an outstanding open question.
As I see it, there are two difficulties in deciding it. The
first is whether to admit all predicates which have possible
speaker’s meanings, or only the vague ones. The second,
conditional on the first, is to determine which predicates
in particular are therefore in V. Neither of these ques-
tions is yet clear enough to answer
. I hope, however, that
it is clear at least that V is non-empty. In any case I
will suppose that it contains a small number of disposi-
tional adjectives.
Though the speaker’s meaning coordinate is actually a
sequence, I hereby warn the reader that I will often refer
to a single component of the sequence as "the speaker’s
meaning coordinate” when it is clear which component I mean.
When there is an entry in a component of the speaker's
1^3
meaning coordinate at an index, that will mean that in the
context of utterance there 15 a speaker’s meaning in the
sense, not merely of a non-circular, possibly direct,
favoring answer to a relevant WDYM-quest i on
, but also of a
true and direct answer. That is, the speaker in the context
will have a certain conceptual e-reason for the belief
expressed by his utterance. We might say that truth and
directness relative to a context tie a member of the set of
possible senses to that context.
2 • Properties, Abstraction, and Predication
The point of introducing a speaker's meaning coordinate
is to allow speaker’s meaning to influence denotation. But
before showing how this may be done, I must discuss some
prel iminaries.
Properties are irreducible entities in the domain of
the model. The function P, a component of the model, takes
a property and a world and returns a denotation - a function
from individuals to truth-values which yields true just for
those entities which have the given property at the given
world. Thus, properties have a "dual mode of existence", in
that there are both properties as individual entities and
"propositional functions" which correspond to them. ^ Corre-
spondingly, there are two kinds of expression denoting the
two modes. Closed expressions of the form rx[ 0 denote
properties - irreducible entities - while closed expressions
l<f<f
form x[0]^ (as well as basic expressions of type
<e,t>) denote functions from individuals to truth-values,
functions which are determined by the property denoted by
16
The following rules implement these ideas.
f
7
‘
^l,i^g° f type and v isj variable, thenLvl0 J : ’9 = F(i ,V[0] ( ::.%)), Where the y sare the variables occurring free in v[0]
, and for all
Y k’ =u k -
vC ^ J a
( y.'-- is vC $ 3 a with the v k ’ s replaced by the
C 0 J ( u <
" ' u
respective u.’s; the latter are stipulated to be constants
of type e such that F ( i ,’u
|<
)
= u
,
for all i. v j \ ")ay.-' y*
is thus guaranteed to be closed, so that F assigns a value
to it relative to i.
SB
- lt ^Mii,§ f type then = P (world of
i
,
L X, J 9 ) .
P must be defined for entities which are not properties as
well as for properties, but I will not be concerned with how
this is done
.
3 • Speaker’s Meaning and Denotation
Since properties are " intensional " entities, in the
sense that c oex tens i ona 1 properties need not be identical,
the property denoted by a closed abstract will not vary from
world to world, as extensions do. More precisely, the
denotation of a closed abstract will not vary as the world
coordinate is varied and the other index coordinates are
held fixed; in this sense the denotation of a closed ab-
stract is "rigid". However, it is still open for the
1 *45
denotation of a closed =h = -t-r-a abst act to vary with other coordi-
nates. In particular, it may vary with the speaker’s
meaning. The denotation of the corresponding ^expression
would then be indirectly influenced as well. In this way
the extension of a predicative expression would depend on
the speaker’s meaning.
I he following semantic rule realizes these ideas.
SO. If P is an expression of type <e,t> which is an cXfor some of e V, and if v is a variable, and if the j4h
component Of the speaker’s meaning coordinate of i is a
non-null element p, then CvC^(v)] j n,1,<3 _ p _
SO says that if there is a speaker’s meaning at an index for
a vague predicate, the correspond i ng abstract denotes the
property which is that speaker’s meaning. By SB, the
denotation of the predicative expression Av [ Q(v) J would
0
then be the denotation determined by the speaker’s meaning
(a property) at the world of the index. Thus we have the
dependence of truth on speaker’s meaning.
Note that since the model function F assigns properties
to closed abstracts relative to indices, SO may be regarded
]as a constraint on F. Another constraint on F is the
f o 1 1 ow i ng
:
SP . If 0 is of type t, v is a variable, and £. i s a
x N , i , “constant of tyoe e, then C <2) ^ ]
L A v L 0 ] ( Z
g _
where 0 ^ is 0 with all free occurrences of v replaced by
£ . 17 SP enables me to abbreviate A -express i ons by simple
predicates when convenient.
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^ • Occasional Ana 1 yt ic i tv
In Chapter 2, I noted that the having of a conceptual
e-reason gives rise to a certain kind of necessity, at least
relative to a speaker. If, f or example, someone on an
occasion means by "John is reckless" that John spends money
without checking his account, then that someone will on the
occasion consider the sentence "John spends money without
checking his account if and only if he is reckless" to be
necessarily true. Now that I’ve concluded that truth
depends on speaker’s meaning, I drop the speaker
-re 1 at i v i ty
of this necessary truth. I now say that, given that the
speaker means what he does, the sentence is on this occasion
— t^c t necessarily true, and not merely in the view of the
speaker .
To see how this is implemented, let’s first suppose for
simplicity that the only two index coordinates are the
speaker’s meaning and the possible world. Now suppose A
and A2 are closed abstracts, where A1 but not A2 is sensi-
tive to the speaker’s meaning coordinate. Then in accord-
ance with SO, A1 denotes s at <<..., s ,...>, w>
,
tor all
properties s and worlds w (where s is the entry at the
component of the speaker’s meaning coordinate corresponding
to Al). Let 5^ be some property which A1 denotes at
<<..., s ,...>, w> for all w. Suppose A£ denotes si at <S,w>
for all speaker’s meaning coordinates S and worlds w. (Note
that since A2 is not sensitive to a speaker’s meaning
IV/
coordinate, saying it denotes a property at all <S,w> is the
same as saying it denotes a property at all w.) Then AS,
like Al, denotes s
x
at <<..., s 1 *> for all * . Hence,
by SB, the A-expr ess i ons cor respond i ng to Al and A£ have
the same denotation at <<..., ,...> ,w> for all w. In other
words, the predicative expressions corresponding to Al and
AB are necessarily equivalent given the speaker’s meaning
for Al . Thus AAl(j) * AAB(j)"1 is necessarily true given
the speaker’s meaning for Al (and given a standard account
the desired result. Thus, for example, "John is
reckless if and only if John spends money without ever
check 1 ng his account is necessarily true on an occasion if
on the occasion the speaker means by "John is reckless" that
John spends money without ever checking his account.
If AB is complex, as I am supposing, then it is not on
the present treatment sensitive to the speaker’s meaning
coordinate. But it is interesting to consider the case where
AB is thus sensitive. If Al and AS are both sensitive, then
by SO it is true of each that it denotes s at all
<<• . . , s , . . . > , w > , where s is an entry at the relevant compo-
nent. Let Al denote s^ and AS denote sB at
<<..., s , s ,...>, w> for all w, where s^ is the entry corre-
sponding to Al
,
and sB is the entry corr espond i ng to AB . We
then have that if si is identical to sB , then Al and AB
denote the same property across all worlds, from which it
follows that rAAl< j)«—> AAB(j)"1 is necessarily true given
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the speaker’s meanings for A1 and A2 . In other words,
identical speaker’s meanings give rise to occasional analy-
tic 1 ty . 18
It is useful to compare this treatment of occasional
ana lyticity with a standard treatment of traditional analy-
ticity, one which uses the notion of a
-'meaning postulate".
A meaning postulate is a device for formalizing a necessary
but non- logical inference such as that from "The ball is
red" to "The ball is colored". It may be regarded as a
formula which any model must make true, at every index. For
example, the meaning postulate
< V x ) (Rx -4 Cx )
guarantees that at any index of any model, anything in the
extension of "red" is also in the extension of "colored".
Clearly, however
, the validity of inferences involving con-
ceptual e-reasons couldn’t be accounted for in this way.
First of all, such inferences are not valid at every index;
and even putting this aside, it would be impossible to
specify all the required meaning postulates. These diffi-
culties reflect the difference between traditional analyti-
city and occasional analyticity: the latter is necessary
truth given a speaker’s meaning, which implies both occa-
sion-dependence and a multiplicity of possible occasions.
5 . Denotation at an Empty Index
a. Introduction
199
I mentioned earlier that each S contains a null
element. But while SO covers the case where the speaker's
meaning coordinate is non-null, it does not cover the case
where it is null. When there is a non-null entry, there is
a speaker’s meaning in the sense of a true, non-circular,
direct, favoring answer to a relevant WDYM-quest i on . When
there is a null entry, there is no such answer. There will
generally be one of two explanations for this. One is that
there is a true and direct answer which is not a favoring
answer, i.e. the speaker has a conceptual e-reason which is
19
~T~improper. The alternative is that there is no true,
direct, and non—circular answer, i.e. the speaker has
nothing more precise in mind. In either case, the speaker
has given up his prerogative to influence denotation, thus
giving way entirely to "conventional" mechanisms.
I will call an index at which a component of the
speaker's meaning coordinate is null an "empty" index (where
the significance of this is understood to be relative to the
predicate to which the component cor r esponds ) . If SO is not
invoked because an index is empty, then other semantic rules
(SC, if is a vague adjective) will determine denotation.
But this is not to say very much about the nature of this
denotation. I turn now to a discussion of this issue.
b. The Attributive Theory of Adjectives
I begin by considering a well-known theory of ad jec-
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ves which entails that dispositional adjectives are not
predicates at all, contrary to what we’ve been assuming.
According to this theory, the meaning of an adjective is a
function from intensions of common noun phrases to other
20such intensions. For example, the intension of "skillful"
is held to be a function that maps the intension of, e.g.,
1 c
"doctor" to the intension of "skillful doctor". Formally,
the proposal is that all adjectives take an expression of
type <e,t> to form another such expression, and the semant
rules for the denotation at an index of a complex <<($), withoC
an adjective and 9 a common noun phrase, depends on the
denotation at that index, and perhaps other indices, of Q ;
in this sense all adjectives are "attributive". It is
plausible to maintain this for all adjectives because many
different kinds of dependency can be accommodated. 21
1 would suggest, however, that dispositional adjectives
are not attributive. As I see it, the basic facts about
"skillful", for example, are that "skillful" is very vague -
so that when "skillful" does not explicitly modify a common
noun phrase, as for example in "John is skillful", one is
quite likely to wonder what is meant - and that this vague-
ness may be reduced by providing a (properly constrained)
speaker’s meaning. Now, if "skillful" were attributive,
then certain ways of reducing vagueness would enjoy a
privileged status. The denotation of an expression con-
taining "skillful" would be defined in exactly those con-
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texts in which by "skinful" the speaker means something ot
the form r skillful p
"
1 (to put it loosely). So, for example,
the denotation of an expression of the form r John is a
skillful P
*
1 would be defined, as would the denotation of
"John is skillful", provided an <e , t >- i ntens i on were given
by context; but otherwise the denotation of "John is skill-
ful" would be undefined. This strikes me as artificial.
n the one hand, why should we suppose that denotation
is defined at all contexts of the specified sort? If
denotation is denied "John is skillful" for reasons of
vagueness, then the question arises why it is not denied
John is a skillful basketball player", for example. The
latter is less vague than "John is skillful", but of course
a speaker still might mean different things by "skillful
basketball player", e.g. that John is an accurate shooter or
that John easily eludes defenders. The difficulty is that
we have no account of why the reduction in vagueness pro-
vided by ’"skillful P n is guaranteed to be "enough" of a
reduction to insure a denotation, and such an account is
required in light of the fact that denotation is denied
"John is skillful".
On the other hand, why should we suppose that denota-
tion is defined only at contexts of the specified sort?
Suppose that by "John is skillful" a speaker means that John
is able to walk along narrow surfaces with his eyes closed.
I take it that there is no <e , t >- i ntens i on such that this
1 52
speaker
’ s meaning is exactly captured By applying the
intension of '•skillful.' to this intension. The intension of
"walker of narrow surfaces" comes to mind, but this won’t do
because a speaker might mean by this, not that John is able
to walk along narrow surfaces with his eyes closed, but that
he can do it very quickly. According to the attributive
theory, then, the denotation of "John is skillful" is
undefined in this context. But if we are going to allow
denotations at all, as the attributive theory does in
certain contexts, it is hard to see how we could justify
ruling it out in this case. 22
1 emphasize that my point here is not that in this
instance there is no noun-phrase with an appropriate <e,t>-
lntension. That would not be a very telling point, for the
attributive view does not entail that an appropriate <e,t>-
intension be expressible at all; a non-pr enom i na 1 adjective
might somehow be supplied with such an inexpressible inten-
sion from context. My point rather is that there is no
appropriate intension at all, expressible or not; there is
no intension which, in combination with the putative inten-
sion of "skillful", would capture the meaning of "being able
to walk along narrow surfaces with one’s eyes closed". The
intuitive reason is that any result of applying the inten-
sion of "skillful" to an <e , t >- i nt ens i on cannot do justice
to the fact that in "being able to walk along narrow sur-
faces with one’s eyes closed", the word "skillful" has been
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"unpacked "
.
In sum, I take it that the temptation to regard "skill-
ful" as attributive stems from its being very vague, and the
fact that this vagueness is reduced when there is a modified
common noun phrase. It is tempting to say that a sentence
such as "John is skillful" can’t be "interpreted", while
"John is a skillful doctor", for example, can be; it is then
natural to suppose that the denotation of "John is skillful"
is undefined, while that of "John is a skillful doctor" is
defined. I think that there is in fact a sense in which one
can’t interpret "John is skillful" (cf. Chapter 2
, pp .
But this sense of "can’t interpret" isn’t the
required sense of "lacking a (communal) meaning", but rather
has to do with the apprehension of vagueness. Moreover
this vagueness may be reduced in many different ways, and it
seems quite arbitrary to single out the providing of a
common noun phrase as necessary and sufficient for a denota-
tion. It seems more natural to regard "skillful" as being
of type <e,t>, but context-dependent. Then for every proper-
ly constrained speaker’s meaning, there is a denotation
(appropriately influenced).
An apparent difficulty with taking "skillful" to be
r“
<e,t> is that it seems to follow that John is a skillful P
must be analyzed as rJohn is skillful and a R n . This seems
to entail that the argument
1 Z)H
John is a skillful doctor;
John is a basketball player;
Hence, John is skillful basketball player,
is valid, which it is not. However, as Huffy Siegel has
pointed out, such an invalidity need not commit one to an
attributive reading of an adjective. The argument
John is a tall doctor;
John is a basketball player;
Hence, John is a tall basketball player.
is likewise invalid, but Siegel argues that '‘tall" is
nonetheless <e,t>. It is just that "tall" is context-de-
pendent; in particular
, that denotation depends on a con-
textual 1 y-g i ven "comparison class". Un this analysis there
1 ^ prediction of validity, since we may have different
contexts in different lines of the argument. lhus, John can
be a doctor, tall (for a doctor), and a basketball player,
without being tall (for a basketball player). Similarly, 1
would argue that John can be a doctor, skillful (in his
capacity as a doctor), and a basketball player, without
being skillful (in his capacity as a basketball player).
The only difference is that here the denotation is dependent
on a different feature of context - not a comparison class,
but the speaker's meaning.
^
Hans Kamp has criticized that view that all adjectives
are attributive, arguing that the interpretation of the
comparative form of an adjective ought to be definable in
terms of the l nterpretat i on of the cor respond l ng positive
i bb
torm, and that it adjectives are treated attr ibutively, this
be done in a satisfactory way. However, Kamp is
willing to allow that a wide range of adjectives might still
be so treated. He remarks:
It should be pointed out that the second theory Li.e.his theory treating adjectives as predicatesJ itself
can^ hardly be regarded as compr ehend 1 ng all adjectives,is alleged" a predicate, even in the most diluted
sense ? It seems not... The same can be said to be true,to an almost egual degree, of adjectives such astake
, skillful", or "good". Where precisely we
should draw the boundaries of the class of adjectives
to which the second theory applies 1 do not know. hor
example, does "skillful" belong to this class? Surely
we must always ask "skillful what?" before we can
answer the guestion whether a certain thing or person
is indeed "skillful"; this suggests that the theory
is not applicable to the word "skillful". Vet there
appears to be some plausibility in the view that
having a good deal of skill" does function as a
predicate — be it a highly ambiguous one as there are
so many different skills. Here the guestion whether we
face an expression that stands for a function from
properties to properties Ci.e. an attributive adjec-
tive! or rather an ambiguous predicate which is disam-
biguated by accompanying expressions for properties has
perhaps no definite answer. Both views appear to be
equally plausible accounts of the same phenomenon. So
it may be impossible to determine in a non-arbitpary
manner how far the domain of our theory extends.
1 have been arguing that the two theories do no t provide
"equally plausible accounts of the same phenomenon". Once
we are clear on the phenomenon, on the "highly ambiguous"
nature of "skillful" < and 1 would suggest, not that we
"must always ask 'skillful what?’", but that more generally
we must ask, or would be apt to ask, "’skillful'1 in what
sense!1 " - a paraphrase of the relevant WDYM-quest i on ) , the
attributive construal seems artificial. The set of adjec-
i bt>
ves to which the attributive theory comfortably extends,
granted that it is not empty, is thus smaller than Kamp s
remarks suggest; correspondingly, the domain ot kamp’s own
theory is larger. Now, inasmuch as my arguments have expli-
citly concerned only dispositional adjectives, 1 too cannot
confidently specify a boundary. But 1 offer this specula-
tion: the attributive theory extends only to those adjec-
tives which, without a common noun phrase, cannot combine
with a subject term to form a sentence. So, tor example, it
extends to "alleged" and "former", since "John is alleged"
and "John is former" are not grammatical, but not to "take",
"skillful", or "good". This speculation is based on my
guess that almost all adjectives not in this class, even it
they exhibit important differences with respect to vague-
ness, are sufficiently similar to the dispositional adjec-
tives so that the arguments I ’ ve made against an attributive
construa 1 of "skillful" apply.
1 claim to have shown that "skillful" is not an attri-
butive adjective. Strictly speaking, though, I've shown no
such thing. As I mentioned earlier, many adjectives can be
treated formally as attributive. In particular, an intui-
tively predicative adjective can be treated as attributive
provided that in every model there is an <e , t >- l ntens l on A
such that the denotation at an index i ot pc (
S
), with £> a
common noun phrase, is identical to the conjunction of A
evaluated at i and the intension of 3 evaluated at i (with
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'conjunction" defined in an obvious way); A would thus be
the "intuitive" intension of DC. I am content, however, to
conclude simply that "skillful" is not gar ad i gma tic a 1 1
y
attributive, but rather is intuitively predicative. But it
1 m right in speculating that the arguments I’ve used for
"skillful" are widely applicable, then presumably the
ar t l f i c i a 1 i ty of treating all adjectives as attributive
would weigh against the gain in uniformity. In any case 1
will continue to suppose that dispositional adjectives are
£ 6)
of type ke ,
t
> .
b. bluster Concepts
1 have been concerned with the nature of a vague
adjective s denotation at an empty index. It vague adjec-
tives are not attributive but predicative, then this denota-
tion is a function from individual entities to truth-values.
(Note, incidentally, that the existence of such a denotation
entails that it would be inaccurate to say that the denota-
tion of a vague sentence is a function of the speaker's
meaning. ) I now want to examine the nature of this denota-
tion.
Une might infer from the vagueness of "reckless" that
nothing could be reckless or not reckless simpliciter, but
only in this or that sense . In that case the partition of
"reckless" at an empty index would be, as a matter of
principle, completely indeterminate (i.e. everything in the
15H
gap., where by "a matter of pr.nc Ipl e-, 1 mean that the
indeterminacy is independent of properties of individuals in
the domain. Ihis entails that competent speakers can't
judge the truth of "John is reckless" if they assume that
there is no speaker's meaning (given that dispositional
adjectives are not natural kind terms). But this seems
incorrect. 1 noted earlier (pp. 128-9) that one's uncer-
tainty with respect to whether an object is in the extension
ot a vague predicate may stem from not knowing what the
speaker means. This phenomenon is of a piece with the
commonsense notion that truth depends on speaker's meaning;
tor obviously if one takes this to be so, one will not
presume to judge the truth of a vague sentence without
knowledge of the speaker's meaning. However, this does not
entail that if one supposes that there is no speaker's
meaning, one can't possibly judge truth; that is a different
matter. To see that this isn't so, it suffices to consider
the possibility of an individual reckless in every possible
sense; by anyone's lights, such an individual would surely
quality as reckless simpliciter (as opposed to reckless in
such-andsuch a sense). So if John is such an individual,
then "John is reckless" is true at an empty index (and, ot
27course, at all other indices as well).
However, being reckless in every possible sense is
surely not necessary; consider, e.g., an individual reck-
less in every possible sense except the sense of liking to
1 59
race mqpeds down aH eys crowded with hot-dog vendors.
, he
guest ion then arises: given that definite membership at an
empty index is possible in principle, what exactly is
required 7 (Of course an analogous question arises for
definite non-membership as well, but 1 will concentrate on
the positive extension.
)
i don't know how to give a precise answer to this
question. Here we face difficulties similar to those which
have led some to posit, with respect to certain terms, a
cluster concept". Perhaps we may view the membership
conditions at an empty index as an infinite disjunction of
conjunctions, each conjunction consisting of properties
deemed jointly sufficient for membership. I’m not sure if
everyone would be happy with this way of char ac ter 1 z 1 ng a
cluster concept, but in any case I wouldn’t want to say
without qualification that dispositional adjectives give
rise to cluster concepts. The crucial point is that we are
talking here about the special circumstance when there is no
speaker’s meaning; when there is a speaker’s meaning, the
requirements tor membership are more definite (but see
below) . 1 take it that no similar allowance is part of the
usual notion of a cluster concept. Perhaps it could be
said, though, that a dispositional adjective gives rise to a
cluster concept relative to an empty index.
Earlier in this chapter I remarked that sometimes
people tacitly think of dispositional adjectives as natural
1 6U
klnd terms
’ that they might take themselves to be reason-
ing non-demonstratively in saying, e.g.,
-'if John is good at
math, then he is intelligent-, as opposed to taking John to
be intelligent just in the sense of being good at math.
While 1 argued that nonetheless these adjectives could not
be regarded as natural kind terms, 1 also said that we could
still perhaps allow for a non-demonstrative rendering. It
is now apparent how we can do this. In cases of non-demon-
strative reasoning, an utterer of, e.g., "John is intelli-
gent" has no conceptual e-reason, but only a non-conceptual
one, e.g. John’s being good at math. Hence the sentence
must be evaluated at an empty index. Since being good at
math is presumably not sufficient for being intelligent
simpliciter, i.e. for being in the positive extension of
intelligent' at this index, the speaker’s reasoning is not
demonstrative - the desired result. Of course, it is not
the sort of non-demonstrative reasoning that the speaker has
in mind; it is not an inference to the possession of some
sort of b l o 1 og i ca 1 1 y-based property, but rather to the
possession of certain superficial properties. But in my
view the speaker is simply mistaken as to the nature of his
non—demonstr at i ve reasoning, owing to his mistake of taking
"intelligent" as a natural kind term.
the empty-index denotation of a vague predicate allows
me to account for sentences like:
John and Bob are both reckless, but in different ways.
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Intuitively, "reckless" here has so»e reading
-Met, ls
dlst.net from any particular sense in
-hich John or Bob
might be reckless. In contrast, consider the deviant
sentence
:
kinds
3
?e n°VH
Ch t0 * bank
’ but to Afferent
. < .g. John to a river bank, Bob to a money bank)
fhe reason this is deviant is because "bank 1 ' here requires a
neutral reading, but it has none. Whereas an occurrence ot
bank" must be associated with some particular sense, an
occurrence ot "reckless" can be read neutrally via evalua-
tion at an empty index.
It is a widely recognized fact that it is often very
difficult to give a word a precise contex t- 1 ndependent
definition. In the case of dispositional adjectives (and,
actually, many other words as well), I would relate this
difficulty to that of specifying the membership conditions
at an empty index. This difficulty raises the question:
how is it that we can know the meanings of these words when
it is so hard to say what they "mean"? My solution to this
problem is a variant of the W i t tgensten 1 an doctrine that the
meaning ot a word is not a thing that can be "given", but
rather is something that one acquires upon learning how to
"use" a word. For me the relevant sense ot "using" a
(vague) expression is meaning something by it (in the
relevant sense), and knowing "how" to use it entails knowing
constraints on what one can mean. fhe latter must be
1 6cf
carefully distinguished from knowing membership conditions
at an empty index (such as they are,. ,his is not that
which is known by a competent speaker, but is merely an
” ePiphenomenon'' stemming from the multiplicity of possible
usages, one which appears when there is no usage. Its
intractability indicates not that we don’t know the meanings
of our words, but only that usage is essential to under-
standing, both of each other and of the world.
6 • "In a Sense" Revisited
1 now turn to considering how the introduction of a
speaker’s meaning coordinate affects the constructions
considered earlier
. I begin with "in a sense".
Intuitively, the application of "in a sense" to a
sentence such as "John is reckless" should induce evaluation
at indices which differ at the speaker’s meaning coordinate,
and not the delineation coordinate. The construction should
be true if "John is reckless" is true at some index where
the speaker means, for example, that John runs red lights,
even it at this index "reckless" has an extension gap.
Thus, Lewis’s account of "in a sense" is, at the very least,
not fully general. I leave open the question of whether it
is correct if we confine attention to scalar adjectives. 1
also leave open the question of whether the speaker’s
meaning account subsumes, or could be made to subsume, the
scalar case.
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In any case we need a new semantic rule. A rule which
is exactly analogous to Lewis’s but in which the speaker's
meaning is shifted instead of the delineation is the fol-
iowi ng
:
S9 . It (f) is of type
some index i ’ like 1
meaning coordinate C
1 "f t tor all such 1 7
t
’ then Cl ( 0 ) J M ’ 1 = l if t tor
(he multiplicity of (constrained) speaker’s meanings means
that a great many indices are considered. So it is very
easy tor a sentence such as "In a sense John is reckless" to
be true.
M further development seems to be necessary. Lonsider
"In a sense John is reckless and diligent." Assuming that
the speaker’s meaning coordinate has components tor both
reckless and "diligent", this sentence is true at an index
on the present account just when the conjunction is true at
some index dittering at either or both components, i.e. just
when John is reckless in a sense and John is diligent in a
sense • Since in a sense" is treated as a sentential
modifier, there is no way for either adjective to be singled
out. However, it appears that "in a sense" can in tact be
selective, as for example in "John is reckless in a sense
and diligent". That is, "in a sense" can act as a predicate
mod l
f
i er
.
Let "I " be the sentential "in a sense" modifier
defined by S9
,
and let "Ip" be the predicate modifier. It
1 £>H
nught appear that latter renders the former superfluous.
hor example, “Ig.Rj A D j>" might be rendered as I <R,,, A
P J
'IpdlMj"). However
, the sentential modifier may in tact be
indispensable, for reasons 1 will explain later.
In any case, I propose the following rule.
S10. If £ is of type <e,t>, then [ I__ ( Q ) /' ’ 1 ’ 9 ls th tfunction from individuals to truth-values which, whengiven an individual a, yields true iff L P j^’ 1 ’
9
( )
lnVu
S trUe + ° r S° me 1 ’ ilke 1 exceP t Perhaps at thispeaker s meaning coordinate; and Cl (P)]^’ 1 ’^ Vlf=ldc.
o given a iff 1 e P’
1 > 9
< a > ytelds 6 for all i^Uke texcept perhaps at the speaker's meaning coordinate.
f course, a new syntactic rule must also be introduced.
Now consider the related operator "in the sense of ..."
(as in "John is clever in the sense of quick-witted").
Intuitively what this operator does is induce evaluation of
the operand at an index with a particular speaker's meaning;
the relation between "in a sense" and "in the sense of" is
analogous to that between "somewhere" and "in Chile".
Assume that "in the sense of" is represented in L by "J", an
expression which takes an expression of type <e,t> to form
an expression which takes an expression of type <.e,t> to
form another expression of type <e,t>; that is, "J" takes a
predicate to form a predicate modifier. 1 hen we have:
Sli. If £ _and JfcL are expressions of type <e,t>, then
L ( J
(
^ ) 3 is that function from individuals to
truth-value^ wt^iich, when given an individual n, yields
1 iff C 3 ,X ’ ^ <n) yields 1 for an i ’ which is like
l except that the (component of the) speaker’s meaninq
coordinate for is Cx[Q ( x ) 3 J ’ 1 ’ ^ (for an arbitrary
variable X
)
^
=*pd t ( J ( P ) ) ( ^_ ) ^
’
1
’
^ yields 0 when given
n iff C 3 ’ ’ (n) yields 0 for an i’ which is like i
excep t . . . etc
.
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Sll guarantees the necessary equivalence ot
, tor
example, John is clever in the sense of quick-witted" and
"John is clever" evaluated at an index where quick-wi tted-
ness is the speaker's meaning; if this coordinate is held
fixed, the sentences are true in all the same worlds. Sll
is motivated by my observation of the previous chapter that
"in the sense of" is used to make a speaker's meaning
explicit <p. 102-3). Mote, however, that if x C ?<x,J does
a
not denote a proper speaker's meaning fori, then, given
the specification of the set I, the required index i
' wi u
not exist, so that neither the truth nor the falsity clause
is satisfied. So, for example,
-John is clever in the sense
of being slow afoot" is truth-valueless at any index, regard-
less of whether John is slow afoot. Note that, in contrast,
evaluation of "John is clever" in a context in which the
speaker means that John is slow afoot is evaluation at an
empty index, so that the result is not necessarily truth-
value 1 essness
. This disanalogy seems right to me; the fact
that the improper speaker's meaning is explicit in the one
case but not the other seems to me to matter. in what case
but not the other
, there's something deviant about "what is
said".
I he existence of "in the sense of ..." confirms the
treatment of "in a sense" as shifting on the speaker’s
meaning coordinate. For evidently the latter must shift on
whatever sort of thing is expressed by the "..." in "in the
1 <b6
sense of and this is not a boundary
mean 1 ng
.
When I proposed specifying speaker’s meanings in the
model, I mentioned that it Was possible to detine an "an-
swering relation on a set of speaker’s meanings. However,
this relation is not needed for S9
, S10, or Sll. As I am
not aware of any other operators which would require the
relation, I presume that we can do without it.
Ihe account of "in a sense" offered here is at best
partial. Not only am I unsure whether or how "in a sense"
applies to scalars, as I mentioned previously (see note £8),
1 am also unsure whether or how it applies to normative
terms. Ihe latter problem arises in light of my previous
conclusion that a "sense" of "good" does not involve speak-
er s meaning in the sense of a conceptual e-reason. (See
PP ' ^ ^ Perhaps "in a sense" can’t be treated as an
operator at all in these cases, or perhaps it simply must be
linked to a different coordinate. But in any case it is
clear that "in a sense" can’t be given a uniform treatment.
7 . Ihe Comparative Revisited
When the truth of a simple vague sentence such as "John
is reckless" depends on what the speaker means, so too does
the truth of a correspond i ng comparative sentence, such as
"John is more reckless than Bob". The latter sentence, for
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example, might be true if what is meant lB that John runs
red lights more frequently than Bob, but false if what is
meant is that John is more careless with money than Bob. In
order to take this into account, we must modify SB’s policy
of considering every possible delineation in the semantic
rule for comparatives. Ue should consider only those
delineations dictated by, or "consistent with", the speak-
er's meaning. For example, if a speaker means that John
spends recklessly, then we should consider only those
delineations which somehow render definite judgments on
borderline spenders.
My goal is not to formulate a new rule which will be
able to handle scalar adjectives as well as vague ones;
rather I will concentrate on the latter task. To be sure,
if the new rule were to succeed, then the question would
arise whether it could be made to subsume, rather than
supplement, S6
. It will turn out, though, that the question
doesn’t arise.
Define the "SM-set" of delineations over which 0 is
true at i to be the set of those member s of the set of
delineations over which (j) is true at 1 which are con-
sistent with the speaker s meaning at 1 (or, more precisely,
with some speaker’s meaning in the speaker’s meaning coordi-
nate at i); let D(i, (/> ) designate this set. Ihen we can
formulate the following rule:
S12. If P is of type <e,t> and Od and $ are of type e,
1 60
; [>(?)(a 3 > v , M > i , g 1 T D < 1 » ? <_5 ) ) C D(i,e
?( Q ° - 0 iff D< i , e <crf ) ) C
then
<«>*))
D< i , <? ( £ ) ) .
" hB relatlon " is consistent with", defined on the set of
delineations and the union of the sets of speaker’s mean-
ings, ,s now presumed specified in the model.) Notice that
the conditions for the negative extension of r > < ? ) ( < at , g >
are those we’d want to specify for the positive extension of
r >=(P)(<l§ ,oi>)"\ where >= ( p ,n may be read „ at least a5 p
as "
.
tariier I expressed my belief that an "in a sense"
sentential operator, as defined in S9
, may not be dispens-
able in favor of a predicate operator
, as defined in S10.
I m now in a position to say why. Consider "In a sense John
is more reckless than Bob". On the S10 reading of "in a
sense", we must, despite appearances, render this as
> ( I ( R
)
) ( <
j
,
b > ) " ; that is, the comparative must have wider
scope than "in a sense". But this is not an intuitively
correct reading. Indeed, it is difficult to understand; by
SIC and SIB "In a sense John is more reckless than Bob" is
true at i only if, whenever "Bob is reckless" is true at
some l ’ which i ’ like i except that the delineation coordi-
nate is d (where d is consistent with the speaker's meaning
at i) and except perhaps at the speaker's meaning coordi-
nate, "John is reckless" is true at some i ' 'which is like 1
except that the delineation coordinate is d, and except
perhaps at the speaker's meaning coordinate. The intuitive
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reading, however, is one in which "in a sense" assumes wide
scope; this requires construing "in a sense" as a sentential
operator. Thus, if the comparative is to be construed as an
operator forming two-place predicates out of one-place
predicates, then we must have S9 in addition to S10.
Since I've posited an empty-index denotation for
positives, evidently I must do the same for corresponding
comparatives. But SIB does not yet determine a denotation
at an empty index, since the SM-set of a sentence at an
empty index is undefined. So let it be defined as the set
of those delineations over which the sentence is true at the
index which are consistent with some speaker’s meaning;
presumably this is simply the set of delineations over which
the sentence is true at the index. 31 Then SIB entails that
John s being more reckless than Bob in every possible sense
suffices for "John is more reckless than Bob" being true at
an empty index. For if John is more reckless than Bob in
every possible sense then "John is more reckless than Bob"
is true at every non-empty index; i.e. for every non-empty
i
,
D ( i , R ( b ) ) d D(i ,R(j)). And given the definition of
the SM-set at an empty index, this entails that at an empty
index i, D(i,R(b)) C D(i,R(j)), which is to say that at 1
"John is more reckless than Bob" is true. The latter,
however, may not entail that John is more reckless than Bob
in every possible sense; it depends on whether there are
subsets of the set of speaker’s meanings of "reckless" such
1 7U
that all delineations are consi^tontu s e with some speaker's
meaning in the subset.
S
’ cour se, indeterminacy at an empty index.
To see this, suppose that John is more reckless than Bob in
one sense, but Bob is more reckless than John in another
sense. That is, [ > ( R ) ( < j , b
>
) J
M
’ 1
1
» 9
_ 1 and
[
->(R)(\b,j>)] 9 = 1, where the speaker’s meaning of ll
is distinct from the speaker’s meaning of 12. By the first
clause of S12, this means that D(il,R(b>) C D<il,R<j>), and
that D(i2,R(j)) C. D ( i 2 , R ( b ) )
.
Hence if i is an empty index,
D(i,R(j)) is not a subset, proper or otherwise, of
D ( i , R ( b ) ) ; and D(i,R(b)) is not a subset, proper or other-
wise, of D<i,R(j)). So by S 1 2 , <j,b> is in neither the
positive nor the negative extension of " > ( R )
"
at i. (Simi-
larly for <b,j>.) In light of the multiplicity of possible
speaker’s meanings, in a true-to-life model it is very easy
for a pair <x,y> to be such that x is more reckless than y
in one sense but y is more reckless than x is another sense,
fheref ore in a true-to-life model indeterminacy at an empty
index is very great.
Scalar adjectives are linear in the sense that their
comparative forms don’t admit of extension gaps; the preced-
ing shows that dispositional adjectives are not linear in
32this sense. Note, however, that it would be misleading to
call dispositional adjectives "multidimensional", inasmuch
as this suggests that they can be "resolved" into linear
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"components"
. In the present context this wouid amount to
the claim that a simple comparative like "John is more
reckless than Bob", though nonlinear at an empty index, is
nonetheless linear at any non-empty index. But this isn't
50, intuitively. An informal analogue of the argument that
there pan be indeterminacy at an empty index can be made for
any non-empty index whose speaker's meaning intuitively has
further speaker’s meanings. (I can't, however, construct a
formal analogue without expanding the current framework to
allow for the sensitivity of complex predicates to a speak-
er ' s meaning coordinate.)
The foregoing conclusions are all conditional on the
correctness of 512 as an account of vague comparatives. But
is it correct 7 As I’ve noted previously, we must have some
account of delineations beyond simply the stipulation that
they close up gaps; without such an account, S12 is just
wishful thinking. However
, the needed account proves
Delineations are satisfactorily explained as
numbers in the case of scalars, but evidently we can’t say
the same for d i spos i t i ona 1 adjectives (not even, I presume,
for "intelligent", IQ tests notwithstanding). What then?
Delineations could not be speaker’s meanings, as I noted in
connection with "in a sense", since speaker’s meanings do
not close up gaps. Nor could they be arbitrary stipulations
("this object is in, that one is out, etc."); they would
close gaps, but then by S12 no object could ever be more
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anything than anything else. 33
1 submit that gap-closers for dispositional adjectives
do not exist. 3' Kamp similarly concludes that gap-closers
don’t in general exist, saying that
-'most tsemanticalj
decisions will fail to render the relevant predicates
completely sharp. They will only make them sharper-' (where
by "sharp" he means "determinate"). 35 But he doesn’t then
give up the notion of a gap-closer. Rather, he renders a
"complete model" (in effect, the model function F evaluated
at an index where there is no indeterminacy) as a construc-
tion out of "partial models" (F at indices where there is
indeterminacy) which have been made more determinate, by
"semantical decisions", than some original partial model. 36
If Kamp is right, we no longer need an account of
<3 aP~ c losin<3 Provided we have an account of gap-narrowing.
But what are these semantical decisions which are supposed
to narrow gaps 7 Evidently, the same properties which Kamp
would call the results of potential decisions I would call
speaker’s meanings; tor example, on Kamp ' s account
we might try to reduce the extension gap of "clever" by
deciding on gu i c k—w i t tedness as a criterion for judging
indeterminate cases. So the question can be put this way:
is the gap of a vague predicate at a non-empty index neces-
sarily narrower than the gap at an empty one? In other
words: does a reduction in vagueness entail a reduction in
indeterminacy?
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lo see that the answer is •'no", note first that any
narrowing is presumably systematic in the sense that the
more determinate partition preserves the definite judgments
ot the original partition. Fine describes this requirement
35 foil ows
:
...a sentence does not become indefinite upon beingmade more precise Th^ t _ _ _ > ^
H
,
, a ls
’ P erhaP 5 » partly defini-lonal of making more precise". For what distinguish-es this operation from a mere change in meaning is that
thp
Pre5er
^
e
^ };
ruth value. To precisify is to rule oute possibility of certain truth-value gaps. In anycase, it would odd if definite truth-value coulddisappear upon prec i s i f 1 cat i on
.
Now consider as an example the positive extension of "reck-
less" at an empty index; and consider the positive extension
of "reckless" at a non-empty index. Need the latter contain
the former 7 Ihis is tantamount to asking whether something
need be reckless in every possible sense in order to be
reckless simpliciter. But this question has already been
considered, and answered negatively. A similar argument can
be made for the negative extension. Hence the gap at a
non-empty index need not narrow the gap at an empty index.
Recall that I am taking vagueness to entail aptness to
prompt a certain kind of question, and the reduction of
vagueness as the supplying of a properly constrained answer
to such a question. As I’ve remarked, it is entirely in
keeping with ordinary usage to describe the supplying of a
speaker s meaning as being less "vague", or being more "pre-
cise". This aside, the important point here is that the
i /H
supplying ot a speaker's meaning doesn't necessarily reduce
indeterminacy, however "odd" this might seem. Thus, if
ne s "making more precise" is supposed to include the
supplying of a speaker s meaning, his account of it is
incorrect; whereas if it just supposed to mean "gap-nar-
rowing", then his account, while unexceptionable, doesn't
apply to predicates which are vague in my sense. (Fine
betrays a certain ambivalence as to what he means, a fact 1
will discuss shortly.)
1 don’t see what could do the job of gap-narrowing, if
possible speaker's meanings don't. Therefore it seems to me
that kamp's attempted rescue of delineations fails. And so
my objection to S12 stands: gap-closers for vague adjec-
tives don't seem to exist.
S12 is the result of trying to account for vague
comparatives by extending S6 . If I'm right, S6 can’t be so
extended. This, of course, doesn't mean that S6 isn't
correct in a limited domain (i.e. the domain of scalars).
Nor does it mean that vague comparatives may not be account-
ed for in some other way. But what way this might be, 1
don't k now
.
8 . Logical Truth Revisited
Without an account of delineations, the definition of
logical truth cannot invoke the notion of a delineation, as
it did previously. This leaves us facing the dilemma which
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motivated that definition: ho. can class.cal logic.! truth
be preserved in a language which allows extension gaps?
The answer is simple: we again define logical truth as
truth at all indices at which there are no gaps, in every
model, but simply allow gaps to be closed arbitrarily rather
than by delineations. 38 This method of preserving classical
logical truth in a language which allows extension gaps has
a precedent in Thomason’s treatment of sortally incorrect
sentences, e.g.
-'The theory of relativity is breakable". 39
Ihe basic intuition that a sentence which is true no matter
how indeterminacy is resolved ought to count as true is, 1
believe, the same whether the indeterminacy stems from
sortal or from ambivalence and variation -TO
D. Vagueness and I ndeter m i nacy
Earlier in this chapter I noted that vagueness, as 1
have been construing it, is conceptually distinct from
intraspeaker variation, interspeaker variation, and speak-
ers ambivalence. Naturally it is also conceptually dis-
tinct from indeterminacy, i.e. gappiness, posited to account
for variation and/or uncertainty. I also showed earlier
that while a vague predicate admits of variation and uncer-
tainty, and hence is indeterminate, a predicate might admit
of variation and uncertainty without being ( par t i cu 1 ar 1 y
)
vague
.
(he fact that vague predicates are indeterminate should
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be treated with some care. It 15 tempting to think that,
While Va9Uene5S m*V not be coextensive with indeterminacy,
it is nonetheless coextensive with a certain high degree ot
indeterminacy. However, this seems to be refuted by the
fact that a predicate less vague than another needn't be
less determinate. I take this fact to follow from the
recent conclusion that a speaker's meaning for a vague
predicate, presumably expressible by a less vague predicate
•-perhaps complex), need not reduce indeterminacy.
Note also that the denotation of a vague predicate may
be indeterminate at either an empty or a non-empty index.
Ht an empty index, indeterminacy reflects ambivalence when
no speaker s meaning is assumed, intraspeaker variation over
times when there is no speaker’s meaning, and/or inter-
speaker variation when the speakers in question do not mean
anything. Ht a non-empty index, i ndeterm 1 nacy reflects
ambivalence when the relevant speaker’s meaning is assumed,
intraspeaker variation over times when the relevant speak-
er’s meaning is present, and interspeaker variation when the
speakers in question have the relevant speaker’s meaning.
Note that variation involving a speaker’s meaning at one
time, or for one speaker, but not at another time, or for
another speaker, and variation involving different speaker ’
s
meanings are not sources of any indeterminacy. (See pp
.
128 - 9 . )
It appears to me that whatever temptation there might
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be to think that the del ineational rules for "in a sense-
end the comparative are, or could be made, applicable to
vague adjectives can only stem from the tacit conflation of
vagueness/precision with i nde ter m i nacy / deter m i nacy
. Intui-
tively, the "in a sense" operator induces the consideration
of "precise" indices, but once "precise" is appropriately
understood, it seems clear that a delineation coordinate is
not the relevant one (at least not if it is a vague adjec-
tive which is being operated on). It is plausible to regard
the comparative operator as inducing the consideration of
determinate indices, but the mechanisms at our disposal for
increasing the "precision" of "vague" adjectives are evi-
dently inadeguate to the creation of such md ices
, once
precision and vague" are appr opr 1 a te 1 y understood (making
a de
1
1 neat 1 ona 1 approach to logical truth suspect as well).
I suspect that Lewis, Kamp
, and Fine are all guilty to a
certain degree of the conflation. In any case my main point
here is that my criticism of their approach (construed as a
gener a 1 approach) depends upon my construal of vagueness.
E . Cone 1 us ion
I hope to have shown how a formal framework incorpor-
ating a speaker's meaning coordinate can both account tor
the intuitive dependence between speaker's meaning (in the
sense of a conceptual e-reason) and truth, and help make
clear the distinction between vagueness on the one hand and
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indeterminacy stemming from ambivalence and variation
other. in the next chapter I will consider whether it
the significant additional advantage of accounting for
mean 1 ng of a vague sentence.
on the
has
the
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conversation, Hans Kamp has suggested that competentspeakers divide equally among those who use dispositionaladjectives as natural kind terms and those who use them mparticular senses. 1 am not entirely happy with saying thathalt ot us misconstrue the nature of dispositional adjec-tives, but it Kamp ' s suggestion is right 1 must.
d. lo review: speaker’s meanings are answers, but need notbe actually expressed in response to either an actually
asked or tacit question. So there is no problem in sayingthat a speaker's meaning may be covert.
H. 1 do not, however, venture even so tar as to attribute
this view to Wittgenstein (though tor all I know it is).
5. See Alston (1968), and references therein, for discussion
ot some ot these notions and related notions.
o. Un open texture, see Wittgenstein (1958), Waismann
(1968), and Margal it (1979).
7. See Uuine (1970), Scheffler (1979).
8. See Black (1939), tor a statistical construal, and Cress-
well (1976), for an equivalence class construal.
7- See Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981) for an introduction to
Montague semantics. It would be more in the spirit of Monta-
gue s program to avoid syncategor emat l c rules, but tor
convenience 1 am using them nonetheless (as Montague did
himself ) . Not much is at stake since the syncategoremat i c
rules (syntactic and semantic) invariably have strictly
compositional equivalents in a language enriched by further
categor i es
.
lO. A longstanding objection to this approach is that there
can be no more justification for sharp lines between deter-
minate and indeterminate cases than there can be for a sharp
line between determinate cases (i.e. between positive
extension and negative extension); see, e.g., Copilowish
(1939). lhis is a powerful objection, but 1 have nothing to
say about it; see Fine (1975), and kamp’s commentary in Kamp
(1978), tor an advanced discussion. The difficulty might
lead one to prefer a semantics based on fuzzy-set theory,
but this alternative has very serious problems of its own;
179
see Kamp (1975) for discussion
See Lewis ( 1972)
.
l Bo
1 1 .
IS. See Kamp (1975) and Klein
13. 5ee Kamp, ibid., and Fine
(1971), pp . 99-6
.
(1980) for discussion.
( 1975) ; see also van Fraassen
1h More precisely, we proceed as follows. Consider anindex relative to which there is indeterminacy in theextension of at least one (n-place) predicate. For anysuch index there is a set of ways to eliminate all indeter-minacy, each way corresponding to an index at which thedelineation coordinate has no null components. Lach suchway determines a total valuation, i.e. a function which
assigns truth or falsity to every sentence. A Supervalu-
ation relative to the original indeterminate index can thenbe defined as a valuation which assigns true to a sentencejust when it is assigned true by every valuation in theinduced set of total valuations, assigns false just when
every total valuation assigns false, and assigns no value
otherwise. Logical truth is then defined as truth in every
super va 1 ua
t
i o n , in every model.
15. See Chierchia and Turner (1985), from which the current
treatment of abstraction and predication is taken. (thanks
to Michael Jubien for assisting my reading of this paper.)
they attribute the basic insight to Frege.
16. For my purposes property-abstracts suffice, but in
general we may have proposition-abstracts [ 0 J and n-place
relation abstracts v^...v J (for n > 1) too; see ibid.
17. Lhierchia and turner do not fully endorse this con-
straint, which is the semantic counterpart to the axioms of
" A -reduction" and " A -expansion"
. They reject the latter
so as to block the derivation of Russell’s paradox. But
Flans Kamp has pointed out to me that paradox can alterna-
tively be avoided by disallowing self-predication by proper-
ties in the following manner: given a property p, the
function P, which maps properties to "propositional func-
tions" (denotations of type <e,t>>, returns a partial
function which returns no value when given p.
18. Barbara Partee has helped me here considerably.
19. If Wittgenstein is right, meaning something improper is
a psychological impossibility; see Wittgenstein (1958), sec.
510. But 1 prefer to take the possibility into account,
even if it is not a psychological possibility.
10 1
20. See Montague (1970).
21
. Sven so, some adjectives are certainlyprovince. 1 he adjective "tantamount", torprepos i t i ona 1
-phrase complement and cannot
na 1 1 y
.
not in its
example, takes
occur prenomi—
a
2 might be replied that in the context 1 describe, theintension ot walker" suffices. Presumably the speaker
e!\r ^ a11 ’ mGan that John ls a skillful walker; it sjust that the speaker doesn't mean merely this, i.e. he inturn would mean something by "John is a skilltul walker", inresponse, 1 can only complain that the "most precise"
speaker's meaning, i.e. one which is not answered by (in thetechnical sense of chapter 3) a true and direct speaker smeaning, will not have been taken into account.
23. In fact, when in order to reduce vagueness one seeks an
"interpretation" by asking the relevant WDYM-quest l on
, onepresupposes a homophonic l nterpretat ion
, as I argued atlength in the previous chapter. The apprehension ot vague-
ness depends upon an apprehension of the (communal) meaning.
Ihis fact might be used to argue against the attributive
theory in the following way. If "skillful" were attribu-
tive, then "John is skillful" would be strictly meaningless.
But if that were so, then it would no t be poss l b 1
e
to
apprehend the vagueness of "John is skillful", any more than
it is possible to judge that "John is grswslo" is vague; the
apprehension would not be ot vagueness, but ot meaning-
lessness. But surely we do apprehend vagueness, and hence
the attributive construal must be wrong. 1 endorse this
argument, but it doesn’t strengthen my position. For it
might be replied that the necessary homophonic interpreta-
tion ot "John is skillful" is given by something like I here
ls a k' such that John is a skillful P . And against this i
can only once again complain of ar t l
f
i c l a 1 i ty
.
29. See Siegel (1979). What Siegel calls "measure adjec-
tives are adjectives of type <e,t> which are sensitive to a
comparison class. fhey include all but not only scalars;
for example, Siegel notes that dispositional adjectives like
"clever" and "intelligent" have measure readings. The "for
a" and "as a" paraphrases ot prenominal constructions which
1 ve used here to distinguish comparison class dependence
from speaker’s meaning dependence were originally proposed
by Siegel in order to diagnose measure readings and attri-
butive readings, respectively. For example, the tact that
"Bonzo is a clever monkey" may be paraphrased as "Bonzo is
clever tor a monkey" is supposed to demonstrate a measure
reading for "clever", while the fact "Bonzo is a skillful
doctor" may be paraphrased as "Bonzo is skillful as a
182
or^n^ur^0^::
a™°"5tra ‘e an citrus,
1 ’ 1 h no
^ uarrel with "tor a" as diaono^ma measure reading, but as I've indicated 1 take "as a" asdiagnostic, not of an attributive reading, but of speak r
:“
t
ni
:d
9 dTndencr My positi ° n - »u« tre55ei by
Vl a t?
J ‘;VK WhlCh have sab; an attributive reading, suchas lleged", "temporary", and "former", never have "ai aparaphrases:
* Mark is former as a senator.
In light of this, "as a" can't very comfortably be taken aslagnostic of an attributive construal. (I thank BarbaraHartee for pointing this out to me.)
25 . Ramp ( 1 975
)
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SO. But see Siegel (1979), pp . 236-7, for an argument
against treating predicative adjectives as attributive inthe way I ' ve described.
2/. Perhaps there is no such individual because some possi-ble senses are mutually inconsistent. But the same point
could be made with respect to a maximally consistent set of
senses; surely an individual with all the properties in the
set counts as reckless simpliciter.
E8. It Lewis's account is okay for scalars, then this latterquestion is the question of whether speaker’s meanings can
subsume delineations. If Lewis's account is not okay, then
it is the question of whether the speaker’s meaning approach
can subsume an adequate alternative account, if there is
one. For reasons to be given below, I’m inclined to think
that Lewis’s account is not okay for scalars, i.e. that "in
a sense" never shifts on a delineation coordinate. But 1 am
tentative about this; and even assuming my suspicions are
right, 1 am not sure whether or how "in a sense" does apply
to scalars. So I am in no position yet to decide on the
generality of my own account of "in a sense".
29 . Hans Ramp has objected that the S9 read mg of "In a
sense John is reckless and diligent", according to which the
"reckless" and "diligent" components of the speaker’s
meaning coordinate vary independently, is not the intuitive-
ly correct one; rather, the sentence seems to say that there
is some "single way" that John is, which is both reckless
and diligent. Barbara Partee has suggested accounting for
this by positing a pragmatic effect which interacts with the
semantics, i.e. S9 . Another possibility consistent with S9
is to treat "reckless and diligent" as a complex predicate
with its own component in the speaker’s meaning coordinate.
1 cannot yet decide between these a 1 ter nat l ves
,
largely
because I am not considering the issue of speaker’s meanings
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tor a complex predicate considered as a whole < as opposed to
wh^‘
y a com P le>< some simple constituent or constituents orich is or are sensitive to speaker’s meaning). Ihat is,while it is clear that there are such speaker s meanings
ef"
6 tD WDVM
-P uest '°t,* expressed by interro-
L.ie th ” Quotes enclose complexes), I’m settingasid e question ot whether the denotation ot a complexcan be sensitive to the speaker’s meaning coordinate, i ewhether a complex predicate can belong to V (see p. lqe).
JO. I’m now in a position to state my suspicions concerningthe adequacy ot Lewis’s "in a sense" for scalars (ct. note"SSUm 1 ng that there is a corresponding "in the sense
° f *° r " ln the sense that"), the del ineational accountpredicts the non-deviance of a locution such as
Kareem is tall in the sense of being seven-toot tour,hut to me this sounds funny; hence I’m inclined to thinkthat in
Kareem is tall in a sense,
"in a sense" is not an operator linked to a delineation
coordinate. 1 tacitly revealed this bias in chapter II,
when I oftered examples 7 and 8 but not example 6, whichinvolved the scalar adjective "old", as cases in which a
"sense" ot a word is requested.
31. It may strike the reader as odd that there is a mismatchbetween the empty-index membership conditions tor the compar
ative which my stipulation determines and those tor the posi
tive. I don’t like it either, but don’t know how else to
proceed. Recall that I earlier suggested thinking of the
membership conditions for "reckless" at an empty index as an
infinite disjunction of conjunctions. Intuitively, if there
is some conjunction in this disjunction such that John is
more reckless than Bob in the sense of each conjunct, then
John is more reckless than Bob" should be true at an empty
index. However, the reader may verify that S1E can’t
guarantee this on any stipulation of an empty-index SM-set
,
even an infinite one, since there is no provision for the
disjunction. Evidently what is required is to have S18
apply only to non-empty indices and supplement it with an
empty— index rule, one which allows for disjunctive membei
—
ship conditions; however, I don’t know how to specify such a
rule. Thus, I prefer my 1 ess- 1 han-na tur a 1 stipulation.
38. I accept the charge that this argument, inasmuch as it
rests partly on a less-then-natural stipulation, is less
than overwhelming. Note, though, that it is premised only
on the existence of empty-index indeterminacy, not neces-
sarily extreme i ndeter
m
i nac y . Note also that on any reason-
able stipulation of an empty-index SM-set, i.e. any stipu-
lation by which such a set consists of the delineations
10 *+
consistent with any member ot some fairly large set of
ex!st
er
aoa
meamn9S
:
^ be 5h ° Wn that indeterminacy can
one sinse and
C
Bob K
° hn ’ 5 h**" 9 m° re reCkless than Bob in
sense but let ?h % 9 m° re reckless than John in another
relevant sei r,9
5enses be speaker’s meanings in the
st n t !
course it might be replied that anyipulation is unnatural (cf. note 31). But 1 am notdistressed about this, because I will soon argue that SIB ismisconceived to begin with. Thus I think that these argu-ments tor nonlinearity, based as they are on SIB, areultimately without foundation regardless ot how the emp-ty-index problem is settled. P
33. Klein proposes viewing gap—closing
a sequence of applying a predicate to a
adjectives only. See Klein, pp . 16-8.
as the end result ot
gap, but for linear
3*+
. It is not just that I can’t imagine an element of
context which closes gaps; I can’t imagine anything whichdoes so. I mention this because on Lewis’s view deline-
ations aren’t supposed to be contextual (at least not
exclusively); see Lewis, op. cit. In the terminology of hislater work, they are elements of an •'index" (what Kaplan
calls a "circumstance" ) ; see Lewis (1979).
35.
Kamp (1975), p. 191.
36.
Ibid., pp . 192-3.
37. Fine (1975), p. 275.
38. More precisely, we proceed as in note 19, except that
the total valuations induced by an l ndeterm i nate index
correspond, not to indices at which the delineation coordi—
has no nul 1 elements, but to ways of somehow assigning
ail objects (or n-tuples of objects) in a gap to the posi-
tive or negative extension of the relevant predicate,
arbitrary though the assignment may be.
39. See Thomason (1972).
hO
.
While classical logic can be preserved in the current
framework, it isn’t clear that it should be. Kamp has
argued that the logic of "observational" predicates is
non-classical, where an observat i ona 1 predicate 0 is a
predicate such that if any objects x and y are observa-
tional ly indistinguishable with respect to the criteria
associated with , then x and y are either both in the
positive extension of , both in the negative extension, or
both in the gap; predicates like "tall", "bald", and "red"
are arguably observat l ona 1 . See Kamp (1978) tor discussion.
CHAPTER 5
MEANING AND SPEAKER’S MEANING
I • I ntroduc 1 1 on
Ht the end of Chapter 3, I summarized the implications
which the study of speaker’s meaning had for the meaning or
a vague sentence, essentially as follows.
(11/ l he meaning of a vague sentence is deficient insome way. fhis makes it apt to prompt, on an occasion
of utterance, a WDYM-quest i on
, one whose parameters are
set in a certain way.
(IE) 1 he content of the belief cor respond l ng to theacceptance of a vague sentence is in some way moredeficient, or less precise, than that of a conceptual
e-reason for the belief.
(13) A competent speaker who knows the meaning of a
vague sentence knows constraints on possible speaker s
meanings. This is in virtue of knowing constraints
on answers to a relevant WDYM-quest l on
.
1 then noted, though, that a theory of meaning was required
to complete this account. The framework of the previous
chapter might be thought to provide the required theory; my
goal in this chapter is to consider the extent to which this
is so. I begin with Ti and T2.
I I . Deficiency and Intension
I he intension of an expression is a function from an
index to a denotation. On the simplifying assumption that
185
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an index consists just of a possible world and a speaker's
meaning, this is a function from a world and speaker's
meaning to a denotation. We may equivalently regard this as
a t unc t 1 on from speaker’s meanings, including a null ele-
ment, to a function from worlds to denotations. (Jail the
former function a •'character", the latter function a "con-
tent". We may now say that each possible speaker's meaning
of an expression, as well as the null element representing
the lack of a speaker's meaning, determines a content. lhis
is equal to the character of the expression evaluated at the
speaker s meaning, or the null element.
fhe terms are borrowed from David Kaplan's theory of
indexicals, but 1 am not really invoking that theory.
Kaplan distinguishes two categories of truth
-deter mining
features: a context" consists of features of an occasion of
utterance, while a "circumstance" consists of features
manipulated by whatever intensional operators are in the
language. (Jn Kaplan s usage, "content" is a function from
c 1 r c urns t a nc es to denotations, while "character" is a func-
tion from contexts to contents. Aside from the fact that 1
am omitting a good many truth-determining features, my usage
is distinct because 1 am not distinguishing between context
and circumstance, but merely separating two features of a
single set of truth-determining features, i.e. an index.
Doing this allows me to mimic Kaplan's approach while
avoiding the complications of actually adopting it (which
1 07
W° Uid world coord 1 nates and, gwen my analysis
ot "in a sense", two speaker's meaning coordinates). 1
lhB technicai notion of "content", i.e. a function trom
possible worlds to truth-values, is thought by some to
provide an account ot the intuitive "content" of a belief.
1 hough the question is far from settled, 1 will be assuming
that this point of view is correct.^ Nonetheless, a dis-
tinction should be drawn between the intuitive notion and
the technical notion meant to account for it (as well as tor
the intuitive content of an assertion), so henceforth 1 will
refer to content in the sense of a function trom worlds to
truth—values as "content
w
It is now tempting to think that identifying meaning
with character (intension) allows an account ot 11 whereby
deficiency in the meaning is explained in terms of the
content^ determined when no speaker's meaning exists, what 1
will call the "default" content
. (Note that the default
w
content evaluated at a world is equal to the denotation at
v*v
an empty index which includes the world in question.) that
is, it might be thought that deficiency in the "meaning" ot
a vague sentence exists in virtue of some property ot the
default content^. This property might then help to explain
a sentence's aptness to prompt a certain WDV M-quest 1 on (see
3
pp . lOB-'f). Also this property might account for the
intuitive deficiency of the content of the belief corre-
sponding to acceptance of a vague sentence, e.g. the belief
lea
that John is reckless. Henceforth I „m call such a belief
a "vague" belief.
l
Similarly, it 15 tempting to think that TE may be
accounted tor in terms of the content^ relative to a speak-
er s meaning. The hope here is to identify the latter with
the content of a conceptual e-reason, e.g. the belief that
John spends money without ever checking his account. Then
T2 might be explained after finding some way in which this
content^ compares with the content which has been identi-
tied with the content of the vague belief tor which there is
a conceptual e—reason.
There are two serious problems, however, with this
approach to 11 and T2. The first is that the hoped-for
properties of content are not discernible. (he second isw
that the content of a vague belief can't really be identi-
fied with any function from worlds to truth-values, so that
it is misguided to look for these properties to begin with.
1 discuss these problems in turn.
Suppose that we identify meaning with character, and
set out to explain intuitive deficiency in the meaning by
appeal to some property of the default content . What could
w
this property be? 1 mentioned in the previous chapter that
vagueness cannot be associated with a high degree of
indeterminacy at an empty index (see pp . 175-6). Ihus this
cannot be the property that we seek. However, it is
difficult tor me to see what other candidates there might
1B9
be .
No™ suppose that ™e identify the content of a vague
belief with the default content^ and the content of a
conceptual e-reason for the vague belief with the content
lA)
determined by the relevant speaker's meaning, and set out to
explain the intuitively greater precision of a conceptual
e-reason in terms of some way in which the two contents
w
compare. What might this way be? Recall the conclusion of
the previous chapter (p. 173) that the extension gap of a
vague predicate at an empty index need not be larger than
that of an index which is identical except at the speaker's
meaning coordinate <i.e., under present assumptions, identi-
cal at the world coordinate but not at the speaker's meaning
coordinate). Thus at any given world the extension gap
determined by the default content^ need not be larger than
that determined by a non-default content
. In this sense
w
the former content need not be more indeterminate than the
lAl
latter content^. Hence we cannot account for comparative
deficiency in terms of the greater indeterminacy, in this
sense, of the default content . And it is difficult to see
lAj
what other sense of comparative indeterminacy might do
instead. Moreover
,
it is difficult to see what other
relation might do other than some sense of comparative
indeterminacy.
in sum, it is not at ail obvious how either positive or
comparative deficiency can be explained in terms of proper-
i VO
ties OT contents^. This does not mean, ot course, that such
properties do not exist. But this can be shown on other
grounds, as 1 will now explain.
in considering what properties of content miqht
account tor positive and comparative deficiency, one pre-
supposes that the content of a vague belief can be identi-
fied with the sentence's default content
. Un reflection,
however, it is clear that this identification fails. Recall
that a vague belief serves as the topic of a question
requesting a speaker s meaning, in the sense ot a conceptual
e-reason. That the topic obtains and that a speakers
meaning exists are both presuppositions of the question.
I hus the topic cannot entail that a speaker's meaning does
not exist; else the topic would not be consistent with a
direct answer. (See pp . 80-1). But if the content of the
topic belief were identified with the default content
,
then
w
this entai lment would hold, tor the default content is that
w
content^ determined when the speaker’s meaning does not
exist. So the proposed identification is incorrect.
The point can alternatively be seen in terms ot prag-
matic rather than semantic presuppositions. An asker of a
WDYM-quest i on presupposes both that the topic of one’s
question obtains and that a direct answer - a speaker's
meaning - exists. In attributing the belief that is the
topic of his question, a rational questioner thus is assum-
ing that a speaker’s meaning exists, not that it doesn’t.
But then the content of this attributed belief cannot be the
default content
w
Nor, of course, could the content of a vague belief be
a non-default content
, i.e. a content determined by some
speaker's meaning. For the topic is assumed before it is
known what the speaker’s meaning is, if there is one (see
pp. 80 - 1 ). Alternatively put, it is possible for a cor-
rective answer to deny that there is any speaker’s meaning
(conceptual e-reason) without denying the topic. But if the
content of a vague belief can be neither the default con-
tent
w
nor a non-default content^, then on the current theory
of content, the content of the belief is not given by any
content at all. So no properties of content will account
lAj
tor intuitive deficiency of content, positive or compar-
a t i ve .
The above argument may be summed up by saying that it
follows from the "neutrality" of a vague belief, i.e. its
entailing neither the non-existence of a speaker’s meaning
nor the existence of any speaker’s meaning in particular,
that a vague belief can’t be assigned content
. For the
w
latter requires commitment to either no speaker’s meaning or
<4
some speaker’s meaning in particular.
There are three possible reactions to this dilemma, as
foil o ws
.
( 1 ) Some beliefs have content but not content . Ihat
is, their content can’t be analyzed as a function from
worlds to truth-values. This is true, in particular,
i9d
°T a vague belief, e.g. the belief that John isreckl ess
.
<2> The (oversimplified) theory of content according to
truth-
C
°? V 5 analyzed by a function from worlds to
incorrect^
termined by some speaker 's meaning is
(3) There is no such thing as a vague belief, i.e. abelief corresponding to acceptance of a vague sentence,and which entails neither the non-existence of a
speaker’s meaning nor the existence of any particular
speaker s meaning.
That is, one can accept the apparent consequence that some
beliefs do not have content^ or try to avoid this conse-
quence, by denying either the assumed theory of content or
the assumption that the problematic belief exists.
Barbara Partee has suggested to me a way that the
latter course might be taken, by a reanalysis of the topic
of a WDYM—question requesting a conceptual e-reason. Take
example 8 of Chapter 2. Consider that a sense of an expres-
sion may be described indirectly, e.g. as "Lewis’s sense",
an important sense", or "a more relevant sense". Partee’s
suggestion is to take the topic of the question to be given
by a be 1 i ef-a 1 1 r l but i on in which a sense of a vague expres-
sion is described as "the sense which the utterer (of the
vague sentence which prompts the question) now has in mind".
1 he topic would be
P’ : A1 believes that John is reckless in the sense
that A1 currently has in mind.
[he relevance relation would then be such that a direct
answer would provide a redescription of the topic, by
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pro v i d i ng an -identifying" description of the sense in
question. For example, a direct answer might be expressed
by A1 believes that John is reckless in the sense of
spending money without ever checking his account". Such an
answer "identifies" the sense that A1 currently has in mind
as the sense of spending money without ever checking one’s
account. Note that the proposed topic is distinct from the
proposition that A1 believes that John is reckless in some
sense. The proposal rather is to describe the presupposed
sense more specifically as the sense which A1 currently has
in mi nd
.
The dilemma to which my original analysis gives rise is
that the neutrality of a vague belief makes an assignment of
content^ to it impossible. Partee’s proposal seems to
resolve this dilemma, in the following way. Like the old
topic, P’ is neutral, entailing neither the non-existence ot
a sense nor the existence of any sense in particular. But
unlike the old topic, P does entail the existence of some
sense. This is consistent with its not entailing the
existence of any sense in particular, since in the specifi-
cation of P ’ the sense is described but not identified. And
now it would appear that an account of the content of the
topic belief can be had. For the intension of "John is
reckless in the sense which A1 currently has in mind" is not
equal to that of "John is reckless". The content of the
belief corr espond 1 ng to the former sentence is the content
144
which is
m 1 nd
, i f
prom 1 ses
above
.
determined by the sense which A1 currently has in
there is such a sense. Thus, Partee’s proposal
to resolve the present dilemma via option (3)
lo evaluate this proposal, and at the same time to
understand it more fully, let's consider more carefully how
it compares with my original analysis. A WDYM-quest ion, to
repeat, presupposes that the topic obtains and that there’s
at least one true answer standing in the relevance relation
to the topic (as well as that the members of the contrast-
class do not obtain - see p. 14). Gn my original analysis,
the latter is the presupposition that there is a conceptual
e reas °ci tor the belief that serves as topic, i.e. Al’s
belief that John is reckless, where the notion of a concept-
ual e-reason is intended to analyze the intuitive notion of
using an expression in a particular sense. The topic, the
presupposition, does not entail this presupposition.
In contrast, on the new proposal the topic, P’, does entail
that on this occasion a sense, or usage, exists. As noted
above, this allows an assignment of content to the topic
belief, which the original analysis did not. Thus on both
analyses the guestion presupposes that a sense exists;
however, on the new analysis but not the old this follows
from the presupposition of the topic alone.
A difficulty with the new analysis is now apparent. As
mentioned previously, it was possible on the original
195
analysis tor a corrective answer to deny the pr esuppost 1 on
that a sense exists on this occasion without denying the
presupposition that the topic obtains. That is, it was
possible for a corrective answer to deny that A1 is using
reckless" in any particular sense without denying that A1
believes that John is reckless. Such an answer is true when
the content of Al’s belief is the default content
. But on
w
the new analysis, it is not possible for a corrective answer
to deny the existence of a particular sense without also
denying the topic. How, then, can the new analysis account
for what the answers do not deny? Only, it would appear, by
positing a pragmatic presupposition, equal to what consti-
tuted the topic on the original analysis. fhen the answers
in question can be said to deny P’ without denying this
pragmatic presupposition.
But now it is clear that the new analysis has gotten us
nowhere. Its original purpose was to eradicate the belief
which served as the topic on the original analysis, so as to
avoid the problem of assigning it content . It turns out,
w
though, that this belief has not been eradicated; it's just
that it no longer serves as topic. But so long as it still
exists, so does the problem of assigning it content . To
w
put matters another way: Partee’s proposal is not a way of
pursuing option (3).
Another route to the same conclusion is as follows.
Recall that on my original analysis what justifies the
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listener’s assumption of the topic is a simple disquota-
tional principle, licensing the passage from direct dis-
course to a belief attribution (pp. 39-90). On Partee's
proposal, this belief attribution is not really the topic.
But even it this is so, it doesn’t follow that the principle
of attribution isn’t valid. For this we would need some
account of why the principle fails, and no such account has
been offered. Lacking such an account, we must acknowledge
the existence of the problematic belief.
So the new analysis of WDYM-quest i ons such as that of
example 8 does not resolve the dilemma it was supposed to
resolve. Moreover, I cannot see that it is preferable to my
original analysis. lo begin with, 1 am not sure how to
complete it - in particular
,
how to characterize the con-
trast-class and relevance relation accompanying the new
topic P . Furthermore, it seems to me ad hoc to render what
was a semantic presupposition on the original analysis as a
(merely) pragmatic presupposition. (See p. 79 for some of
the original motivation for the presupposition in question.)
Finally, it seems to me that the new analysis ignores a
crucial task, that of explaining what it is to use a word in
a particular sense, where this involves a kind of necessary
inference. The notion of a conceptual e-reason was deve-
loped with this task in mind, but on the new analysis no
analogous attempt is made; rather, the topic and relevance
relation (insofar as the latter is discernible) simply
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appeal to the intuitive notion of a sense. 1 he approach
thus tails prey to the vagueness of this notion (see p. 96).
1 conclude, in any event, that Partee's attempt to
pursue option (3) is a false start. It doesn’t follow, of
course, that option (3) is not the correct one; for all 1
know, it is. For the moment I am not sure how the problem
of assigning content^ to a vague belief can be resolved,
it seems to me to be a very difficult problem, and I leave
it as a subject for future research.
To sum up, the attempt to account for T1 and T2 m
terms ot the current theory of mean i ng / content is not yet
successful, to say the least. For it isn’t clear whether or
how the content of a vague belief is analyzable by content ;
w
and even if it were clear that it is, it still wouldn’t be
c ^ ear what properties of content would do the account ino
III. Constraints and Tis-Cond l t ions
Another term for the content of a sentence is "truth-
w
conditions". I he truth —cond 1 1 i ons of a sentence determine,
given a world, whether the sentence is true. A related
notion, one which turns out to be relevant to T3, is that of
the conditions under which a sentence is true i_n a sense -
henceforth, "tis-conditions"
.
(he notion is clear enough intuitively. The tis-con-
ditions of "John is reckless", for example, consist of
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-orlds in Whl ch John runs red lights, worlds m which John
spends money without checking his account, and so forth.
Whereas a sentence’s truth-conditions on an occasion are
equal to its content
^
relative to the speaker’s meaning on
that occasion, i.e. its character evaluated at that speak-
er s meaning, its t 1 s-cond 1 t 1 ons are occasion-independent,
and can be specified by quantifying over speaker’s meanings.
1 he t 15-condi t ions of a sentence S are given by that func-
tion from worlds to truth-values which, when given a world
-’ yieids true just when, for some speaker’s meaning s, the
intension of S evaluated at s and w yields true.
A sentence’s t 1 s-cond 1 t i ons are equivalent to the truth-
conditions of a construction resulting from the application
of the sentential "in a sense" operator
. f-or example, the
t 1 s-cond 1 t 1 ons of "John is reckless" are identical to the
content^, relative to any speaker’s meaning, of "In a sense
John is reckless". The following is derivable from the
semantic rule S 9 of the previous chapter:
"(I
s
<R(j))" is true at s and w iff "Rj" is true at s’
and w for some s
,
where s and s’ are speaker’s
mean l ngs
.
<1 suppress reference to the model and assignment.) Thus
the truth-conditions of "In a sense John is reckless",
relative to any speaker's meaning, are defined by a function
from worlds to truth-values wh ich yields true just for those
worlds at which "John is reckless" is true for some speak-
er ’ s meaning. But this same function defines the tis-condi-
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tions of "John is reckless".
Corresponding to the notion of the tis-conditions of a
sentence is the notion of the "s-membersh ip conditions" of a
predicate P, i.e. a function from worlds to sets of indivi-
duals which are P in a sense. (For simplicity 1 assume here
that functions from individuals to truth-values are total,
so that they may be identified with sets of individuals.)
Ihis is a function which, when given a world w, yields the
set
fx: x belongs to the result of evaluating the intension
of P at s and w, for some speaker's meaning s>.
And just as the I
g
operator serves to transform the inten-
sion of a sentence into its tis-conditions, the I
p
operator
serves to transform the intension of a predicate into its
s membership conditions, as may be verified by inspection of
the rule S10 of the previous chapter. Thus the s-membership
conditions of P are given by the content (relative to anv
w 7
speaker's meaning) of I
p
(P).
Knowing the tis-conditions of a vague sentence is
equivalent to knowing the constraints on possible speaker's
meanings. If one is able to recognize a given speaker's
meaning for a sentence S as falling within constraints, one
is also able to recognize certain worlds as ones in which S
is true in a particular sense - namely, in that sense
corresponding to the given speaker's meaning; and converse-
ly. We might put it this way: for all s, if s (a propo-
dUO
sition) is a constrained speaker's meaning tor b, then one
is able to recognize that s is a constrained speaker's
meaning tor S if and only if one is able to recognize that
the set ot worlds in which s is true is a subset ot S’s
t 1 s-cond 1 t 1 ons
. Having the former ability tor all s is
equivalent to knowing the characteristic tunction ot the set
ot constrained (propositional) speaker’s meanings (e.g. the
set b^_
A
described on p. 113), while having the latter
ability for all s is equivalent to knowing the tis-condi-
t l ons
.
Similarly, knowing the s-membership conditions of a
vague predicate P is intuitively equivalent to knowing the
constraints on possible speaker’s meanings. If one is able
to recognize a given speaker’s meaning tor a predicate as
falling within constraints, one is also able to identify
certain individuals in a given world as being P in a parti-
cular sense - namely, in that sense cor respond i ng to the
given speaker’s meaning; and conversely. We can put it this
way: tor all p, if p (a property) is a constrained speak-
er ' s meaning for a predicate P, then one is able to recog-
nize that p is a constrained speaker’s meaning it and only
if one is able to recognize that the set of individuals
which have p in a world is a subset of P’s s-membership
conditions evaluated at that world. Having the former
ability for all p is equivalent to knowing the character-
istic function of the set of ( pred i cat i ve ) speaker’s mean-
£01
mgs (e.g. the set described on p. 113 ), while having
the latter ability for all p is equivalent to knowing the
s-membership conditions.
Note that if 0 i 5 such that I s < 0 ) i5 logically equi-
valent to 0/Ip, where 0/I
p is that construction formed by
attaching predicate modifiers to each predicate P of
l
which is sensitive to a speaker’s meaning coordinate, then
the tis-condi tions of 0 may be regarded as being determined
in part by the intension of each I
p (P ). But as we saw in
the previous chapter, 1^(0 ) is not equivalent to 0/1 , it
there is a comparative operator in the language which makes
two—place predicates out of one—place predicates. (See p.
168. ) So the intension of I
p
(P ) is not necessarily a
contribution to the t i s-cond l t l ons of a sentence in which P
l
occurs
.
We have that knowledge of constraints on possible
speaker’s meanings for a sentence 0 is equivalent to know-
ledge of 0 ’ s tis-conditions, which is equivalent to know-
ledge of the truth-conditions of 1^(0 >• The question of
whether the identification of intension with meaning ac-
counts for T3» i.e. licenses the inference from knowing the
meaning to knowing constraints on speaker’s meanings, may
thus be reduced to the question of whether knowing the
intension of 0 entails knowing the intension of 1^(0 ). I
now turn to the consideration of this question.
What is it to "know the intension" of an expression?
bob
Well, the relevant sense is the one in which a semantically
competent speaker knows intensions, since T3 is intended as
an observation about the abilities of a competent speaker.
But what sense is this? To fully answer this, one would
have to address a number of fundamental issues raised by the
Mont ago v i an semantic theory which I have adopted, e.g. the
issue of how entities like functions and possible worlds can
characterize cognitive abilities. I cannot do this here;
the concerned reader is hereby referred to other sources. 5
We may note, however, that a crucial tenet of the Montago-
v i an account of semantic competence is the rigorous version
of compos 1 1 1 ona
1
1 ty whereby the intension of a complex
expression is computed "bottom—up" from the intensions of
structural parts. On this account, a competent speaker s
knowing the intension of a sentence entails knowing the
1 f"1 1 ^r1 ^ 1 ° r'=> of basic constituents and knowing the composi-
tional procedures for combining these intensions. That is,
a competent speaker could know the intension of a complex
only by knowing how to "compute" it.
Let us conclude, then, that a competent speaker's
knowing the intension of a sentence 0 entails knowing the
intensions of 0’s basic parts and the semantic rules tor
0’s constructions. Still, knowing the intension of 0 does
not entail knowing the intension of I <_, ( 0 )» since the "in a
sense" operator is not, or anyway need not be, a basic part
of 0 . Evidently, for the entailment to hold we must assume
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a competent speaker to know, not only the intensions ot rfl's
parts and the rules for 0 '5 constructions, but also the
intension ot "Ig" and the rule tor it. 7 It would appear
that this can be reasonably assumed only if we take "compe-
tent speaker", as the term appears in T3, to mean or to
entail competent, not just with respect to but with
respect to the language as a whole. The question then
arises whether it is reasonable to so take "competent
speaker "
.
1 believe that it is. First of all, it is arguable, T3
aside, that it is not cognitively possible for a competent
speaker to know the meaning of one sentence in isolation
from the meanings of many other sentences. That 15
, it is
arguable that in some cognitive sense competence with
respect to a sentence entails "overall" competence. But
moreover
,
T3 would simply not seem as plausible to me were
"competent" to be taken narrowly. The ability it notes ot
competent speakers involves broad cognitive abilities, in
particular the capacity for commonsense reasoning, and it is
not plausible to suppose that one who knows the meaning
merely of some particular sentence - assuming this to be
possible - must have these abilities. This consideration is
somewhat impressionistic, I admit, but seems to me suffi-
cient to establish that the pretheoret 1 ca 1 notion of compe-
tence in T3 is one of overall competence.
1 conclude that equating meaning with intension does
£ 0*4
provide a tenable account of T3. For it is reasonable to
take ''semantically competent" to entail or mean overall
competence. In that case a semantically competent speaker's
knowing the intension of a vague sentence $ entails knowing
the intensions of (most or all) basic expressions and (most
or all) semantic rules for complex expressions, which
entails knowing the intension of I^(^$ ).
IV. Conclusion
Identifying the meaning of a vague sentence with its
Mont ago
v
1 an intension provides an account of f3, but not of
T1 or T£. However, it is not at ail clear that the semantic
theory is really to blame for the failures, as I’ve noted.
And even if this were clear
, no alternative theory has yet
been shown to do any better. I conclude that it would be
premature to give up on the theory (which is successful in
other domains) as a way of explaining what I have identified
as the phenomena of vagueness
.
I emphasize that I am considering here the meaning of a
vague sentence, not just any sentence. While some have
quite generally rendered intension as meaning, it doesn’t
seem correct to do so. For example, the meaning of a
natural kind term is certainly not its intension, if meaning
yis what is known by a competent speaker. We needn’t then
give up on intension as an analysis of meaning; we simply
£05
need to proceed on a case-by-case basis. That is what I am
doing in considering whether the meaning of a vague sentence
could be its intension.
(hough I have not succeeded in accounting for the
meaning ot a vague sentence, I hope to have shown that an
adequate theory of meaning can and must incorporate speak-
er’s meanings as truth-determiners. And I hope to have
satisfactorily explained the notion of speaker’s meaning and
how it relates to vagueness. I leave as a project for the
future the task of making my story more nearly complete.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1. See Kaplan (1977).
£. See Stalnaker (1985), for a recent defense.
3. Actually, what would be needed would be an appeal, not
just to a sentence's intension, but to its "structured
m^<3ning" > i .e. a tree structure isomorphic to the sentence's
syntactic analysis tree and which has at each node the
intension of the constituent which is at the cor r espond i ng
node of the syntactic tree; see Lewis (1972), and Cresswell
(1985). This is because the vagueness of a sentence is
always with respect to a particular constituent, but the
intensions of the sentence's constituents are not
recoverable from the intension of the sentence.
9. I repeat that a vague belief is one which corresponds to
the acceptance of a vague sentence, and that I do not mean
by this the belief whose object is determined by the
character of the sentence plus context, in the manner
suggested by John Perry. (See p. 115, note 2.) I could not
mean this, since I am taking a vague belief to be
attributable before knowing what the speaker's meaning is or
whether there is one, i.e. before knowing the relevant
feature of context. Rather, I mean the belief whose
specification is related by a "disquotational" principle to
the accepted sentence.
5. See, e.g., Lewis (1972), Cresswell (1985), and Stalnaker
( 1985 ) .
6. See Partee (1989) for discussion.
7. The intension of "in a sense" is not discernible from S9
of the previous chapter, the semantic rule for "in a sense”,
which is synac tegor emat i c . But S9 has a compositional
equivalent
,
one which would compute the intension of
I ( 0 ) from the intensions of I and 0 .
8. This is a departure from Putnam (1975), who concludes
that meaning "ain't in the head", and hence might well be an
intension in the current sense. But as Putnam himself
notes, the twin-earth thought experiment shows only that
whatever is in the heads of competent speakers doesn't
determine extension; meaning may then be taken either as
what's in the head or as what determines extension. I have
chosen the former, inconsistently with Putnam's terminology
but not with his main argument.
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appendix
FOCUS AND CONTRAST-CLASS
In Chapter 2, I argued that the contrast-class of a
question depends on psychological factors under deter m i ned by
the focus, if there is one, of the interrogative that one is
disposed to utter. Since these psychological factors depend
on the case at hand, the determination of contrast-class is
unsystematic. The contrast-class of a WDYli-quest 1 on may,
however, be regarded as the result of the interaction of a
psychological component together with a systematic component
which is determined by focus. My goal here is to spell this
out.
Mats Rooth, presupposing a set of semantic rules which
assigns a semantic object s(E) to every expression E of a
language, defines the notion of the "p—set" p(E) correspond-
ing to E as follows:
p ( E ) is
(a) the set of objects in the model matching s(E) in
type, if E is focussed
(b) the unit set fs(E)>, if E is a non-focussed basic
expression
(c) the set of objects which can be obtained by picking
one element from each of the p-sets corresponding to
the component phrases of E, and applying the semantic
rule for E to this sequence of elements, if E is a
non-focussed complex expression.
(See Rooth (1985), p. 19; I have taken minor liberties with
his wording and terminology.) So, for example, the p-set
corresponding to "Adam a te the apple" is, by the application
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of (c) to the whole sentence, of <b) to
-Adam", of (a) to
"ate", and of (c) to "the apple", is the set of propositions
which differ from the proposition that Adam ate the apple
exactly with respect to the propositional constituent
corresponding to "ate", i.e. sC'ate").
For WDYM-questions with a saying-that or be 1 i ev i ng- 1 ha
t
topic, and which are expressed by i nter r ogat i ves with
hybrid-quotes, I propose the following link between focus
and contrast-class.
The p-set of a sentence expressing the topic of the
question, where those constituents of the sentence
which correspond to the quoted constituents of the
i nterrogat i ve are treated as focussed, is identical to
the default contr ast—c 1 ass of the question.
By the "default" contrast-class, I mean the actual con-
trast-class if there are no psychological factors at work
narrowing down the p-set; if there are such factors, then
the actual contr ast — c 1 ass is some proper subset of the
default contr ast— c 1 ass . So, for example, the p —set of "A1
believes that John is reckless", where this is the focussed
counterpart of the topic of a WDYM—quest i on expressed by
"What do you mean, John is 'reckless’?", is identical to the
default contr ast-c 1 ass of the question, which is the actual
contrast-class of example 8 of Chapter II. (This supersedes
my previous simpler but more ad hoc account of that con-
trast-class, according to which it contains simply the
proposition that A1 believes that John is not reckless.)
Note that this account could not apply to WDYM-ques-
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t ions expressed by mention-quote i nter r ogat i ves
, because
while mention-quotes do serve to focus an expression, they
do not permit interpretation, so that the notion of a p-set
doesn’ t app 1 y
.
Inasmuch as the notion of a p-set presupposes a seman-
tic theory, so does the notion of a default contrast-class.
The theory must be very rich, since the concern is with
focus in natural language, and must be intensional, since
the contr ast-c 1 ass is a set of propositions. Beyond this,
the commitment to a semantic theory is not specific. (In
particular, there is no commitment to a particular treatment
of belief reports.)
It the semantic theory is such that intuitively synony-
mous propositions need not be identical, then the default
c o n t r as t —c 1 ass
,
which is typically very large, may easily
contain propositions synonymous with the topic. For exam-
ple, in example 8 of Chapter 2, it contains the proposition
that A1 believes that John is careless. It might be thought
that this is a problem for my account of proper senses as
speaker’s meanings which do well on the favoring criterion
(as well as meeting other constraints), since it may seem
that intuitively proper senses, e.g. that corresponding to
Al’s meaning that John spends money without ever checking
his account, no longer do well on the favoring criterion.
But this isn’t so. While it is true, for example, that Al’s
believing that John spends money without ever checking his
eiu
account doesn’t particularly favor Al’s believing that John
is reckless over Al’s believing that John is careless, it
does favor Al’s believing that John is reckless over a great
many other members of the (default) contrast-class, which
suffices for overall goodness on the favoring criterion.
(See Chapter 2, p. 17.)
Still, it may plausibly be argued that the p-set
procedure yields contrast-classes which are too big. A
contr ast-c 1 ass should not be generated from a 1
1
the semantic
objects of the appropriate type, but only those in the same
"cognitive category" as the original topic constituent. For
example, it might be urged that the contrast-class of the
question of example 8 should contain propositions such as
that A 1 believes that John is lazy and that A1 believes that
John is friendly - propositions generated by dispositional
properties such as that of being reckless - but not, for
example, the proposition that A1 believes that John is a red
tractor . This point of view is supported by the fact that
contr ast-c lasses are supposed to have psychological signi-
ficance of some sort. However
, it seems possible to regard
a "cognitively real" contr ast-c 1 ass as the result of the
interaction of systematic semantic component, defined by the
p-set procedure, and, optionally, psychological factors
which narrow down the set of possibilities. As I’ve men-
tioned, this view is needed anyway in order to account for
particular contextual interests. But perhaps "psychological
di 1
factors" may be taken to include, in addition to contextual
factors, relatively context-independent factors which
determine a cognitively coherent set of alternatives.
Uf course, the nature of "cognitive categories" must
still be explicated. But that is not a task which can be
undertaken here.
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